Efficacy and understanding of the safety hierarchy of controls by Young, Stephen
i 
 
 
Efficacy and Understanding of 
the Safety Hierarchy of Controls 
Stephen A. Young 
Student number 30119409 
 
This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Federation University Australia 
 
School of Health Sciences and Psychology 
Faculty of Health 
Federation University Australia 
 
 
September 2017 
Principal Supervisor:  Associate Professor Jennifer Blitvich 
Co-Supervisor:  Associate Professor Derek Viner 
Associate Supervisor:  Dr Jeong ah Kim 
   
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Ngaire 
  
   
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
This document constitutes the submission of Stephen Young for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
at Federation University Australia. The submission is offered as a thesis by publication – 
representing a summary of the candidate’s research based around a number of already-published 
peer-reviewed papers, supported by additional analysis and commentary.  
The research project is entitled “Efficacy and Understanding of the Safety Hierarchy of Controls”. 
The key question posed in this thesis is stated as: 
“What constrains understanding of the efficacy of the safety hierarchy?”  
This question was broken down into three sub-questions, each of which is represented within this 
submission as Part One, Part Two, and Part Three respectively. The three questions are stated as: 
1. How may contemporary evidence demonstrate the efficacy of the safety hierarchy? 
2. What are the constraints on understanding the hazard vector as it relates to the safety 
hierarchy? 
3. What is the current understanding of hazard mitigation in a selected industry and how may 
the safety hierarchy be implemented to ameliorate a key hazard? 
The Introduction indicates the importance of the topic and explains the background to the concept 
known as the [safety] hierarchy of control, including a distinction between hazard and risk. It then 
undertakes a brief review of the development of twentieth century safety literature, including a 
consideration of how safety analysis has been split into the energy damage model and the 
anthropocentric model – complicated by a persistence of myth and superstition. An update of more 
recent safety literature in the twenty-first century and literature relating to governance decision 
making is also included. The intended contribution of this research project is laid out along with an 
explanation of how the thesis is organised. 
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Part One seeks to use contemporary evidence to demonstrate the efficacy of the safety hierarchy. 
This is primarily achieved by presenting two case studies predominantly focussed on a New Zealand 
aluminium smelter. The first paper, “From zero to hero: A case study of industrial injury reduction”, 
used the candidate’s earlier research documenting that company’s remarkable journey from a 
worksite with an unenviably high level of injuries to that of one of the safest industrial worksites in 
the world. It contextualised the research within the contemporary zero accident vision (ZAV) and 
considered the company’s use of the hierarchy of controls as a primary means of hazard 
intervention. This paper was published in Safety Science in 2014.  
A further study was conducted later in 2014 to qualitatively consider the effect on safety of the 
difficult economic times being experienced by the aluminium industry. This purposive critical case 
study revisited the New Zealand aluminium smelter to document the observations of safety 
managers as they sought to continue the company’s exemplary safety record in the face of financial 
duress. “Safety in hard times: A qualitative analysis of safety concerns in two industrial plants under 
financial duress” also included parallel observations of safety managers from an Australian 
aluminium rolling mill as it closed down in response to the same economic factors. The impact of 
lean management and the ongoing efficacy of hierarchy of controls methodology within both plants 
was documented and considered. This paper was published in Safety Science in 2018. 
Insofar as is possible using case studies, both papers demonstrated the efficacy of the hierarchy of 
control as an intervention methodology for ameliorating hazards in the workplace. 
Part Two seeks to consider the constraints on understanding the hazard vector as it relates to the 
hierarchy of controls. A focussed literature review entitled “The root cause fallacy” was conducted 
to better understand the uses of the word cause in philosophy, law, and science – as well as in the 
applied science of safety management. This paper highlighted the limitations of the concept of root 
cause as a safety intervention precept; thereby identifying a significant constraint on understanding 
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the hazard vector and the hierarchy of control. This is followed by a chapter deconstructing the 
most common version of the hierarchy of controls, pointing out how it could be made easier to 
understand and proposing a simplified version – more aligned to the underlying hazard vector.  This 
alignment has been successfully presented in a number a conferences including the proceedings of 
2014 Australian Systems Safety Conference; and ultimately, to the 15th World Congress on Public 
Health in 2017. 
Part Three applies the knowledge gained in Parts One and Two, and presents two studies 
investigating the fermentation industry to both understand the role of the hierarchy of controls in 
hazard mitigation and to illustrate how it can be more effectively implemented. The first paper took 
the potentially catastrophic hazard of asphyxiation from elevated levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) and 
demonstrated how the hierarchy of controls could be applied to more effectively control the 
hazard. The second paper surveyed the rapidly growing boutique beer industry in Victoria and 
Tasmania to understand how hazards were being managed, and the degree to which the hierarchy 
of controls was used to ameliorate the identified hazards. Together, these papers illustrated that 
application of the hierarchy of controls is largely conspicuous by its absence in the mitigation of 
hazards in a rapidly growing industry; while also demonstrating an effective hierarchal control that 
could evade an almost inevitable looming catastrophe. 
In conclusion, this thesis demonstrates the efficacy of the hierarchy of controls in Part One. In Part 
Two, it considers the linguistic origin of the word cause and consequently reconsiders the hazard 
vector insofar as it relates to the hierarchy of controls – incorporating these findings into a simpler 
and more easily understood hierarchy. Part Three provides a demonstration of how the hierarchy 
of controls can be applied to a difficult hazard in an emerging industry and also highlights the 
contemporary deficiencies in how that industry currently deals with the hazards they identify. 
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Finally, the key question “What constrains understanding of the efficacy of the safety hierarchy?” 
is addressed by summarising the three parts of this thesis and concluding: 
1. An assiduous application of the hierarchy of controls can prevent occupational injuries. 
2. The efficacy of the hierarchy of controls is constrained by the following factors: 
a. Over-complication of what is a simple concept; 
b. Misunderstanding of how hazard interventions may be used to prevent injury; 
c. Misunderstanding of the construct of cause as it relates to the hazard vector. 
3. Appropriate recognition of the relative significance of identified hazards is central to the 
understanding of the safety hierarchy. 
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Preamble 
In February 1985, I was working in my video production company in Dunedin, New Zealand, when 
the phone rang: “Can you make us a video about isolation tagging procedures?” “Of course”, I said 
– having no idea what language the person from New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited was 
speaking. I wrote a script from their current best practice (CBP) manual; then we drove the 240 
kilometres to the smelter and pretended we were not terrified by the molten metal, flames, noise, 
stories of electrocution, crush injuries, amputations… We shot the video, edited it back in our 
Dunedin studio, and sent them a video tape. 
We heard nothing for weeks. Finally, I called them to ask if there was anything wrong. “It’s a 
disaster!” they said. After a few minutes’ conversation, I discovered that they felt that the video 
was disturbingly accurate, for when it was viewed by the management group, a dispute broke out 
about why their staff shown on the video were not working according to their CBPs. “That’s not the 
way we do it!” they said. But the video did not lie – it was the way they did it: they just imagined 
they worked as per their best-practice safety manuals.  
This was my introduction to “safety” in a very hazardous workplace. Things are not always how we 
think they should be. Over the following quarter of a century I made scores of videos for the 
company and was privileged to participate in, and contribute to, a remarkable journey of learning 
how one of the most hazardous workplaces imaginable could become one of the safest workplaces 
in the industrial world. 
And now I’m trying to analyse and share the lessons learned.  
Stephen A. Young, July, 2017 
1 
 
Chapter One: Background to the study 
1.1   Importance of prevention of workplace injury and fatality in Australia 
From 2003 to 2015 (inclusive), 3,207 workers lost their lives in Australia in work-related incidents. 
Although the annual fatality rate for Australian workers has been decreasing over those 12 years, 
195 individuals lost their lives in 2015 as a result of the work they were undertaking (Safe Work 
Australia, 2017b). Every death represents an unimaginable tragedy for the family of the deceased 
person, for their fellow workers, and for their employer. Furthermore, those who suffer serious 
workplace injuries often have unanticipated and irrevocable physical and mental restraints imposed 
upon the remainder of their lives as a result of the injury. 
In addition to the moral and ethical outrage of workplace deaths or injuries as a result of people 
simply trying to earn a living, the economic costs to both the victims and the employers are 
significant. The typical unit cost for a workplace injury in Australia - averaged across all severity 
categories – can be calculated as $75,380; with the average cost for a workplace related illness 
calculated as $216,150 (Safe Work Australia, 2017a). Aside from ethical and reputational aspects of 
an organisation’s safety management, cost alone is clearly a major incentive for understanding how 
occupational injury and illness may be prevented. 
There is also a common law requirement in most Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) jurisdictions for employers to have an overarching duty of care for people 
who rely on others for their wellbeing. This important requirement is central to general workplace 
health and safety (WHS), and the associated legal duties inherent in professional competence (or 
lack thereof) (Fullbrook, 2007). As a general requirement, an employer has a duty of care to provide: 
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• a safe environment 
• safe equipment and tools, and 
• a safe method of work 
(Tshoose, 2011). 
Nonetheless, common law differs between jurisdictions (in nuance, if not in general principle). The 
subject matter and intent of this research project is primarily to examine the hierarchy of controls 
(HOC) as a means to prevent WHS injury – which also complies with, and at times over-reaches, the 
minimum requirements of the law. Therefore, an important concept in this thesis will be that the 
use of hierarchy of controls methodology should aspire to rise above the requirements of common 
law – not necessarily down to the basic legal requirement. 
If, by substantiating and elucidating the efficacy of the safety hierarchy of controls, fewer lives are 
devastated in the workplace, then this research project will have positively contributed to the 
legacy of occupational health and safety writing. 
 
1.2 The distinction between ‘hazard’ and ‘risk’ 
 
In order to precisely examine the hierarchy of controls as a means to prevent WHS injury, this study 
must examine the nature and relationship of the words ‘hazard’ and ‘risk’.  
The discussion surrounding the concept of risk is extensive and disputed (Aven, 2013); there is also 
a distinct variation in definitions for the word ‘risk’ (Aven, Renn, & Rosa, 2011). The Robens-based 
WHS legislation in Australian states and most British Commonwealth and similar countries makes a 
clear distinction between the words ‘hazard’ and ‘risk’. [See Section 9.1, p. 125 for an explanation 
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of the origin and nature of the Robens approach to WHS legislation.] Table 1, p. 4 quotes definitions 
of both words as they relate to their respective countries’ legislation and relevant guidelines. 
While the definitions of ‘hazard’ are very consistent, the literature offers an intriguing debate on 
the inconclusive nature of risk. Perhaps the most useful distinction between hazard and risk lies in 
the understanding that a hazard (or danger) is an ontological fact i.e. it is widely acknowledged that 
when the human body is subjected to a force greater than the body’s capacity to withstand that 
force, an injury (or harm or damage) will occur (see the definitions of ‘hazard’ in Table 1 on page 4). 
On the other hand, the perceived risk that the probability of the identified event resulting in such 
an injury is an epistemological construct (Aven & Renn, 2009). Writers such as Rosa (2010) and 
Merkelsen (2011) have debated the distinction between ontology and epistemology as they relate 
to hazard and risk, and a consensus of sorts (discussing 11 definitions of risk) was published in 2011 
(Aven et al., 2011). Nonetheless, Aven’s (2013) editorial in the Journal of Health, Risk, and Society 
concedes that “There is no consensus on the meaning of risk” (p. 117). 
Therefore, in order to best investigate the safety hierarchy, this research project will focus primarily 
on the efficacy of the hierarchy to control hazards rather than risk. As an ontological reality, the 
potential hazard can be taken as a certainty which may be controlled, whereas risk, as an 
epistemological construct, will vary according to the context and heuristics of the analyst’s 
perceptions.  In other words, the hazard vector (see Figure 2 on page 11) is regarded in this study 
as a demonstrable circumstance for which controls may be applied, whereas the risk is the analyst’s 
perception of the probability that that circumstance will occur. The intent of this study is therefore 
to examine the efficacy and understanding of the hierarchy of controls once the analyst has 
determined that the risk of an injurious event occurring is unacceptable and must be controlled. 
This primary emphasis on potential hazards as the focus of the hierarchy of controls represents a 
paradigm change for those who consider the nature of risk to be paramount in safety management. 
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Table 1. Definitions of ‘hazard’ and ‘risk’ in parallel Robens-based WHS legislative guidance. 
Country Hazard Risk Source 
United 
Kingdom 
“…something (e.g. an 
object, a property of a 
substance, a phenomenon 
or an activity) that can 
cause adverse effects.” 
“…the likelihood that a hazard will actually cause its adverse 
effects, together with a measure of the effect.” 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/theory/alarpglance.htm 
New 
Zealand 
“An activity, arrangement, 
circumstance, event, 
occurrence, phenomenon, 
process, situation or 
substance (whether arising 
or caused within or outside 
a place of work) that is an 
actual or potential cause or 
source of harm.” 
“…the probability and magnitude of harmful consequences 
arising from a hazard. The likelihood of a specified undesired 
event occurring within a specified period or in specified 
circumstances. The probability of harmful consequences arising 
from a hazard.” 
https://worksafe.govt.nz/the-toolshed/definitions-and-
acronyms/ 
Ireland “….a potential source of 
harm or adverse health 
effect on a person or 
persons.” 
“…the likelihood that a person may be harmed or suffers 
adverse health effects if exposed to a hazard.” 
http://www.hsa.ie/eng/Topics/Hazards/ 
Australia “…a situation or thing that 
has the potential to harm a 
person.” 
“…the possibility that harm (death, injury or illness) might occur 
when exposed to a hazard.” 
https://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/risk 
Canada “…any source of potential 
damage, harm or adverse 
health effects on something 
or someone.” 
“…the combination of the likelihood of the occurrence of a 
harm and the severity of that harm.” 
https://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/hsprograms/hazard_risk.html 
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1.3 A review of common safety-related words and their use in the thesis 
Many of the key words used in this thesis appear both in academic writing and in everyday 
workplace conversations. Therefore it is necessary to explain and define how many of the 
frequently used words are used within this research project. The following words can be assumed 
to have these associated meanings and/or usage/non-usage throughout this thesis. 
Accident 
During the 20th century, the word accident was frequently dismissed as an inadequate descriptor of 
workplace injury (Doege, 1978, 1999; Gibson, 1961; Haddon, 1970, 1973; Haddon, Suchman, & 
Klein, 1964; Heinrich, 1931; Langley, 1988; Robertson, 1992). For instance, Loimer and Guarnieri 
(1996) wrote that accidents have customarily been regarded as purely random events, 
communicating a mixture of ideas: injury, property loss, unexpected events, and unintended 
results. This culminated in the British Medical Journal recommending in 2001 that the use of the 
word accident in its publication should be banned (Davis & Pless, 2001). The editorial article 
admitted that the word would be difficult to purge from the general lexicon of safety practice and 
academic literature, but sought to lead the effort for a more accurate description of the phenomena 
leading to workplace injuries. 
Nonetheless, the word accident persists in most safety practitioners’ and the general public’s 
description of workplace (and other) injuries. This thesis contains manly quotes from both academic 
literature and qualitative research in which accident is used. It therefore acknowledges the common 
usage of the word, but, in its reflective text and general commentary, it avoids the use of the word 
where possible. 
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Cause 
Similarly, wherever possible, this thesis avoids the word cause in general discussion. The reasons 
for this are examined in Chapter 8 “The Root Cause Fallacy” which explains that the word cause has 
no precise definition in the analysis of occupational injury. As with the word accident above, it 
appears frequently in quotes from academic literature and from qualitative data, but is used 
sparingly in the body of this thesis.  
Hazard 
In discussing the hierarchy of control and its application to the industrial hygienist’s task of 
preventing injury from chemicals, Viner (2015) writes: “The industrial hygiene model is not very 
amenable to application in many other areas of Risk [sic], such as electricity, transport, chemical 
process plants and automated machinery, to name a few. For example how could one apply 
elimination or substitution to a petrochemical refinery? Nevertheless, the principle of preferring 
safe place controls to safe people controls can be applied to any area of Risk [sic]…” (p128). 
In order to study the hierarchy of controls exhaustively therefore, this thesis considers a hazard not 
as an energy source or body of mass that may be inherent in the work being undertaken, but as the 
potential for that energy source or body of mass to produce a force capable of injuring a person 
(see also injury below). Virtually all work is essentially a product of the application of energy, or 
more precisely, about the application of force (Newton’s second law: force = mass x acceleration). 
But the researcher argues that it is not the energy or the mass that creates the hazard per se, but 
the potential for a person to be exposed to a force (greater than the body’s capacity to withstand) 
which constitutes the hazard. In this way, the hierarchy of controls can indeed be used in any area 
of risk, as Viner indicates. 
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For instance, in the first published paper “From zero to hero”, automation was described as a key 
intervention contributing to the dramatic drop in injuries. The actual sources of energy – molten 
aluminium (potential burns) and one-tonne carbon blocks (potential crush injuries) etc. were not 
eliminated, but in many instances automation removed any possibility of the potential force 
connecting with people. Some might interpret this as isolation from the energy source or resulting 
force, although elimination could be argued where the automation is so self-contained (as was 
usually the case in the NZAS case study) that there was simply no possibility of anyone being 
subjected to the forces and consequently injured. In either identification, these interventions 
clearly represented the uppermost levels of the hierarchy of controls. 
Therefore, the researcher has used the following definition of the word hazard throughout the 
thesis: 
A hazard is that which has the potential to produce a force which, when applied to the human body, 
is greater than the body’s capacity to withstand that force. 
Mitigate 
In considering WHS interventions, the thesis often refers to “mitigation of hazards”. Mitigate may 
be defined as “make less severe, violent, or painful”. This word is used in the sense of an 
intervention either eliminating or reducing the hazard generally – therefore making the hazard less 
severe etc; it is not used in direct relation to any particular level of the hierarchy of controls. 
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Ameliorate 
 Similarly, the thesis sometimes refers to amelioration of hazards. Ameliorate may be defined as 
“make better”. Again, this is intended as referring to eliminating or reducing the hazard generally, 
not using a specific level of the hierarchy of controls. 
 
Injury (occupational) 
As with accident and cause, the word injury has a variety of meanings in WHS; or more accurately, 
it is often misconstrued through its various contributing components and acronyms. For instance: 
• there is sometimes confusion between the agent of the injury and the resulting pathological 
effect: e.g. a flame can burn a person, resulting in a burn injury 
• Injuries can be acute (occurring virtually instantly) or chronic – perhaps taking up to 40 years 
for the effect to be acknowledged e.g. asbestosis or noise-induced hearing loss  
• The common classifications of workplace injuries, and their propensity for 
misrepresentation are discussed throughout the thesis: lost-time injury (LTI), medical 
treatment injury (MTI), etc.  
• The severity of occupational injuries is also discussed several times using McDonald’s (1994) 
classification of Class I, II & III injuries (see Table 17, p. 193); and his simple definition of 
injury as damage (to the body). 
For the purpose of this thesis therefore, and in conjunction with the definition of hazard above, the 
word injury is defined in its simplest occupational and pathological sense: 
Injury is damage suffered by a person when a force applied to the person’s body is greater than the 
body’s capacity to withstand that force. 
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Hierarchy of controls and Safety hierarchy 
These terms are used interchangeably throughout the thesis, as they are in general WHS use. They 
are assumed the mean the same thing. 
Person(s) conducting a business or undertaking (PCBU) 
This term is used to include not only managers, but owners and instigators of the work being 
undertaken e.g. the directors, and by their representation, the shareholders (owners of the 
company) or stakeholders in an organisation. 
1.4  The background for the research project 
Once a hazard has been identified in the workplace, the hierarchy of controls (or safety hierarchy) 
generally recommends a prioritised series of control measures, of decreasing effectiveness, for 
mitigation of that hazard. The intent is to only progress to a lower level of mitigation when the 
completion of a higher level is impossible. A graphic representation of a common version of the 
safety hierarchy is shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. A common representation of the hierarchy of controls 
(The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2017) 
The safety hierarchy is ubiquitous in safety education, management, and safety theory; but it is only 
a theorem or scientific law in an ordinal sense. Safety hierarchies do not generally arise from a 
research base, but “rather they reflect the experience of safety professionals and safety 
organizations” (p.49) “…born out of consensus, not research…” (p.52) (Barnett & Brickman, 1986). 
There are many diverse, and potentially confusing versions of the safety hierarchy descriptions and 
procedures; a universally agreed hazard mitigation hierarchy is conspicuous by its absence. 
The hierarchy of controls appears to have arisen from the occupational hygiene profession where 
the hygienist’s observation of a three-stage transfer of energy – from the hazard source, across a 
pathway, to the “receiver” – concluded that controlling the hazard at source was the most effective 
safety control (Culvenor, 1997). This simple three-element concept is the basis for all safety 
hierarchies and is represented in Figure 2 as the hazard vector: transferal of energy from hazard to 
potential receiver. 
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Figure 2. The hazard vector: transferal of energy from the hazard to potential receiver. 
 
The earliest version of this approach appears to have come from Alice Hamilton’s 1929 book, 
Industrial Poisons in the United States (Behm & Powell, 2014; Culvenor, 1997). Hamilton “…laid 
down the principles of preventive medicine as applied to industry” (Gafafer, 1943, p.910).  As soon 
as the hierarchy of controls concept gained traction as a credible approach to occupational injury 
reduction in the 20th century, differing versions of the hierarchy appeared.  
Culvenor (1997) classified 19 versions from 1936 – 1994 using the following features:   
• Source reduction 
• Containment 
• Separation 
• Behaviour and worker protection 
• Post-event. 
Barnett and Brickman (1986) classified 39 versions from 1953 to 1984 using the following 
headings: 
• Eliminate danger 
• Safeguarding technology 
• Warn 
• Train 
• Guard person. 
Hazard source ReceiverHazard pathway 
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Gordon (1949), Gibson (1961), and particularly Haddon (1970, 1973), implicitly pointed to a safety 
hierarchy within their seminal papers. These publications may be regarded as the big bang in safety 
theory: they asserted that occupational injury could and should be prevented through a logical 
process of preventative measures. Haddon’s (1973) paper “Energy damage and the 10 
countermeasure strategies” is often regarded as the ultimate hierarchy for preventing injury. But 
an increased focus on safety culture and behaviour-based safety programs in the latter part of the 
20th century appears to have created some ambivalence about the most effective way forward 
among safety professionals. Without making any judgment about the relative efficacy of the 
differing approaches, Behm and Powell (2014) have noted a shift away from safety professionals’ 
interest in behaviour-based safety since the year 2000. Roelofs, Barbeau, and Ellenbecker (2003) 
noted that although industrial hygiene training and texts typically recommend that the hierarchy of 
controls should be followed, industrial hygienists rarely implement this strategy. This may be a 
result of a singular focus where hygienists concentrate only on the hazard and the personal 
protective equipment (PPE) that may protect the worker, at the expense of clearly identifying the 
source of the hazard. For instance, Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) noted that in incident reviews, 
“Causes precede effects, but effects are seen first and are used to predict their prior causes” (p.10); 
although Roelofs et al. (2003) note (perhaps more generously) that hygienists may be uncertain 
about the performance and safety of substitutes, or be unfamiliar with the process of investigating 
primary prevention strategies. Culvenor (1997) suggests that the “broadening” of the safety 
hierarchy from occupational hygiene into accident prevention “was stifled because the cause of the 
injury was unclear” (p.60). 
In any event, it is clear that the hierarchy of controls is simply not used in most circumstances where 
accident and incident reports identify a significant hazard requiring intervention. In a literature 
review of 92 peer-reviewed articles describing control or prevention strategies for chemical hazards 
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in actual workplaces, only 2 articles explicitly discussed the hierarchy of controls (Roelofs et al., 
2003). The paper concluded, “Despite their theoretical primacy, primary prevention strategies – 
those focusing on reduction of hazards at the source – are not commonly considered in practice…” 
(Roelofs et al., 2003, p.65). This apparent “blindness” to the application of the safety hierarchy is 
corroborated by Behm and Powell (2014) who reported that in 249 accident investigation reports 
from 7 U.S. organisations, 87.55% recommended administrative (lower order) controls as adequate 
for future protection from the relevant hazard. It appears that the safety hierarchy is largely an 
ideal that most safety professionals profess but few enact. 
The most commonly used version of the hierarchy of controls for hazard mitigation uses six tiers 
(see also Figure 1, p.10): 
1. Elimination  
2. Substitution 
3. Isolation 
4. Engineering  
5. Administration  
6. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
 
The “hierarchy of risk control” advocated by Safe Work Australia incorporates these six tiers in three 
levels of control (Safe Work Australia, 2016). This model is reproduced as Figure 3 on page 14. 
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Figure 3. The hierarchy of risk control – Safe Work Australia. 
(Reproduced from https://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/risk#the-hierarchy-of-risk-control 
“Identify, Assess, and Control Hazards”) 
 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) in the U.S.A., in setting a research 
agenda entitled “Control of Workplace Hazards for the 21st Century”, called for “an ordered 
effectiveness hierarchy of elements for prevention of overexposure of workers to hazardous 
agents” (Roelofs, 2007, p.6). NIOSH’s hierarchy of controls solutions in order of preference are: 
1. First, prevent or contain hazardous workplace emissions at their source 
2. Next, remove the emission from the pathway and the worker 
3. Last, control the exposure of the worker with barriers between the worker and the 
hazardous work environment.  
(Roelofs, 2007 , p.25) 
Nonetheless, the Z10 standard, introduced in 2005 in the U.S.A., consisted of seven stages of 
control:  adding Warnings to the commonly accepted hierarchy (Palassis, Schulte, & Geraci, 2006): 
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1. Elimination  
2. Substitution  
3. Isolation  
4. Engineering  
5. Warnings 
6. Administration  
7. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) 
The multiplicity of hierarchy versions may have led to confusion in workplace hazard mitigation, 
and ultimately, to a constraint on mitigation efficacy. Behm and Powell (2014) even suggest that “a 
continuing focus on lower-order controls… may explain the decline in accident frequency rate 
without a similar decline in severity rates” (p.3).  
Some papers such as Lingard et al. (2015) provide some “preliminary  empirical evidence” (p. 121) 
of the efficacy of the hierarchy of control in the construction industry when applied earlier in the 
timeline of the construction project, rather than at a later stage. Other papers however, reveal only 
limited understanding of the hierarchy itself. For instance, some refer to the safety hierarchy in 
their introduction or to contextualise the issue they are discussing, then fail to integrate it into their 
research or discussion. See for instance, Hunt-Sturman and Jackson (2009), Kaminski (2001), or 
Laughrey and Vaubel (1998). Others provide an inadequate description of higher level controls. See 
for instance, Knudson (2013): the “Hazard Elimination” section makes no mention of any possibility 
of elimination nor even why elimination may not be possible. 
This disturbing lack of understanding may contribute to a perceived lack of efficacy of workplace 
safety interventions in general. Unevaluated interventions may result in wasted resources, have no 
discernable effect, or produce more harm than good (Shannon, Robson, & Guastello, 1999). Roelofs 
et al. (2003) note that, “Little is known about the extent of use of prevention and control strategies 
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in actual workplaces…” (p.62); this gap in safety knowledge presents the opportunity for this 
research project. 
This research project acknowledges the singularity of purpose behind the many versions of the 
hierarchy, but also seeks to examine its efficacy in selected industries, and its understanding by 
safety practitioners.  Before doing so, this introduction continues with a brief overview of the 
relevant literature in order to contextualise the themes of the research. A more focussed and 
detailed literature review appears in Chapter Eight. 
 
1.5 Brief overview of relevant literature 
1.5.1 Context for the proposed research study 
The literature surrounding injury to people working in their respective occupations is extensive. 
There are currently almost 50 peer-reviewed journals dedicated to occupational health and safety 
(Li & Hale, 2015). Accident causation and prevention literature draws from a range of disciplines 
including those as disparate as engineering and psychology, and its conclusions are often 
contradictory. In addition, longitudinal studies of alternative approaches to safety are ethically 
problematic and therefore rare. Few corporate case studies on safety exist – perhaps for reasons 
of confidentiality and protection of company reputations. 
This overview of safety literature provides a brief history of the seminal papers and books that 
influenced occupational safety research leading up to the 21st century. It then provides a short 
summary of safety literature in the 21st century to date, and a brief consideration on literature 
relating to safety governance.  
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1.5.2  A brief history of 20th century occupational safety literature 
Popular interpretation of injury causation has been driven historically by superstition, concepts of 
atonement, retribution, and divine punishment (Guarnieri, 1992; Haddon, 1973). The word accident 
has been universally applied to unexpected events involving injury, using ideas concerning property 
loss, unexpected events, blame and unintended results (Guarnieri, 1992; Loimer & Guarnieri, 1996). 
In the latter part of the 20th century, the word accident was determined to be inadequate to 
describe the complexity of workplace health and safety events (Doege, 1978, 1999; Gibson, 1961; 
Gordon, 1949; Haddon, 1968, 1973; Heinrich, 1931; Robertson, 1992). Haddon (1968) wrote, “The 
notion of an accident is descriptive, not etiologic” (p.1433); while Gibson (1961) pointed out that if 
an accident is defined as unpredictable, it is by definition, uncontrollable. The emerging application 
of scientific method to control occupational injury required a more professional approach. 
Throughout the 20th century, theories of workplace injury aetiology were developed by drawing 
from the scientific disciplines of physics and behavioural psychology in particular. The resulting 
explanations of industrial injury became polarised towards two viewpoints: the energy-exchange 
approach which attributes damage and injury to an unintended exchange of energy, represented 
by writers such as Haddon and Robertson; and the human-error/anthropocentric approach which 
attributes damage and injury to perceived lapses in workers’ behaviour, represented by writers 
such as Heinrich, Rasmussen, and Reason. This dichotomy of theoretical approach to accident 
aetiology, highlighting the most influential writers in each approach, is represented in Figure 4 on 
page18. 
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Figure 4. The industrial safety dichotomy in literature (Young, 2013). 
 
 
The persistence of fatalism and supernaturalism (magic, myth and superstition) in workers’ 
interpretation of workplace injury complicates this theoretical dichotomy. Together, these three 
streams: (i) Energy exchange approach; (ii) Magic, myth & superstition; and (iii) Human 
error/anthropocentric approach of industrial injury understanding; represent a fragmentation of 
theory and belief resulting in considerable confusion in the workplace. 
The energy exchange approach 
The energy exchange approach considered occupational injury simply as a matter of Newtonian 
physics. During World War II, the mechanics of survivability of falls was investigated and evidence 
was established of the significant increase in safety provided by design (De Haven, 1942). Gordon 
(1949) identified that, although deaths from communicable disease had been falling for more than 
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100 years in response to public health initiatives, death rates from accidents and criminal violence 
remained at 1900 levels. He proposed that in parallel with a bacterium causing a disease in a host, 
injury is a combination of factors relating to at least three sources: the host, the agent, and the 
environment in which the agent and the host find themselves. He concluded that the same 
principles hitherto applied to eliminating or decreasing community disease – that is, prevention of 
the agent, (manifested in the workplace as force) – could work equally well for eliminating or 
decreasing injuries (Gordon, 1949). These writers demonstrated that comprehensive taxonomies, 
examined to determine the agent of injury – the force – were as essential for industrial safety as 
they were for public health. Building on the taxonomic approach, Haddon (1980) linked 
epidemiology, energy exchange, damage, injury, and specified techniques or strategies for 
managing energy sources for reducing injuries (Haddon, 1970, 1973). In Australia, Viner (2013, 
2015) continued and strengthened the case for focusing on the energy damage model. The energy 
damage model is examined in more detail in Chapter Nine, Section 9.11, pp. 140-142. 
 
The anthropocentric approach 
The anthropocentric approach treated occupational injury as a product of human behaviour. An 
increasing awareness of occupational injury in the nineteenth century, the rising popularity of 
psychiatry as a tool for behaviour change, and the increasing focus on workers as being responsible 
for their own safety pervaded early analysis of workplace health and safety injury aetiology 
(Guarnieri, 1992; Hale, 2014). Many of these anthropocentric concepts were formalised in 
Heinrich’s influential work Industrial Accident Prevention (Heinrich, 1931). This book dominated 
safety thinking for the remainder of the 20th century and promoted the idea of the worker as the 
cause of 88% of WHS injuries (Heinrich, 1931). Although this view still pervades much of safety 
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thinking, Heinrich’s data and conclusions insofar as they relate to human error have more recently 
been discredited (Manuele, 2011). 
Nevertheless, behavioural scientists such as Reason and Rasmussen continued to investigate the 
field of human error in the latter part of the 20th century (Rasmussen, 1982, 1999; Rasmussen, 
Duncan, & Leplat, 1987; Rasmussen & Jensen, 1974; Reason, 1990); although it can be noted that 
both Reason and Rasmussen turned more to the concept of organisational, (or latent, or systemic) 
error around the turn of the century (Rasmussen, 2003; Reason, Hollnagel, & Paries, 2006). 
1.5.3   A 21st century update 
In recent decades, there has been an acknowledgement that occupational accidents are 
controllable and that those who allocate resources for work must become more accountable for 
safety. The OECD, and increasingly, developing nations, have high expectations that governments 
and corporations should ensure the protection of working people (Reason, Hollnagel, & Paries, 
2006). Communities are also beginning to reject the fatalistic notion that “accidents happen”, or 
that a working life will always be vulnerable to chronic wear and tear and acute trauma (Roberts & 
Robert, 2001). People increasingly expect that their working life will be remunerated without 
compromise to their health and wellbeing (James, 1987). Further, there has been a call for more 
diverse and sophisticated models of workplace safety (Dien, Dechy, & Guillaume, 2012; Le Coze, 
2013). In particular, there an increasing focus on the aetiology of WHS injury. The author’s literature 
review “The Root Cause Fallacy” will investigate the literature surrounding this in more detail in 
Chapter Eight. 
1.5.4  Safety literature relating to safety governance 
The design and assessment of theoretical frameworks for organisational safety is limited 
(Goldenhar, LaMontagne, Katz, Heaney, & Landsbergis, 2001; Robson, Shannon, Goldenhar, & Hale, 
2001; Shannon et al., 1999; Zwerling et al., 1997). The review by Goldenhar et al. (2001) of 36 
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occupational health and safety intervention studies concluded that more reliable and valid data 
were needed before definitive recommendations could be made for effective intervention. Many 
models of safety have nonetheless been introduced as exemplars of incident investigation and 
intervention over the past 30 years. Safety practitioners are often confused as to which they should 
use and why (Underwood & Waterson, 2013). Rather than elevating one model above all others, Le 
Coze (2013) suggests there is room for alternative models based on complementary insights from 
several areas of study – not to replace the existing models but to “sensitise phenomena differently, 
to open up new interpretations but also help to guide more precisely, or more analytically, than 
was previously the case, where and what to look at” (p.209).  
Despite the ubiquitous nature of the hierarchy of controls in the safety community, there has been 
minimal exploration this century into how this concept may contribute to significant reduction of 
workplace injury. 
 
1.6  Contribution to the literature and to workplace governance intended by this research 
project 
This research project is comprised of a series of peer reviewed publications supplemented by 
additional material for further examination and analysis. The research approach, described in 
Section 1.7, outlines three stages of investigation and induction, intended to contribute to the 
literature on the efficacy and understanding of safety interventions in the following way: 
1. Part One will seek to map high levels of safety performance to the use of the safety hierarchy 
of controls.  
2. Part Two will explore non-deterministic models of intervention with the intent of identifying 
possible “roadblocks” to general understanding of the safety hierarchy. 
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3. Part Three will analyse a selected industry to ascertain their level of understanding of hazard 
mitigation; and provide an exemplar of effective use of the safety hierarchy.  
 
Upon peer-review acceptance of the critical papers, the project may make a significant contribution 
to occupational injury reduction by providing the basis for pragmatic and effective decision-making 
for boards of directors, chief executives, and safety managers. Implementation of the concepts and 
models developed through this study and described in the included papers may advance 
organisations’ abilities to make logical and transparent investment decisions for safety. The intent 
to clarify and strengthen understanding of the safety hierarchy may significantly aid organisational 
governing bodies in their workplace safety practices. The researcher sees this critical examination 
as an important ongoing research field for the Victorian Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(VIOSH) graduate students, and for safety research generally. 
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1.7  Organisation of the research and the research questions 
Currently available literature may be of limited value to organisational boards and chief executives 
as typically they may not have the necessary background for full comprehension of the underlying 
hierarchal principles. Safety theory and associated commentary abounds, but limited accessible 
methodology exists for making optimal safety intervention choices at governance level. In their 
review of measurement and reporting of work health and safety performance, Safe Work Australia 
suggested that “…significant potential exists for collaborative efforts of the work health and safety 
and accounting professions to develop, test and validate novel performance measures and 
indicators for work health and safety management control systems” (O'Neill, Martinov-Bennie, 
Cheung, & Wolfe, 2013, p.26). In particular, they call for “new, effective approaches for monitoring 
and managing work health and safety performance” (O'Neill et al., 2013, p.5).  It is proposed that 
this research project will contribute to credible and appropriate bases upon which health and safety 
governors may meet this call. 
Given the simplicity of the hierarchy of controls concept, its self-evident logic and its almost 
universal acceptance, the project therefore poses the key research question:  
“What constrains understanding of the efficacy of the safety hierarchy?”  
In order to answer this vital but nebulous question, the three parts of the investigation will each 
pose a more specific sub-question. The papers in each part are intended to provide answers to the 
respective question. The three questions – constituting the three parts of this research project – 
are stated thus: 
1. How may contemporary evidence demonstrate the efficacy of the safety hierarchy? 
2. What are the constraints on understanding the hazard vector as it relates to the safety 
hierarchy? 
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3. What is the current understanding of hazard mitigation in a selected industry and how 
may the safety hierarchy be implemented to ameliorate a key hazard? 
The combined papers and discussion included in Parts One, Two, and Three are submitted as 
answers to the questions posed. The papers are framed in each part with a chapter offering 
introductory comment on why the papers were written (and how they intend to contribute to the 
particular question), and a summarising chapter drawing the findings together in a retrospective 
commentary. 
The conclusion considers the three questions and the research submitted, in order to answer the 
key question, “What constrains understanding of the efficacy of the safety hierarchy?” It also 
provides a practical outline of the issue, intended ultimately for both publication and usable 
dissemination to organisational governors such as boards of directors, chief executives, advisors, 
and regulators.  
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Chapter Two:  Contextualising an industrial case study within the zero 
accident vision (ZAV) 
 
The candidate’s professional and research background is closely associated with a New Zealand 
aluminium smelter. That company’s transition from an especially hazardous environment with 
many serious occupational injuries into an exemplar of safety practice for heavy industry around 
the world was recorded in the candidate’s Master of Health Science thesis (Young, 2013). The 
aluminium smelter has had fewer than 10 injuries, all relatively minor, per annum in each year since 
2000, while other similar smelters continued to experience serious acute injuries and chronic 
disease. The Master’s thesis concluded with the sentence “Their relative success should be 
recognised and emulated wherever possible” (Young, 2013, p.141).  
 
In considering this concluding sentence, the author extended this work to produce two papers that 
may allow organisations to understand the decision-making paradigms that have delineated the 
New Zealand smelter’s approach to safety. The two papers constituting Part One will seek to: 
 
1. Contextualise the New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited’s (NZAS) relentless drive to 
effectively implement higher order controls within the contemporary zero accident vision 
(ZAV), and  
2. Qualitatively investigate whether the ZAV is sustainable, even in circumstances of financial 
duress, or when organisations are faced with staff redundancies and low morale.  
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If the ZAV can be described as sustainable over an extended period of time and under harsh financial 
conditions, other organisations’ customary expectations that WHS injuries are inevitable in a highly 
hazardous environment will be challenged. The establishment of a highly aspirational baseline for 
WHS will seek to underpin the author’s assertion of the effectiveness of the safety hierarchy 
methodology and thereby address the question, “How may contemporary evidence demonstrate 
the efficacy of the safety hierarchy?” 
 
Meaningful progress towards the absolute prevention of occupational fatalities and injuries – the 
zero accident vision – is critically important: 178 Australians were killed in their workplace in 2016 
(Safe Work Australia, 2017b). Australia has a national strategy to reduce worker fatalities by 20% 
by 2022 (from a 2012 baseline) (Safe Work Australia, 2014); but regardless of welcome 
improvements in Australia’s safety record, any fatality or significant injury in a workplace is morally 
indefensible. Commercial organisations, their shareholders and other stakeholders have no wish to 
injure their workforce or anyone else, but there is sometimes a perceived conflict between 
increased profitability and increased safety. Furthermore, “safety” represents a value judgement 
and many organisations tend to benchmark their safety performance against the performance of 
other similar organisations – thereby tacitly accepting avoidable injuries. 
Some organisations nevertheless do hold highly aspirational goals – embracing the zero accident 
vision, but their leaders often have little idea of how to achieve those goals. Aside from the moral 
imperative to reduce injuries, governors of organisations are also becoming increasingly 
accountable for the safety and health of their workforce – facing significant penalties for non-
compliance with WHS law. 
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The penultimate section of the author’s Master’s thesis also stated “…other industrial plants must 
acknowledge that hazards are more readily ameliorated by long-term persistence with hierarchy of 
controls methodology for injury prevention” (Young, 2013 p. 140). The hierarchy of controls in WHS 
has received very little evidence-based examination in the literature. Practitioners and consultants 
alike profess its efficacy in the workplace but give little pragmatic consideration to how it may be 
integrated into organisational policy and investment. 
The first paper in Part One reviews the literature on the zero accident vision, and contextualises a 
case study on a New Zealand smelter accordingly. Existing literature on the efficacy of safety 
intervention and goal theory was compared to the case study’s results, concluding with a 
demonstrated model of aspirational safety. 
The paper “From Zero to Hero” responded to a call for more scientific evidence to support the 
efficacy of the ZAV [see Zwetsloot et al. (2013)]. The originating research conducted by the 
researcher in 2012 described the exemplary safety practices of a high-achieving workplace but did 
not contextualise it within the common contemporary understanding of the ZAV. The paper 
included as Chapter Three links the original data to the contemporary concept of the ZAV. 
“From Zero to Hero” was published in Safety Science (64) 2014 pp.99-108 and is also included (as 
printed in Safety Science) as “Appendix B”. 
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Chapter Three:  From Zero to Hero: A case study of industrial injury 
reduction: New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited 
Abstract 
 
There is a need to pursue more evidence to support the zero accident vision (ZAV). New Zealand 
Aluminium Smelters Limited (NZAS) has been operating under a ZAV for more than two decades 
and now consistently has fewer than ten lost-time injuries (LTI) per annum. Although the ZAV has 
not been fully realised, NZAS is now one of the safest heavy industrial worksites in the world. This 
mixed method case study substantiates the significant reduction in LTIs and describes the 
interventions used to achieve the improvement. The interventions are rated using a hazard 
intervention effectiveness matrix and by contextualising their apparent efficacy within the available 
literature. The NZAS ZAV achievement is further analysed using goal theory. The study concludes 
by attributing NZAS’ relative success to an assiduous application of hierarchy of controls 
methodology with a particularly strong ergonomic focus. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The zero accident vision (ZAV) has become widespread among companies around the world as they 
seek to protect their employees from work-related harm (Hinze & Wilson, 2000; Mohamed, 1999; 
Van Scyoc, 2008). Some writers, however, question the unwavering belief in the attainability of 
absolute safety as a distraction from achieving realisable safety goals (Reason, 2000), while others 
point to a need to pursue more scientific evidence to support the efficacy of the ZAV (Zwetsloot et 
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al., 2013). This paper describes a case study into a ZAV in a hazardous industrial plant through 
substantiation of the injury reduction and a description of the interventions used. 
 
New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (NZAS) has been named as the safest aluminium smelter 
of its class in the world (New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited, 2007). It is unusual for a New 
Zealand company to be recognised internationally for its safety record. New Zealand’s workplace 
injury rates are twice those of Australia and almost six times those of the United Kingdom 
(Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, 2012). NZAS’ reputation as a relatively 
safe workplace is especially surprising considering the potentially hazardous nature of the process 
of smelting aluminium. As an indication for the potential for injury to aluminium smelter workers, 
a study analysing accidents at an Indian smelter, with approximately 2100 employees, similar in 
both size and production methodology to NZAS, reported a total of 465 lost-time injury (LTI) 
accidents, including 5 fatalities, between January 1989 and December 1991 (Das & Chaudhury, 
1995). Over the same period, with a workforce of approximately 1700 people, NZAS recorded 116 
lost-time injuries and no fatalities. In the 11 years since 2000, no fatalities have been recorded at 
NZAS, and lost-time injuries have been confined annually to single figures. 
 
NZAS’ ZAV was introduced in 1990 with the slogan “Our Goal is Zero”. In November 2010, a full 
twelve months was completed with zero LTIs – although one LTI at the end of 2010 meant that the 
goal was not completed for a full calendar year. Nevertheless, in such a hazardous industry, this 
represents a significant result. The apparent superiority of NZAS’ safety record over that of other 
smelters internationally, operating in a country with a relatively high workplace injury rate, is 
therefore worthy of investigation. If the improving safety record of NZAS can be substantiated and 
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described, then others may be able to learn from this success and prevent serious injuries in their 
respective workplaces. 
3.2   Methods 
 
To explain NZAS’ ZAV, a research project was undertaken in 2012 comprising a mixed method case 
study, with a pragmatic worldview, using a concurrent strategy of inductive enquiry (Young, 2013).  
 
The quantitative component of the study interrogated NZAS LTI data over the years 1972-2011. The 
data were retrospectively reconciled to 2011 definitions of LTI by incorporating LTIs recorded by 
contractors and visitors, and by including restricted work duties (RWD) previously omitted from 
LTIs. Where data were missing or uncertain (particularly in the early years of the study data), 
interpolations and estimations were performed, based on relevant data or ratios drawn from 
adjacent years. In these cases, sensitivity tests were completed to gauge what effect a 50% 
overestimation or underestimation of the relevant data would have on the resulting lost-time injury 
frequency rate (LTIFR). The data were tabulated and a regression analysis calculated. 
 
The qualitative enquiry employed semi-structured interviews seeking responses to open questions. 
Interviews were conducted with 23 NZAS employees across a broad range of organisational levels, 
operating departments, and ages, and included both male and female workers. A deliberate bias 
towards members of the “25-year club” (those who had worked at NZAS for more than 25 years) 
was exercised in order to explore changes in the worksite throughout the course of those 
employees’ working lives. 
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The transcript from the interviews was coded according to themes emerging from the participants’ 
responses. Quotes identified as being rich in detail and contextual meaning were highlighted 
(Patton, 2002). Upon completion of transcription and coding, the data set was considered to have 
reached saturation, since nothing new was emerging and replication and redundancy of dialogue 
were strengthening, but not expanding, the identified themes (Bowen, 2008). An inductive analysis 
was developed interpreting the participants’ statements insofar as they related to the research 
project’s two objectives of (1) substantiating the fall in the LTIFR and (2) describing the interventions 
associated with the LTIFR reduction. The themes identified were each categorised initially as 
intervention or outcome according to their role in safety at NZAS.  
 
It was recognised that not all themes classified as interventions could be considered as direct safety 
interventions. The themes initially identified as interventions were therefore further classified into 
three categories: enablers, moderators, and interventions. An enabler was defined as a critical 
element required for the identified interventions to be established; a moderator was defined as a 
contextual condition which may influence the success or failure of the intervention process; an 
intervention was defined as a specific programme introduced with the intention of effecting change 
and contributing significantly to the achievement of the goal. While the study did not set out to 
conclusively establish the relative efficacy of the four identified interventions, the description of 
each intervention was enriched through a consideration of the interactive relationship between the 
enablers, moderators, interventions, and the ultimate goal. The interventions were also rated using 
a hazard intervention effectiveness matrix and evaluation criteria based on the available literature. 
Finally, goal theory literature was used to describe the successful application of the ZAV at NZAS. 
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3.3   What did the numbers say? The quantitative enquiry 
 
The LTIFR data set was represented in graphical form, with an overlaid trend line, as shown in Figure 
5. The regression coefficient represented by the trend line was found to be statistically significant 
(R2 = 63%, p<0.001).  
 
 
Figure 5. NZAS lost-time injury frequency rate (LTIFR), for the period 1972-2011. 
 
An additional and more unusual analysis was also performed. Since the annual output of the smelter 
had increased more than threefold over the period of the study, the LTIs could have been presumed 
to have increased in relation to total product output – all other factors being equal.  The productivity 
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LTIFR or LTIFR/tonne was therefore also represented in graphical form. This resulted in an even 
more significant negative trend, as represented in Figure 6. The regression coefficient represented 
by the trend line was also found to be statistically significant (R2 = 64%, p<0.001). 
 
 
Figure 6. NZAS lost-time injury frequency rate/ tonne for the period 1972-2011. 
 
The extremely low p-value in both graphs indicated the robustness of the observed decline in LTIFR 
and LTIFR/tonne, confirming that the decline in lost-time injuries and the trend for this decline was 
statistically significant.  
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3.4   What did the NZAS people say? The qualitative enquiry 
 
An underlying caution for all LTIFR investigations must be that LTIs can be misrepresented in a 
myriad of ways. An LTI measurement system has inherent potential for manipulation through 
under-reporting (Oleinick, 1993; Probst, 2008). The association of LTIs with remuneration, either in 
injury compensation levies or in bonus reward systems, has also been shown to distort the accuracy 
of the LTI measurement (Robertson & Keeve, 1983). Furthermore, there has been a call for a 
movement away from LTI towards the development of positive performance indicators (PPI) (Coyle, 
Sleeman, & Adams, 1995; Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Stiller, Depczynski, Fragar, & 
Franklin, 2008). 
The qualitative interviews, therefore, probed for evidence of such misrepresentation in order to 
substantiate or dispel the apparent empirical fall in LTIs. The respondents appeared very familiar 
with the possibility of LTI underreporting and the means by which this may be carried out by 
organisations. Importantly, even the most sceptical respondents were confident in the quality and 
reliability of the LTI records … 
“I don't know if an LTI would go unreported… it is part of your employment here, so if you are caught 
not reporting something that's reasonably serious – it probably would cost you your job… everybody 
here knows that. Second of all, I guess the nature of an LTI – you know if you’ve got a broken leg, it’s 
bloody hard to hide the fact that you’ve got a broken leg.” [respondent 21] 
“…people say, “Oh, it’s only the reporting that’s making the difference”, but it’s not – you’re either 
injuring people or you’re not, and we’re not.” [respondent 2] 
The respondents were encouraged to speak openly about safety related changes they had seen 
over their time at NZAS, and to describe the interventions they believed had made a difference. 
After transcription and coding in accordance with the methodology above, the study distinguished 
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four enablers, four moderators, and four interventions, and one outcome. These are represented 
in Table 2. 
Table 2. NZAS enablers, moderators, interventions and outcome. 
Enablers Leadership Total quality 
management 
Ownership and 
governance 
Employment 
Contracts Act 
("Employment 
Contracts Act," 
1991)  
Moderators Ergonomic 
focus 
Work 
organisation 
Culture Individual 
behaviour 
Interventions Automation Proprietary 
interventions 
Personal 
Protective 
Equipment 
(PPE) 
Incident 
analysis 
 
Outcome  
Lost-time Injuries “Our Goal is Zero”  
 
 
The four enablers were identified as: 
• Leadership – as well as the initial impetus to begin the quest for reduced injuries on site, 
leadership at all levels set directions such as the ergonomic focus, changes in work 
organisation and individual behaviour; and also had a high level of input into automation 
decisions and incident investigation accountability. 
• Total quality management (TQM) – the cycle of improvement methodology underpinned 
the relentless incident investigation methodology, identified as a key intervention. 
• Ownership and governance – commissioning and enabling automation required significant 
capital and will to initiate and perpetuate. 
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• The Employment Contracts Act ("Employment Contracts Act," 1991) – this New Zealand 
legislation enabled (inter alia) the reorganisation of work practices and allowed leaders 
more flexibility to introduce goal-oriented interventions. 
Four moderators were also identified: 
• Ergonomic focus – a directive that appeared to have had a major pervasive effect on choice 
of interventions: automation, PPE, and an emphasis on plant and work conditions in the 
incident investigation methodology. 
• Work organisation – a flexibility that facilitated the incident investigation process in 
particular. 
• Culture – the pervading attitude to safety by NZAS employees as it related to individual 
behaviour and proprietary interventions. 
• Individual behaviour – also a significant consideration in self-efficacy and its effect on 
proprietary interventions. 
Four interventions were identified: 
• Automation – the process of eliminating or isolating hazards through engineering. 
• Proprietary behavioural interventions – programmes intended to alter behaviour in the 
workplace. 
• PPE – used primarily to isolate the hazard from the worker. 
• Cycle of improvement incident investigation – the cyclical process of constant improvement 
based on analysis of historical incidents. 
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Figure 7 highlights the relationship between the enablers, moderators, interventions, and the 
ultimate goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Relationship between the enablers, moderators, interventions, and the ultimate goal. 
 
The primary focus of Figure 7 is to illustrate the direct effect of the interventions on the goal (dark 
arrows), and the contributory effect of the enablers and moderators on those interventions (white 
arrows). A simple figure showing the four interventions affecting the goal would only partially 
indicate their efficacy. For example, in examining the automation intervention, plant upgrades were 
directly enabled by NZAS owners and its leadership; however, this leadership was also moderated 
by an ergonomic focus, prioritising eliminating or isolating hazards through automation. 
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Some relationships work in both directions. For example, the cycle of improvement incident 
investigation process, while moderated by an ergonomic focus, also recommends specifications for 
PPE and automation, and “cycles upwards” to make recommendations for work organisation, 
individual behaviour, and leadership. Despite the complexity of these relationships, it is important 
to distinguish the interventions from the enablers and the moderators. It is the interventions that 
have the direct effect on the ultimate goal. Enablers and moderators on the other hand, do not 
have a direct effect on the goal, but do influence the success (or otherwise) of the interventions 
through facilitation (enablers), or influencing their efficacy (moderators). 
3.5   The four interventions 
Having identified the four interventions implemented by NZAS in pursuit of a ZAV (“Our Goal is 
Zero”), the study then used the qualitative evidence to describe the characteristics of each with 
reference to the available literature.  
3.5.1  Automation 
Interview participants overwhelmingly identified automation of the smelter over its 40 years of 
operation as the most important reason for the decrease in acute injuries. Logically, it follows that 
if a hazard is removed through automation, then it ceases to be a hazard. This is entirely consistent 
with the requirement of New Zealand’s Health and Safety in Employment Act ("Health and Safety 
in Employment Act," 1992) and other OECD countries’ safety legislation. They all prescribe the 
elimination of hazards in the first instance. The overarching legislation and the ongoing programme 
of automation at NZAS are clear applications of the hierarchy of controls methodology of hazard 
mitigation.  It is important that automation is regarded as an intervention, for while some may see 
a worksite as a static model and interventions as mere manipulations of the existing plant and 
workforce, elimination of the actual source of the hazard must always be the first consideration. 
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Ellenbecker (1996) points out that considering a hazard as a product of a static worksite and 
therefore difficult to alter, is a mistake. Productivity, return on investment, feasibility, pragmatism, 
and social outcomes may all feature in any decision to automate, but when safety is prioritised, 
hazard elimination by replacing people’s exposure to that hazard through automation is the 
ultimate intervention.  
Flin and Yule's (2004) review of industrial safety literature for leadership research summarises two 
leadership models: transformational and transactional leadership. Both models appear to be highly 
characteristic of NZAS leadership. Transformational leaders provide inspiration, question 
assumptions, and encourage others to approach problems from many different angles (Flin & Yule, 
2004). The initial drive for safety at NZAS originated from a 1980s General Manager (GM) who 
demonstrated transformational leadership by refusing to accept the inevitability of injuries on site. 
Successive GMs have continued the transformational style, introducing the ambitious goal of zero 
injuries on site, and intiating interventions to achieve that goal.  
The enablers necessary to initiate automation at NZAS were identified as ownership/governance, 
and leadership. Successive owners have provided the resources necessary to enable significant 
plant upgrades; while leaders from the 1980s until the present have provided transformational 
leadership, enabling the application of resources towards goal-oriented interventions. Ongoing 
GMs have also been the conduit between worksite identification of the need for automation and 
the investment of resources from the owners. The key moderator for this leadership conduit was 
seen as the ergonomic focus on safety that pervaded the smelter throughout the late 1980s and 
the 1990s. This ergonomic focus may have originated in the transformational leadership 
characteristic of approaching problems from many different angles (Flin & Yule, 2004). This 
characteristic also echoes the need to consider the multifactorial nature of a complex industrial site 
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from all perspectives when assessing the efficacy of interventions (Goldenhar & Shulte, 1994; 
Zwerling et al., 1997). 
In preference to the former blaming of individuals’ actions for safety breaches, management moved 
to address the plant and environmental conditions perceived to have made the injury possible. The 
Haddon (1980) concept of linking epidemiology, energy exchange, and injury was introduced to 
NZAS by Australian consultants, followed by the introduction of the National Occupational Safety 
Association (South Africa) (NOSA) equipment rating system in the 2000s. Acceptance of an 
ergonomic rather than an egocentric focus for injury aetiology by a succession of GMs from the late 
1980s onwards appears to have intensified the automation intervention as a means of eliminating 
hazards. 
3.5.2 Personal protective equipment (PPE) 
Similarly, the NZAS identification of isolating PPE as equivalent to any other means of hazard 
isolation manifests the ergonomic rather than egocentric focus of NZAS leadership. The high levels 
of isolating PPE specification and compliance requirements reflect a transformational leadership 
(enabler) moderated by an ergonomic rather than egocentric outlook. While PPE is generally 
regarded as a means for hazard minimisation or attenuation in occupational health and safety (Aw, 
Harrington, & Gardiner, 2007), isolating PPE at NZAS is considered simply as a means of isolating 
the worker from the respective energy forms distinguished by Robertson (1992). The ergonomic 
approach is particularly evident in the downstream effect of NZAS incident investigation, where the 
use of isolating PPE is regarded as a means of isolation of the worker from an energy source –
equivalent to any other guard or barrier. For example, in the view of NZAS the hazard presented by 
the dropping of a heavy tool may most simply be isolated by the compulsory wearing of steel-
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capped safety boots. This is another manifestation of the hierarchy of control methodology with 
elements of the Haddon matrix also evident (Haddon, 1980; Runyan, 1998, 2003). 
Many valuable papers have been published on overcoming workers’ reticence to wear PPE, or the 
inappropriate use of PPE (Feeney, 1986; Holmes, Triggs, Gifford, & Dawkins, 1997; Lombardi, 
Verma, Brennan, & Perry, 2009; Sorock et al., 2004). These papers are primarily egocentric in focus, 
for they are essentially advising on means to alter human behaviour to promote PPE usage. 
However, the transformational leadership at NZAS, moderated by an ergonomic focus, initiated 
research into the exact energy characteristics of each hazard on site. Where the hazard could not 
be eliminated, precise specifications for isolating PPE were established in order to isolate the NZAS 
worker from the hazard. For example, aluminium smelting presents potential for both acute and 
chronic respiratory injury and disease through the presence of dust and fumes (O'Donnell, 1989, 
1995). Previous use of paper masks offering limited respiratory protection was replaced by filtered 
and positive-pressure masks specified for exposures higher than those on site at NZAS. These are 
ergonomically based interventions initiated by NZAS to prevent worker exposure to unintended 
energy exchange. Once the goal of zero incidents had been established by NZAS transformational 
leaders, the role of monitoring performance and achieving compliance was delegated to 
superintendents and crew leaders, using transactional leadership styles. Omission or incorrect 
wearing of PPE has been a cautionary and ultimately dismissible offence at NZAS. Locke & Latham 
(2002) identified that goal specificity decreases variation in performance by reducing the ambiguity 
about what is to be attained. Due to the high specifications of NZAS isolating PPE within their hazard 
isolation programme, variation of PPE usage, or human error, is a minor consideration in hazard 
isolation. The transactional leadership in place relies very little on motivating workers to wear PPE, 
since no alternative is possible to ensure the specified protection.  
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3.5.3 Incident investigation 
Comprehensive incident investigation has been undertaken for every significant injury or near miss 
since the late 1980s. These investigations use the Haddon matrix (Haddon, 1980; Runyan, 1998, 
2003) as a framework for analysis of each incident. However, tools introduced by the total quality 
management methodology also became important in incident investigation from the late 1980s. In 
particular, The TQM methodology’s cycle of improvement (Evans, 2008; Foster, 2007) became an 
enabler for effective incident investigation across site. The cycle of improvement ethos took 
incident investigation beyond a simple analysis of the incident. Using the cycle of improvement 
model in incident analysis led to recommendations which were duly implemented, monitored, and 
institutionalised when found to be effective. Leadership also became an enabler for this process to 
succeed, for without leadership commitment across site, recommendations from investigations 
would not have been as effective. Another unanticipated enabler, the Employment Contracts Act 
("Employment Contracts Act," 1991), also emerged from the qualitative research. This Act enabled 
reconstituted hierarchical and interdepartmental relationships on site, allowing significant changes 
in work organisation. 
Work organisation therefore became a moderator of incident investigation. The effect of causal 
attribution (DeJoy, 1994; Gray, 2009; Gyekye, 2010) has been minimised by a policy of frequently 
using horizontally and vertically integrated incident investigation teams. Team members are often 
drawn from across different departments and from differing organisational levels. For instance, a 
relatively low-skilled operator from a totally unrelated department, albeit with some training in 
investigative methodology, may investigate an incident from an unfamiliar department alongside 
the manager of that area. Other elements of work organisation such as safety audits, safety-
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oriented policies and alternate procedures became unencumbered by conflicts over worker 
allowances, thereby moderating the cycle of improvement in a positive manner.   
The transformational leadership change from an egocentric to an ergonomic focus at NZAS has also 
been a moderator on incident investigation. In particular, in the late 1980s, Australian consultants 
introduced the essential factors model of incident analysis which treats human behaviour as but 
one element of any injurious event. Heinrich's (1931) focus on human error as the most likely cause 
of the accident was given little weight in NZAS incident investigations after the late 1980s.  Similarly, 
the Swiss cheese model of incident investigation (Reason, 1990, 1997, 1998) appears not to have 
been used at NZAS. This may be due to the egocentric focus of much of Reason’s work when 
compared to NZAS’ ergonomic paradigm. It is more likely however, that the Swiss cheese model’s 
reliance on a chance alignment of opportunities for the incident to progress is inconsistent with the 
essential factors model of a predictive sequence of critical events. 
3.5.4 Proprietary behavioural interventions 
A number of proprietary interventions were introduced to NZAS from the late 1990s. These were 
primarily based around the intended modification of individual and team behaviour. In common 
with the other interventions, transformational leadership was a clear enabler for these proprietary 
behavioural interventions. Without leaders selecting these interventions and facilitating their 
introduction, they simply would not have been launched. 
Culture and human behaviour were identified as moderators of these behavioural interventions. 
Many writers have pointed to the difficulties in defining culture in an organisation (Cooper, 2000; 
Flin et al., 2000; González-Romá, Lloret, Peiro, & Zornoza, 1999; Zohar, 2000, 2002). The qualitative 
research in this study also revealed the many different uses of the term by NZAS employees, with 
participants often not distinguishing between organisational, local or national culture. The New 
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Zealand, Southland, or NZAS culture was interpreted as having both a positive and negative 
moderating effect over safety interventions. For instance, some of the training media 
accompanying the Du Pont STOP® programme was regarded by some employees as inappropriate 
to the local culture and disparaged accordingly. However, one participant who had doubts about 
the cultural fit and efficacy of several programmes, also said that he was unwilling to reject them 
because he considered that some parts of each of the programmes might contribute to fewer 
accidents. This is suggestive of Cooper's (2000) work which asserts that a focus on the product of 
safety culture was the most important aspect of a study of culture. The decreasing injuries result is 
the product regardless of the perceived or actual efficacy of any one proprietary intervention 
(Cooper, 2000). 
As a moderator of these proprietary behavioural interventions, the effect of (individual) human 
behaviour is even more difficult to determine. Reason (1990, 1997, 1998, 2000; Reason et al., 2006) 
and Rasmussen (1982, 2003) have added much to the understanding of how people interact with 
their workplace, but some writers argue that the means by which behaviour can be changed within 
a workforce have not been demonstrated (Robertson, 1992; Wagenaar, 1998).  Furthermore, Gray 
(2009) identifies the DuPont STOP® programme as an example of the responsibilisation of safety, 
attributing workers’ human error as the frequent cause of incidents rather than considering the 
company’s duty to provide a safe workplace. It is perhaps indicative of NZAS’ ergonomic focus that 
participants have generally rejected or adapted many of these proprietary behavioural 
interventions that do not fit the overall pursuit of their goal. 
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3.6   A hazard intervention effectiveness matrix 
Drawing from Haddon’s work and his fellow ergonomists, the hierarchy of controls model 
prescribes a sequential consideration of controls for hazard reduction: the hazard should be 
eliminated; if it cannot be eliminated, it should be isolated; if it can neither be eliminated nor 
isolated, the hazard must be minimised through administrative measures, work organisation, and 
training (Barnett & Brickman, 1986; Ellenbecker, 1996; Manuele, 2005). Figure 8 represents an 
effectiveness vector, showing that elimination of hazards provides the most effective control, 
whereas minimisation of hazards provides the least control. 
 
Effectiveness 
 
 Eliminate Isolate Minimise 
 
Figure 8. The hierarchy of control effectiveness vector. 
 
However, the hierarchy of controls model is often misunderstood or misinterpreted. Ellenbecker 
(1996) notes that in many workplaces, the bulk of industrial hygiene resources is not devoted to 
engineering controls, but to measuring worker exposures and comparing the results to legislative 
standards. Furthermore, the model focuses solely on a hazard in a static context, whereas effective 
changes made to the dynamic work environment may produce a more positive effect on workplace 
safety. 
These observations point to another effectiveness vector: that of ergonomic intervention versus 
egocentric intervention. An ergonomic intervention such as automation, when introduced to 
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substitute for a hazardous human task, will eliminate a hazard; whereas an egocentric intervention 
such as a behavioural change programme or a rule-based system may never be assumed to have 
completely eliminated a hazard. An egocentric intervention based on the assumption that human 
behaviour change is feasible may therefore be regarded as less likely to be effective than an 
ergonomic intervention such as automation. This additional effectiveness vector is illustrated in 
Figure 9. 
 
Effectiveness 
 
Ergonomic intervention 
e.g. Automation  
Egocentric intervention   
e.g. Human behaviour change 
      
Figure 9. The ergonomic-egocentric effectiveness vector. 
 
As part of the description of the identified interventions, the hierarchy of controls effectiveness 
vector and the ergonomic/egocentric effectiveness vectors were combined in a hazard intervention 
effectiveness matrix shown in Figure 10. The identified interventions were then plotted on this 
matrix to better understand their relative effectiveness. 
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Figure 10. Hazard intervention effectiveness matrix with NZAS interventions 
 
The automation intervention is exclusively ergonomic and primarily eliminating and is therefore 
largely plotted in quadrant 1. Quadrant 1 is the most effective quadrant since it describes 
interventions that are both eliminating and ergonomic. Automation may also be isolating only, so 
it is also plotted into quadrant 2. 
When considering personal protective equipment (PPE) intervention, NZAS drew a distinction 
between isolating PPE and risk mitigation PPE. At NZAS, intervention using isolating PPE is regarded 
as ergonomic and has efficacy across the isolation hierarchical control, so isolating PPE is plotted 
across quadrants 1 & 2. The placement of the isolating PPE intervention here is regarded as 
2. Isolating PPE 
3. NZAS Incident investigation - cycle of improvement 
 4. Proprietary behavioural interventions 
1. Automation 
1 2 
3 4 
minimise     eliminate 
egocentric 
ergonomic 
isolate 
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ergonomic in accordance with NZAS’ practice of inseparable hazard measurement, PPE technical 
specification, and unequivocal transactional leadership. 
NZAS incident investigation is plotted across quadrants 1 and 2, and has an acknowledged 
behavioural input. However, it has been established above that NZAS incident investigations 
preferentially focus on ergonomic solutions wherever possible, and although behaviour may be 
important to understanding the incident, it is generally regarded as a lesser consideration. This 
intervention is nevertheless closest to the ergonomic quadrants. 
It has also been demonstrated above that behavioural intervention can never eliminate a hazard. 
The proprietary behavioural interventions are therefore primarily plotted in the 4th quadrant. 
Because human behaviour modification is occasionally required to isolate a hazard, e.g., a warning 
sign on a machine, this intervention is also plotted into the 3rd quadrant. 
3.7   Evaluation of interventions  
In addition to the use of the hazard intervention effectiveness matrix, the study also assessed the 
interventions in relation to evaluation literature. Evaluating the effects of occupational health and 
safety intervention has become central to ongoing safety improvement (Daltroy et al., 1997; 
Goldenhar & Shulte, 1994). Intervention research may be defined as the study of planned and 
applied activities designed to produce designated outcomes (Windsor, Baranowski, Clark, & Cutter, 
1984). Prevention effectiveness research includes identifying efficacious and effective strategies to 
reduce morbidity and mortality (Goldenhar & Shulte, 1994). The effectiveness of evaluation relates 
directly to the assess stage of Deming’s cycle of improvement (Evans, 2008). Further, Daltroy et al. 
(1997) called for inclusion of a qualitative component in quantitative studies in order to understand 
how and why specific interventions may contribute to injury prevention. 
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However, the literature proposing theoretical frameworks for devising or assessing safety 
interventions is limited (Goldenhar et al., 2001; Goldenhar & Shulte, 1994; Rivara & Thompson, 
2000; Roelofs et al., 2003; Shannon et al., 1999; Zwerling et al., 1997). Goldenhar & Shulte's (1994) 
review of 36 occupational health and safety intervention studies called for increased measurement 
of reliability and validity of intervention data. Existing intervention research is too often based on 
individual researchers’ intuition and experience rather than on theory and evidence (Goldenhar & 
Shulte, 1994; Shannon, 1999). Since Rivara & Thompson, (2000) opined more than 12 years ago that 
few randomised trials had been conducted evaluating occupational injury interventions, very little 
appears to have been added in the literature. Smith & Shannon (2003) stated that the near total 
absence of controlled trials, randomised or otherwise, is indeed an issue of concern for the field of 
injury prevention research. 
In general, literature reviews of occupational injury intervention studies have commented on the 
reviewed studies’ limitations (Daltroy et al., 1997; Goldenhar & Shulte, 1994; Roelofs et al., 2003). 
Daltroy et al. (1997) pointed out that many interventions are multi-factorial. Moreover, Goldenhar 
& Shulte (1994) cautioned that causal phenomena are complex, and advised that intervention 
research should focus more on the ongoing process of interventions as well as studying the 
outcomes. Goldenhar, et al. (2001) also pointed out that, “…although ‘Does it work?’ is the ultimate 
question that must be answered, the broader view of the intervention research process includes 
research to evaluate the development (or adaptation) and implementation of interventions” 
(p.621). These statements are consistent with the multi-factorial nature and complexity of a large 
industrial plant.  
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In 2001, the (USA) National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) set out to address 
this lack of safety intervention models by engaging health and safety stakeholders to establish a 
national occupational research agenda (NORA). In their overview of the intervention research 
process, Goldenhar, et al. (2001) specified that an intervention must meet three criteria to be 
evaluative: 
1. the intervention should be operating or have been implemented as intended 
2. the intervention should be relatively stable 
3. the intervention should seem to be achieving positive results. 
 
Table 3. NZAS interventions and evaluative criteria 
 
 
 
Automation 
 
PPE 
Incident 
investigation 
Proprietary 
behavioural 
interventions 
Implemented as 
intended 
Yes Yes – since the 1980s Yes – since 
the 1980s 
Inconsistent 
Relatively 
stable 
Yes Yes – since the 1980s Mostly No 
Seem to be 
achieving 
positive results 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Using these criteria, the rating of the interventions remained the same as plotted on the hazard 
intervention effectiveness matrix as demonstrated in Table 3. 
1. Automation – criteria all positive 
2. Isolating PPE – criteria all positive since the 1980s 
3. Incident investigation – criteria mostly positive since the 1980s 
4. Proprietary behavioural interventions – criteria inconsistent 
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3.8   The “Zero Accident Vision” – goal theory 
Ultimately, the only absolute definition of a safe worksite is one that has zero injuries on site: the 
very goal set by NZAS more than twenty years ago. Indeed, in 2010, NZAS celebrated having 
operated for twelve months without a single LTI. However, the following year seven LTIs were 
recorded, and annual LTIs have varied between one and seven for the twelve years to the end of 
2011: the goal has not been reached. Nevertheless, the examination of LTIFR over NZAS’ 40 years 
of operation reveals an extraordinary reduction and represents an outstanding achievement. 
Locke & Latham's (2002) characteristics of goal effectiveness all appear to have been met at NZAS, 
either consciously or intuitively. NZAS’ use of their slogan “Our Goal is Zero” provides an 
unequivocal direction for safety on site (Rothkopf & Billington, 1979). Failure to consistently achieve 
the aspirational goal of zero injuries frustrates NZAS employees, but also energises them to pursue 
the goal more assiduously (Bandura & Cervone, 1986). The pursuit of a difficult goal often induces 
prolonged effort (La Porte, 1996). The NZAS goal was introduced more than 20 years ago and has 
yet to be consistently achieved, but the persistence of successive GMs and other NZAS leaders has 
brought LTI numbers tantalisingly close to zero. Health and safety professionals at NZAS have 
repeatedly sought task-relevant knowledge from around the world to confront persistent safety 
issues on site, in pursuit of their goal (Wood, Mento, & Locke, 1987). For instance, working at 
heights equipment and methodology was first introduced to New Zealand by NZAS and is now 
commonplace throughout the country. Other indicators of successful goal pursuit such as public 
commitment to the goal (Hollenbeck, Williams, Klein, & Schmitt, 1989), a belief that the goal can 
be attained (White & Locke, 2000), and feedback on progress to all personnel (Bandura & Cervone, 
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1986), were all represented in the study’s qualitative research of NZAS safety as specified in Table 
4. 
Table 4. Goal theory characteristics and NZAS evidence 
Characteristics of successful goals: NZAS evidence: 
A goal may serve as a benchmark against which 
performance feedback can be evaluated (Wood et 
al., 1987). 
NZAS asserted that the only absolute definition of 
a safe worksite was one that had zero injuries on 
site – and having a goal of zero injuries is the 
ultimate benchmark. The potential difficulties 
with using LTIs as a performance measure are 
acknowledged, but as a benchmark, consistently 
recording zero carefully specified LTIs would 
indeed represent the benchmark for an achieved 
goal. 
Conscious goals can constitute an intervention on 
a measureable outcome and the power of the 
self-fulfilling prophecy has been well established 
(Bandura & Cervone, 1986). 
Although variation in the way NZAS employees 
viewed the efficacy of interventions was noted, all 
employees were conscious of the goal and 
enthusiastically supportive of its pursuit. 
 
Specific, difficult goals consistently lead to higher 
performance than urging people to do their best 
(Bandura & Cervone, 1986; LaPorte & Nath, 1976) 
Exhortations to “be safe” were not acceptable at 
NZAS. Absence of LTIs represented a pragmatic 
and unambiguous target. 
Effectiveness indicators:  
Goals serve a directive function, avoiding 
distraction from goal-irrelevant activities 
(Rothkopf & Billington, 1979) 
The TQM cycle of improvement was used in 
incident analysis pervasively. The goal of 
recording zero LTIs was a compelling directive – 
with little room for distraction. 
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Difficult goals have an energising function, leading 
to greater effort than that applied towards low 
goals (Bandura & Cervone, 1986). 
Every level of management, from GM to crew 
leaders, was accountable for injuries suffered by 
subordinates – and all understood the difficulty of 
preventing injury in such a hazardous 
environment. Their motivation for success has 
been kept at a high level – a collective mindfulness 
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
Goals affect persistence, with difficult goals often 
inducing prolonged effort (Bandura & Cervone, 
1986). 
The effort applied to injury prevention has been 
unrelenting – the plant operates without pause, 
and successive leaders have sought to improve 
interventions to approach the unilateral goal in a 
more effective manner. 
Goals affect action indirectly by leading to the use 
of task-relevant knowledge or strategies (Wood et 
al., 1987). 
NZAS personnel sought solutions to hazards from 
a wide range of TQM and engineering sources, 
with a pragmatic attitude to applying the 
hierarchy of controls. 
 
Goal moderators: 
 
Commitment (Hollenbeck, et al.  1989) Since the pivot point moment in the 1980s of the 
GM “putting his flag in the sand” over workplace 
injuries, all GMs and owners have shown their 
commitment to injury reduction through both 
declaration and resource allocation. 
Feedback (Bandura & Cervone, 1986) A large board at the front gate has displayed the 
yearly tally of LTIs. The negative connotations of 
this tally have been noted above, but employees 
were never unaware of the current status. 
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Task complexity (La Porte, 1996) While they may have differing views on the 
interventions used, all employees understood the 
complexity and the aspirational nature of the 
goal. 
 
3.9  Conclusion 
The aluminium smelter at Tiwai Point in New Zealand is an industrial site where potentially 
catastrophic hazards are confronted 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; and yet, its safety record has 
improved significantly over its 40 years of operation. From the early years of the smelter’s 
operation, when workplace injuries were frequent and tacitly accepted, NZAS has worked 
assiduously to reduce the incidence of injuries on site. LTIs have reduced from 682 for the five years 
1975-1980, to 24 for the five years 2005-2010. This has been investigated by analysis of composited 
NZAS records and field data, and a programme of semi-structured interviews with NZAS employees 
(Young, 2013). The research confirmed the trend of declining LTIFR over the 40-year period 
examined, and established that under-reporting of LTI was not likely to be an explanatory factor for 
this decline. 
 The qualitative research component also identified and described the key enablers, moderators, 
and interventions at NZAS through which the safety improvement was engineered. These 
components were positioned within the context of the available literature, and the relationship 
between each component was described. Four interventions were identified and ranked in order 
of their perceived efficacy: 
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1. Automation 
2. Personal protective equipment 
3. Incident investigation – cycle of improvement 
4. Proprietary behavioural interventions 
The ranking of these interventions was achieved by deductive analysis using a hazard intervention 
effectiveness matrix and criteria from evaluation literature. The progress of NZAS towards their goal 
of having zero injuries on site was also assessed and found to be consistent with the established 
principles of goal theory.  
Other companies can learn from NZAS’ success. In general, the smelter’s unrelenting focus on an 
unequivocal goal of having zero injuries on site, while not yet consistently fulfilled, has 
demonstrated that a significant reduction in lost-time injuries is possible. Specific, difficult goals 
consistently lead to higher performance than urging people to do their best (Locke & Latham, 2002). 
Exhortations to “be safe” are not acceptable at NZAS: a genuine absence of LTIs is the non-
negotiable, unambiguously defined target. 
Specifically, other industrial plants must acknowledge that hazards are more readily ameliorated by 
long-term persistence with hierarchy of controls methodology for injury prevention. In particular, 
the control of unintended energy exchange through ergonomic rather than egocentric measures 
has been shown by the NZAS experience to be the most effective mode of intervention. Automation 
and the use of isolating PPE are clear manifestations of the hierarchy of controls methodology. Cycle 
of improvement TQM methodology using non-blame incident investigations can result in 
meaningful worksite changes. Over time, these changes are able to produce a significant decrease 
in LTIs. 
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Further, worksites should not be regarded as a static environment where automation and 
ergonomic intervention are regarded as impracticable. Effective feedback from incident 
investigation can result in the elimination or isolation of hazards.  Automation may have major 
financial implications for the elimination of major hazards, but these must be considered against 
the ongoing costs of a high injury rate, the company’s reputation, and its statutory duties. 
Notwithstanding the process of major plant upgrading, avoidance of perfunctory judgements of 
human error in incident investigations often identifies simple, low-cost engineering solutions for 
worksite hazard elimination or isolation. 
This case study supports the effectiveness of hierarchy of controls methodology as the basis for 
workplace injury prevention. Further, NZAS’ ergonomic focus in hazard intervention has been 
shown to significantly enhance the efficacy of its ZAV. The study places New Zealand Aluminium 
Smelters Limited at the forefront of ZAV hazard amelioration both within New Zealand and 
internationally. Their relative success should be recognised and emulated wherever possible. 
3.10 Acknowledgement, researcher declaration, limitations and opportunities 
The researcher acknowledges the cooperation of NZAS through their provision of open and 
unencumbered access to their data and employees. The researcher’s access to NZAS’ complex 
workplace was a notable strength of this research project. The confidence of NZAS management 
that this study would be conducted in good faith was founded in the researcher’s long association 
with the smelter as a subcontractor. The study was therefore a unique opportunity to affirm and 
describe NZAS’ remarkable safety achievement.  
The initial data collection for the study was conducted within the University of Otago (Dunedin, 
New Zealand) Master’s degree programme. It was supported by a University of Otago Master’s 
scholarship.  Some preliminary analysis of the data was conducted for the researcher’s Master’s 
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thesis. The contextualisation within the ZAV and subsequent hierarchy of controls analysis was 
conducted for the doctoral thesis.  No financial support from NZAS or any other body was sought 
or received. 
As a participative observer, the researcher’s association with NZAS is nevertheless noted as a 
possible source of bias. The respondents in the qualitative research were self-selected, and the 
codification of the interview transcript was performed solely by the researcher. In addition, the 
historical LTI data cannot be validated. These may be seen as limitations of the study. A further 
limitation should be noted: data from other, similar companies were not available for comparison.  
The pragmatic worldview evidence presented herein may contribute to a better understanding of 
industrial safety in general, and initiate opportunities for further enquiry. In particular, the 
descriptive distinction between enablers, moderators, and interventions has been shown to be a 
useful construct for the analysis of safety interventions. The development of a hazard intervention 
effectiveness matrix may also provide opportunities for further research into assessment of safety 
intervention efficacy. 
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Chapter Four:  The exemplar of the NZAS ZAV 
4.1 The contribution of From Zero to Hero 
This paper used data from the author’s earlier (2012) investigation of the significant drop in 
occupational injuries at New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (NZAS) and scrutinised the 
information within the context of the zero accident vision (ZAV). The paper From Zero to Hero was 
written in response to Zwetsloot et al.’s (2013) call for more scientific evidence to support the 
efficacy of the ZAV. 
While the original (2012) data confirmed NZAS’ success in that company’s significant reduction of 
occupational injuries, in order to generalise and disseminate the aetiological basis for this 
reduction, it was important that the achievement was contextualised within the ZAV 
conceptualisation. Elimination of the hazard through automation was identified as a primary 
intervention contributing to the NZAS ZAV. This technique of elimination for addressing hazards 
was recognised as a clear manifestation of a successful application of the long-established hierarchy 
of controls. Actual demonstration of the hierarchy’s efficacy is largely conspicuous by its absence in 
the literature. This may be a consequence of the rarity of peer-reviewed industrial case studies 
generally (in contrast to the many surveys and reviews of national statistics).  
An important characteristic of the NZAS ZAV was identified in their almost universal rejection of 
human error as an acceptable finding in incident investigations. NZAS’ reduced reliance on WHS 
defences such as signs, behaviour-based training, etc. (i.e. lower-order controls), further supported 
their predisposition towards the higher levels of the hierarchy of controls. Controls such as human 
behaviour modification were usually accorded lesser importance in all incident investigations and 
resulting recommendations, with preference given to elimination or isolation of the hazard. A 
 Chapter Four: The exemplar of the NZAS ZAV 
 
 
60 
 
hazard intervention effectiveness matrix was described to establish how higher order, ergonomic 
controls were demonstrably more effective than lower order, egocentric controls in preventing 
occupational injury. 
The paper highlighted that elements of hazard intervention could also qualify to appear in 
previously unexpected prioritised layers of the hierarchy of control. For instance, personal 
protective equipment (PPE) is almost always identified as the weakest element of any safety 
hierarchy, largely because its efficacy is dependent upon its appropriate use by people working 
alongside the hazard – which can usually never be assured. The NZAS data nonetheless 
demonstrated that with appropriate PPE specification and effective transactional leadership, PPE 
can be identified as a higher-level control. 
The comparison of the NZAS results with existing peer-reviewed literature also highlighted that the 
hierarchy of controls is often misunderstood or misinterpreted, and that evaluation of well-
intentioned hazard intervention is largely absent in the literature. While not representing a 
randomised trial of hazard interventions (ethically impossible in safety research), the paper was 
nonetheless able to strongly associate the upper-hierarchy controls with the NZAS safety success. 
An analysis of the NZAS interventions was conducted using Goldenhar and Shulte’s (1994) 
evaluative criteria. This analysis resulted in an identical ranking of the interventions to the hazard 
intervention effectiveness matrix – further corroborating the linking of upper-hierarchy of controls 
with intervention efficacy. 
Goal theory was also considered in relation to NZAS’ significant reduction of occupational injuries. 
The paper found that a favourable comparison of NZAS general management practice to peer-
reviewed evidence for successful achievement of goals, was consistent. In addition, the very 
existence of a goal (the ZAV) appeared to be a key driver for the NZAS success. 
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The paper From Zero to Hero identified the following outcomes: 
• that the case study represented the successful results of a ZAV and could be represented as 
such for wider dissemination 
• that the elimination stage of the hierarchy of controls could be credited as a significant part 
of the success of the ZAV 
• that the prioritised layers of the customary versions of the hierarchy of controls were not 
always as well-defined as is commonly assumed. In more effective leadership environments, 
interventions previously regarded as lower level controls could be re-classified as higher 
order controls 
• that a resistance to simplistic human error explanations for any accident or injury pervaded 
virtually all health and safety practice at NZAS, and widely contributed to the ZAV 
• that higher order, ergonomic controls were demonstrably more effective in preventing 
occupational injury than lower order, egocentric controls 
• that NZAS management of their ZAV was consistent with peer-reviewed best-practice goal 
theory. 
The contributions to the research project from this paper therefore include: 
• the ZAV is achievable, even under extreme circumstances such as in a particularly hazardous 
industrial plant 
• the ZAV should be included within stakeholder values for WHS 
• an aversion to arbitrary egocentric attribution of cause contributed to the recorded success 
• a relentless hierarchy of controls methodology for dealing with all worksite hazards 
undoubtedly contributed to the recorded success. 
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The possibility of having zero injuries on a hazardous worksite over an extended period of time is 
often regarded as unlikely. For this research project to establish that an aspirational model of safety 
management driven by the hierarchy of controls can be achieved, it was essential to establish that 
a ZAV is indeed possible. This paper was published in Safety Science (Young, 2014) and the published 
manuscript is included as Appendix B. The content of the paper was also accepted for presentation 
at the following conferences from 2013 to 2015: 
• Young, S.A. (2013) The safest aluminium smelter in the world – how did they do 
it? 11th Australasian Injury Prevention & Safety Promotion Conference; Fremantle, 
West Australia; November 11-13, 2013. 
• Young, S.A. (2014) From Zero to Hero: A case study of industrial injury reduction: 
New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited. Forum for Injury Prevention at the 
World Congress 2014 (International Labour Organisation); Frankfurt, Germany; 
August 31, 2014.  
• Young, S.A. (2015) Raising the bar: How essential contractors were dragged 
kicking and screaming into a New Zealand smelter’s exemplary safety journey. 
Australian Oil and Gas conference, Perth, Australia; March 11-13, 2015. 
 
4.2 Introducing a longitudinal component to the case study   
 
The From Zero to Hero paper demonstrated that an effective ZAV is possible when driven by higher 
level hazard elimination or controls. As well as being published in Safety Science in 2014, the 
findings from this paper were presented at several conferences in subsequent years.  
In response to these presentations, conference delegates occasionally pointed out that “normal” 
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companies often cannot afford to employ higher order controls such as elimination by automation, 
or expensive engineering protection. Common criticisms of such hazard resolution included that a 
financially successful company can afford such expensive “fixes” for their identified hazards, but 
that these “fair weather” solutions may disappear when that same company is placed under 
financial duress. The author then began to consider what effect severe financial constraint and even 
existential threat to the workplace had on safety intervention within formerly successful 
companies. Since the original data for the From Zero to Hero paper was collected in a very successful 
period of NZAS’ operation, the “fair weather” criticism was worthy of examination. A further study 
was conducted to enquire what happened to safety management when such organisations “fell on 
hard times”. 
 
A purposive critical case study of safety managers from two aluminium smelters was conducted: 
one that had already announced its permanent closure with all its staff to be made redundant (Alcoa 
in Point Henry, Geelong, Victoria, Australia); and NZAS which, 2-3 years on from the original study, 
was facing threat of closure and, regardless of their future, had announced significant levels of 
redundancies in response to financial difficulties. The intent of the qualitative study was to 
understand what happened to “safety in hard times” at two large industrial plants which had 
previously demonstrated consistently low occupational injury levels in a hazardous industry. The 
small group of personnel selected for interview clearly did not represent a broad sample of 
operating personnel, but it presented a unique opportunity to study the issues faced by safety 
managers with restricted financial resources and a workforce who were either definitely losing their 
jobs (in the case of Alcoa), or under threat of losing their jobs [in the case of NZAS, which lost $48 
million in 2012 (New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited, 2014)]. 
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The unusual opportunity to study the two companies operating in difficult circumstances enabled 
an enquiry covering a wide range of issues facing the respective safety managers and their staff. 
Many of these issues reached beyond the core purpose of the overarching research project (i.e. the 
hierarchy of controls), and the resulting paper Safety in Hard Times provided a rare  insight into 
safety management when the companies were facing difficult decisions and their staff were being 
placed under enormous stress. Nonetheless, the paper included an enquiry into the efficacy of the 
hierarchy of controls in these companies during a time of financial constraint. The results of this 
enquiry feature prominently in the discussion and conclusion of the paper. 
 
The study sought interviews with senior managers and/or staff whose roles were tightly coupled 
with safety performance in their respective organisations. A purposive non-random sample (n=8) 
of in-depth interviews was chosen to provide rich data on themes of interest and additional 
emerging themes across the two sites. The semi-structured interviews were conducted in 
November and December 2014, seeking responses to open questions relating to respondents’ 
understanding of their companies’ safety performance in harsh economic circumstances. Interview 
transcripts were coded according to themes of interest and other themes emerging from the 
participants’ responses. Quotes identified as being rich in detail and contextual meaning were 
highlighted (Patton, 2002). An inductive analysis was developed to interpret the participants’ 
statements and present an understanding of any influence on plant safety noted from the difficult 
economic reality facing both workforces. Finally, themes of interest and emerging themes were 
compared to existing literature in a logic model approach where recorded statements were 
compared to theoretically predicted events (Yin, 1994). 
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The literature has indicated that lean management may lead to compromised safety of a workforce 
through rationalisation of resources and elimination of non-productive waste (Longoni, Pagell, 
Johnston, & Veltri, 2013); but actual instances of this have seldom been documented. The paper 
Safety in Hard Times recorded senior safety managers highlighting areas where safety had indeed 
been compromised by the cutting or replacement of apparently redundant reporting of safety 
issues. Where safety initiatives had been maintained within the lean environment, they tended to 
focus more on less serious potential injuries (i.e. recoverable) rather than life-changing injuries or 
fatalities. The paper presented a rare insight into the propensity for companies to focus on their 
frequent and familiar hazards, rather than on the rare and unexpected hazards. The documentation 
of this effect represents an instance of McDonald’s distinction between Class I and Class II potential 
injuries (McDonald, 1996) [see Chapter Thirteen, subsection 13.5.1 pp. 193-194 for a more 
comprehensive discussion of this system of injury classification]. 
While many post-catastrophic or post-event investigations of occupational injury have been 
conducted and documented, research identifying a drift into failure (Woods, 2003) before any 
adverse outcome occurs is very unusual, and in-progress resolution of continuing deterioration of 
preventive measures is even rarer. External audits are intended (and assumed) to signal and prevent 
adverse events, but this prescience has not been documented in the safety literature. 
 
Similarly, while the adverse effects of redundancy on the well-being of people generally has long 
been recognised and acknowledged in hindsight, the literature on the difficulties confronting those 
facing redundancy or under threat of redundancy has seldom been documented. 
 
The implications of injury prevention generally in “hard times” was of particular interest to this 
research project. Specifically, the study highlighted the ongoing influence of hierarchy of controls 
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methodology as the companies’ profitability faltered (and, in the case of Alcoa, ultimately ceased 
completely). The paper presents an examination of the safety hierarchy’s impact on both 
companies’ management of safety, and considers its efficacy over an elongated and more 
challenging timeline.  Safety in Hard Times is presented as Chapter Five.  
 
This paper is published in Safety Science 102C (2018) pp. 118-124. The label [NZAS 2] refers to NZAS 
participant number 2, etc. These labels do not necessarily relate to the order of participants listed 
in Table 5, page 71. The paper as submitted, originally included a number of footnotes - these have 
been represented within parentheses in the body text. 
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Chapter Five:  Safety in Hard Times: A qualitative analysis of safety 
concerns in two industrial plants under financial duress 
 
 Abstract 
 
A purposive critical case study of two heavy industrial plants was conducted to identify and discuss 
safety issues faced by companies under financial duress. Access to these companies presented a 
rare opportunity for study: one plant had announced definite closure while the other was under 
threat of closure. Both companies were facing significant redundancies. Interviews with senior staff 
members accountable for safety outcomes sought to answer three questions relating to lean 
management, redundancies, and hierarchy of controls methodology in times of financial duress. An 
inductive analysis compared respondents’ comments with peer-reviewed literature and identified 
commonalities, differences and concerns. Four recommendations are made for companies facing 
similar financial duress. These recommendations include (i) an emphasis on use of the hierarchy of 
controls for hazard mitigation, (ii) the influence of lean management, (iii) prioritisation of injury 
classification, and (iv) the importance of external audits. 
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5.1  Introduction 
The evidence base for the efficacy of the zero accident vision (ZAV) is growing. Recently, in a critique 
considering all sides of the ZAV debate, Zwetsloot et al. (2017) called for, “a more realistic 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the ZAV” (p. 263). The Zwetsloot et al. (2017) 
paper cited  Young’s (2014) analysis of New Zealand Aluminium Smelter’s (NZAS) exemplary safety 
performance as positive evidence for ZAV. Young’s paper described the nature of the interventions 
used in a hazardous industry to achieve a remarkable safety result over the period 1972–2011. It 
found that (inter alia) hazards are more readily ameliorated by long-term persistence with hierarchy 
of controls methodology for injury prevention. But what happens when an organisation with an 
apparently successful safety strategy faces extreme financial duress?  
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 appeared to have relatively little effect on smelter 
operation, but in recent years, oversupply in world aluminium markets has resulted in lower prices 
(Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics, 2014). In response to the consequential economic 
pressures and NZAS’s $49 million loss in 2012, the company reduced the size of its organisation by 
100 roles, representing 14% of the workforce (New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited, 2014). In 
order to address the same fiscal drivers, in February 2014, Alcoa announced the closure of its 
aluminium smelter and rolling mills at Point Henry, Geelong Australia (Alcoa Corporation, 2014). 
Both companies demonstrated excellent safety records in the years leading to this time, but what 
effect would prolonged financial duress have on safety in these extremely hazardous worksites? In 
particular, the following three questions were selected for investigation: 
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• Both plants practised lean management methodology in order to maximise profits (or 
minimise losses). What were the effects on safety management when lean management 
practices were subject to even further financial duress? 
• The staff at both plants were likely to be affected by confirmed or looming redundancy. 
What were the key issues for safety managers surrounding actual or likely staff redundancy? 
• NZAS’s ZAV had been characterised by a long-term persistence with upper-level controls for 
injury prevention (Young, 2014). Did the benefits derived from hierarchy of controls 
methodology continue in times of financial duress? [For a discussion on the efficacy of the 
upper levels of the hierarchy of controls, see Young (2014, sections 5 and 6)]. 
A purposive strategy using critical case sampling (Teddlie & Yu, 2007) was employed to provide 
insight into the effects and significance of financial duress on safety management at these two large 
industrial plants. When asked whether safety standards slip in tough economic times, 73% of a 
sample of United States chemical engineers replied that there is a decline (Sharp, 2010); but very 
few studies have been conducted to substantiate or challenge this claim. This paper sought to 
explore safety management issues relating to the imminent closure of the Alcoa plant, and the 
rationalisation of NZAS, with a view to providing a useful insight for other companies facing similar 
difficulties. 
The NZAS aluminium smelter is recognised as a particularly hazardous work environment (Young, 
2014), but despite the threat of closure, it continued its exemplary safety performance with only 
four lost-time injuries in 2014 (all musculo-skeletal injuries in an aging workforce). At the Point 
Henry Alcoa rolling mill, one staff member commented on the potential for catastrophe: “…the 
consequences in heavy industry is death in a lot of cases - or a very serious injury” [Alcoa 2]. 
 Chapter Five:   Safety in Hard Times 
 
 
70 
 
Nevertheless, despite the pending closure, and the possibility that the associated workforce anxiety 
could produce a spike in injuries, “…this year’s been the best year that… Alcoa Rolled Products has 
ever had in regards to safety” [Alcoa 1]. In posing the three questions above, this paper examined the 
apparent contradiction of highly stressed staff remaining free of serious injury during “hard times”. 
5.2  Methods 
 
The research project undertook a purposive study of two large industrial plants, with different 
corporate owners and in two different countries, operating in similar industries. Both were 
experiencing significant down-sizing or closure. The exemplary safety record of one of the plants 
was researched previously by one of the authors in a mixed method study (see Young, 2014) and 
presented as evidence substantiating the zero accident vision (ZAV). The current research project 
sought to build on the previous study by investigating the same plant in the context of a particularly 
challenging time in its operation. Another similar plant facing the same financial challenges was also 
examined. 
 
Interviews were conducted with safety management staff in the two organisations. A purposive 
critical case sample (n=8) of in-depth interviews was chosen to provide rich data on topics of 
interest across the two sites. The interviewees were “…deliberately selected for the important 
information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices” (Maxwell, 1997 
p.87).  
 
Purposive sampling leads to greater depth of information from a smaller number of carefully 
selected cases (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). The researcher’s unique access to NZAS (Young, 2014), and 
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access to Alcoa’s Point Henry smelting operation, offered an excellent opportunity to provide 
considerable insight into these workplaces under financial duress. Unlike the original NZAS study 
(Young, 2014), this study did not seek to validate the empirical data concerning safety performance. 
With both NZAS and Alcoa, the authors accepted the injury data as presented by the respondents 
in the current study, and focussed on accessing qualitative understanding “…that had previously 
been inaccessible to scientific investigation” (Yin, 1994,  p.42). The selected roles for the two 
companies are listed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Company roles selected for interview 
Role Company 
Maintenance Safety Supervisor Alcoa Rolling Mill, Australia 
Safety and Environment Change Agent Alcoa Rolling Mill, Australia 
Health and Safety Advisor Alcoa Rolling Mill, Australia 
General Manager New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd 
Senior Manager – Loss Reduction New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd  
Manager – Health and Safety  New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd  
Communications Manager New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd  
Health and Safety Advisor New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd  
 
[Note. The labels following each quote in the text below e.g. [NZAS 2] refer to a randomly allocated 
number for NZAS participants (similarly for Alcoa). These labels do not necessarily relate to the 
order of participants listed in Table 5.] 
The critical case (Maxwell, 1997) interviews were conducted in November and December 2014, 
during a period of significant economic restraint, and sought responses to purposive questions 
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(Teddlie & Yu, 2007) relating to the implications for safety management in harsh economic 
circumstances. The interviews were recorded with the respondent and interviewer only present, in 
closed offices, over 20 – 30 minutes. Interviews were subsequently transcribed verbatim with 
transcripts coded according to themes of interest and new topics emerging from the participants’ 
responses. Quotes identified as being rich in detail and contextual meaning were highlighted 
(Patton, 2002). An inductive analysis was developed to interpret the participants’ understanding of 
any effect on plant safety as a result of the difficult economic reality facing both workforces. Finally, 
both themes of interest and new emerging topics were compared to existing literature in a logic 
model approach where recorded statements were compared to theoretically predicted events (Yin, 
1994). 
 
5.3  Results 
The coding of the interview transcripts highlighted the three purposive themes addressing the 
respondents’ reflections on safety during times of financial duress: 
1. Concerns about the effects of lean management on safety practices; 
2. Key issues for safety personnel surrounding staff redundancies;  
3. The continuing influence of hierarchy of controls implementation. 
These themes appear in section 5.3 as questions, sub-questions and relevant comments 
representing a coherent account and analysis of the respondents’ understanding of their difficult 
financial situation and its effect on their safety management duties. 
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5.3.1 What are the effects on safety management when lean management practices are subject to 
even further financial constraint? 
“…all the ‘nice-to-haves’ are gone…” [NZAS 5]. 
5.3.1.1 What does lean mean for staff safety?  
NZAS staff noted a gradual deterioration in their safety processes due to the often indistinguishable 
effects of the progressive application of lean principles. In particular, their decades-old checks and 
balances that had kept them safe (Young, 2014), were gradually being eroded despite their best 
intentions: “…no-one said ‘stop using your systems’; in fact, everyone thought that they were being 
used…” [NZAS 3]. With fewer operatives, more digital systems were introduced to assure compliance 
with long-established procedures: “What lean said was, ‘OK we’ll have a visual system that says 
have the checks been done and did you find anything?’; and that system kept on coming up: ‘check’s 
been done - didn’t find a thing’ - so they took it away…” [NZAS 3].  
 
Observations about the role of safety management considered the apparent contradiction between 
saving money and keeping their people safe: “…it’s imperative that you have to have these 
governance systems in place… they’re robust and they’re audited, because they’re the things that 
are stopping you from killing people… and if it falls over, unfortunately it’s probably only a matter 
of time” [NZAS 3]. Senior management noted that despite operational staff being focussed on 
production economy, “the leaner your organisation gets, the stronger your governance has to be, 
in some ways, because you can afford to do ‘light-touch and fit-for-purpose’ but you’ve got to be 
really sure that things aren’t slipping” [NZAS 1]. A balance between an urgency of saving money at a 
divisional shop floor level and a consideration of the possibly negative effects on safety of cost 
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saving, appeared to have preoccupied management thinking at NZAS: “…if you’re not operating for 
the long term, then you’re probably not going to be there for the long term…” [NZAS 3]. Governance 
decisions made offsite were also acknowledged: “…out of the financial crisis, one of the things that 
surprised me, was how fast decisions can be made for big operations… they can make those 
decisions in weeks and the place can be shut down in months…” [NZAS 3]. 
5.3.1.2 Where is the focus of injury prevention?  
In reviewing the overall model of hazard mitigation at NZAS, one manager made a distinction 
between the three types of safety considerations on site: 
• Multiple fatality, catastrophic failure protection; 
• Single fatality prevention – working at heights, confined spaces etc.; and 
• Injury prevention – training procedures, safety observations etc. 
The manager noted a recent tendency for safety management to focus more on prevention of 
moderate injuries. “…for a number of reasons, the focus had drifted away from maintaining the 
systems around fatality prevention in particular…” [NZAS 3]. In addition to advocating the need for a 
higher emphasis on potentially disastrous outcomes, the NZAS manager pointed to an increased 
legal emphasis on accountability for such catastrophes: “…if you’re found lacking, there is a real 
clear line of sight to prosecution, and in fact in the worst case, jail terms. Now that makes directors 
sit up. And senior leaders sit up...” [NZAS 3]. 
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5.3.1.3 What role do company audits play during difficult times?  
As soon as the Alcoa closure was announced, the company used its internal audit system to 
“…double up on our compliance audits…” in the time remaining before actual closure [ALCOA 3]. In 
contrast, at NZAS, it was noted that the internal audits and checks became less effective as a result 
of the economising: “…there’s a slow decay of audit, if you like - governance - starting to slide away 
from the leadership - just checking that those checks were being made…” [NZAS 3]. One manager 
compared the process to maintaining a garden: “…you don’t notice the impact straight away… 
things start to get a bit frayed around the edges… like a garden where you’re not doing as much 
gardening any more…” [NZAS 1].  
 
This deterioration at NZAS was ultimately detected by an external audit conducted by staff from a 
sister smelter from Pacific Aluminium (PacAl) [a subsidiary of Rio Tinto]. The audit exposed that 
many critical systems had been unintentionally discontinued: “…we certainly were alerted to that 
pretty sharply through our…‘third party audit’: the process we have where other people from PacAl 
came in last year and really gave us a bit of a wake-up call about some of those things...” [NZAS 1]. 
The external audit exposed a number of safety systems that had unintentionally been allowed to 
degrade. For instance, even “well-performing superintendents” [NZAS 3], when asked about their 
anchor points (for securing working-at-heights harnesses etc.) and other such systems, said, “…‘yep, 
they’re good…’ so they went out and looked and what they found was: no, they weren’t…” [NZAS 3]. 
This came as a surprise to a community of people who took pride in their exemplary safety 
procedures (Young, 2014). Alcoa have a similar process whereby “independent Alcoans” arrive on-
site every 3 to 4 years to: “…verify that we’re doing, what Alcoa expects, and it’s taken very 
seriously… if you do poorly in those audits, plant managers will lose their job…” [Alcoa 2]. 
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Both companies considered the audit process as a key tool in monitoring their satisfactory safety 
progress through difficult times; importantly, the company that was continuing to operate (NZAS) 
exposed its vulnerability to a significant injury event through an external audit. “…things are not 
where we would typically have been over the last… seven or eight years. So this year in particular, 
(there) has been a lot of effort put into re-establishing those systems…” [NZAS 3]. 
5.3.2 What are the key issues for safety managers surrounding actual or likely staff redundancies? 
“I certainly had grown men crying in my office” [NZAS 2]. 
5.3.2.1 The personal effect of actual or potential redundancy 
Staff of both companies were not taken by surprise by the announcement of redundancies: “(There 
were) a lot of rumours… for probably a good 12 months to 2 years so then when it initially happened 
there was that initial shock and then it was like ‘OK, yeah’…” [Alcoa 3]. Both companies were very 
aware of the potential for the welfare of their staff to be adversely affected, and both provided 
access to external professional advice. “…we encourage people to come forward if they need to talk 
to us… and we actually had people come on site as well and the safety team see that as a real big 
focus for us” [Alcoa 1]. There was also a pro-active emphasis on anxiety management on-site at NZAS 
“…at one stage we had probably three psychologists reasonably active on site” [NZAS 3]. The ongoing 
uncertainty in NZAS was in some ways worse than the certainty of closure for Alcoa: “…there’s not 
much you can do to take that anxiety away…” [NZAS 3]. “…we are trying to be positive but you(‘ve) 
still got to be real and think, ‘well you know, closure potentially is still a possibility’…” [NZAS 5]. 
 
Despite the well-resourced professional help, one long-term staff member articulated the difficulty 
of providing effective support: “…we have EAP (employee assistance program) and we’ve got 
industrial chaplains - we have got heaps of support networks but a lot of people don’t feel 
comfortable using that kind of stuff, do they?” [NZAS 5]. 
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5.3.2.2 The collective effect on staff morale 
The inevitable closure of the Alcoa plant produced a remarkable determination to defy any intuitive 
assumption of deteriorating safety performance: “It’s just pride for us. We can present to 
management: ‘we’ve shut everything down and we’ve done it safely’…” [ALCOA 3]. Alcoa staff were 
particularly proud of their company’s policy of workers being able to stop the task in hand if they 
were not confident that the job could be completed safely. This mutual confidence between staff 
and management is something that had taken a long time to develop: “I guess historically we’ve 
patted people on the back for getting the job done: ‘we’ve got the machine up and running again, 
that’s fantastic.’ Now we’re patting people on the back for stopping…” [Alcoa 1]. Another staff 
member explained how the “stop of the week” was rewarded with a small prize, and related how 
he was teased by workers from other companies for being praised for shutting down production: 
“Alcoa’s the one place that you get rewarded to stop work for safety” [Alcoa 3]. 
 
Staff in both companies drew some reassurance from the dedication to safety of their respective 
company throughout their working life to date: “Alcoa… from the moment I had my first interview 
they spoke about safety… they did have that 100% commitment” [Alcoa 1]. NZAS reported a similar 
ethos: “…over many, many years, very, very deeply ingrained into the culture and the psyche I guess 
of people here, is safety. And it’s continually reinforced, through senior leadership, I guess, of Rio 
Tinto. It’s always visible, it’s always reported on” [NZAS 3]. Both companies had continued their 
responsiveness to staff concerns as and when they were raised: “When you did raise any issues 
using tools that were in place, you got feedback and it didn’t take 2 weeks, 3 weeks - it was like the 
next shift you’d come back in there was feedback provided to you” [Alcoa 1]. “…if something happens 
there’s always an immediate response… underlying that I think is a very, very deeply held view that 
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safety is important - and the most important thing at work - and we don’t compromise on it...” [NZAS 
3]. 
Despite the Alcoa managers’ sense of achievement of their stated aim: “the main thing for us was 
to ‘let’s all leave here safely’ and we’ve done that” [ALCOA 3], there was nevertheless an underlying 
sadness and mystification about their apparently hollow success: “…we’ve run record production 
on the line here so it seems strange that we are shutting down… ’cause the guys are producing 
records… we’re safe, probably we’re better than we’ve ever been in our lives; we’re making a profit 
yet they’re closing the business” [ALCOA 3]. 
 
5.3.2.3 Management perception of behaviour-based safety (BBS) programs 
Alcoa personnel placed much of the credit for their excellent safety performance on their Human 
Performance behavioural safety program: “…what’s keeping us safe? …what’s different between 
now and five years ago? …and you know, everyone – Human Performance would be the first thing 
they say” [ALCOA2]. This program encouraged operatives to stop and think for a few minutes before 
they commenced a task. In particular, its role was to identify “error traps” when first time or 
infrequent tasks are undertaken. 
 
NZAS reported encouraging results from their relatively new Brother’s Keeper behavioural safety 
program: “It’s given us a statistically significant change in behaviours associated with particular 
incidents, so those incidents have stopped happening…” [NZAS 4]. Compared to previous behavioural 
management tools, Brother’s Keeper is more of a voluntary system which allowed staff to learn as 
and when they wanted – rather than having the system imposed upon them. One staff member 
claimed Brother’s Keeper was superior to a previous behavioural system employed at NZAS in that 
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it: “stop(s) that gotcha and the spying and the tattle-tailing - all the negative stuff that was 
associated with the STOP® system…” [NZAS 4]. The gotcha effect was discussed in Young (2013). 
 
In a time of tight budgetary constraints, one of the NZAS safety managers expressed frustration 
with the number of sales pitches being received: “I was frequently getting phone calls from a variety 
of people… selling me the next best safety system that would ‘revolutionise’ safety at NZAS…” [NZAS 
2]. The staff member wanted “to get rid of these people because it just felt like a great sales pitch… 
yet, I didn’t really have any idea whether what they were saying was going to have worth or not” 
[NZAS 2]. As a result, this safety manager reviewed all 20 BBS programs used at NZAS, and identified 
which programs conformed to Geller’s  seven key principles of BBS (Geller, 2005). The manager 
intended recommending the elimination up to half the BBS programs that did not comply with 
Geller’s seven key principles.  
 
5.3.3  Do the benefits derived from hierarchy of control methodology continue in times of financial 
duress? 
 
5.3.3.1 The influence of hierarchy of controls methodology 
The safety managers frequently referred to their respective company’s application of higher-order 
hierarchy of controls interventions in the past as a reason for their continuing safety success. One 
NZAS manager pointed out that many of the higher order mitigation investments had already been 
completed before the financial duress: “I wonder if that’s just where we are on the safety journey 
- whether those… big ticket items… have been done…” [NZAS 3]. Nevertheless, as new hazards were 
identified, higher-order controls continued to be sought and implemented at NZAS: “…straight-out 
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elimination is always the holy grail” [NZAS 1]. The general manager’s (monthly) innovation awards 
continued to produce higher order suggestions from staff resulting in higher order hazard controls 
that did not necessarily require major capital expense:  “I think if you give people more time… to 
draw on more ingenious thought, you can sometimes come up with a really well-engineered 
solution that the users of the equipment like… it’s also cheap… it also solves the issue… in fact, 
they’re the classic hallmarks of a really good solution… it actually ticks more boxes than you thought 
it would…” [NZAS 1].  
 
5.3.3.2 Is capital still available for safety initiatives, even when the plant is closing (or under threat 
of closure)? 
Notwithstanding the effectiveness of existing higher order controls, constriction of money for 
operations did not stop continuing safety investments at either plant when they were needed. Staff 
commented that while capital was now difficult to justify for general business applications, capital 
for injury prevention was never withheld: “…we’ve been struggling for 14 years financially - we’re 
not cashed up… (but) Alcoa’s good - they will make capital available for safety and (we) see the 
results of that…” [Alcoa 2]. NZAS staff explained that the “hurdle rate” on capital access had generally 
decreased in recent years from a five-year payback to a two-year payback as a result of the financial 
duress, but: “The hurdle rate for safety improvement capital actually didn’t change during that 
period of time” [NZAS 1]. Where the justification for a high capital safety item was clear, NZAS still 
intended to solve the problem through investment in higher level controls despite the cost. For 
instance, “…we still have someone holding on to a vibrating tool and there’s a growing body of 
evidence that that’s not a great thing over a long period of time… we may still have to spend a 
million dollars eliminating that task… it wouldn’t take many (injury) cases like that to make a million-
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dollar robot worthwhile. So from time to time we’re still going to have to make those big 
investments” [NZAS 1]. 
 
5.4  Discussion 
 
In section 5.4, the themes identified in the results section are considered in relation to relevant 
peer-reviewed safety literature.  
 5.4.1 What are the effects on safety management when ‘lean’ management practices are subject to 
even further financial duress? 
5.4.1.1 Pressure for productivity 
Since the 1990 introduction of its zero accident vision (ZAV), NZAS dramatically reduced its lost-
time injuries (LTI) to single figures annually, but also maintained a constant mindfulness (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007)  about the potential for catastrophe on site (Young, 2014). The observation of the 
NZAS respondent that “the focus had drifted away…” [NZAS 3] indicated that the preventive measures 
aimed at rare, but potentially catastrophic, events had deteriorated more than the attention 
focussed on day-to-day LTIs. This has a parallel with Woods’ (2003 p.4) “drift towards failure as 
defences erode in the face of production pressure”. While Woods was referring to production 
pressure rather than financial duress, the net effect of producing more (or the same) output with 
less input is similar. Hopkins (2000, 2008) also documented this drift toward failure where fatalities 
occurred in the wake of financial cuts and constriction. The efficiency-thoroughness trade-off 
principle (ETTO) (Hollnagel, 2012) remains a core contradiction at the heart of safety management: 
efficiency is usually the short-term catalyst for productivity, whereas thoroughness is often the 
long-term guarantor of safety. 
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5.4.1.2 Lean management 
The increasing sophistication of management expertise has precipitated the use of best practice 
total quality management (TQM) techniques (Manzella, 1997). NZAS has excelled in using TQM to 
maximise production quality [see (Young, 2014)] including lean production methodology. Lean 
production seeks to eliminate all waste from the production process. The three types of waste 
identified are overburden (too much input into the process), unevenness (input that is irregular and 
therefore counterproductive), and non-value-adding work (Longoni et al., 2013). The identification 
and elimination of non-value-adding work has potentially adverse implications in that many safety 
checks and balances do not appear to do anything: they represent what Weick (2011) called a 
dynamic non-event. Redundancy in safety interventions is implicit: i.e. an occupational injury will 
not necessarily occur when a safety intervention is absent. As far as the production process is 
concerned therefore, a lean rationalist could argue that safety precautions are seldom required. 
While no safety professional would ever profess this polemic, the pursuit of lean production 
nevertheless presents continuing safety dilemmas in the selection of which particular non-value-
adding work to eliminate from the work process chain. 
 
The prediction by Longoni et al. (2013) that lean thinking may be detrimental for safe operational 
outcomes appeared to be occurring surreptitiously at NZAS during the period of cost-cutting. Some 
routine “checks and balances” that had been part of NZAS safety procedures for decades (Young, 
2014) had been cut because they appeared to be non-value-adding since they continually returned 
a zero result: i.e. nothing was going wrong, so why keep checking?  This drift to failure (Woods, 
2003) was detected by an external audit conducted by staff of NZAS’s sister smelter, and modified 
following its identification.  
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5.4.1.3 The reason for audits 
NZAS senior staff were appreciative of the discovery, through the external audit, that their formerly 
exemplary systems were deteriorating: “I’m very thankful that the audit happened… They’re not 
unpleasant things that people come and do to you - they’re a fresh set of eyes that are just checking 
that the things that are going to keep you out of jail, that stop people from dying, are actually in 
place…” [NZAS 3].  
Contrasts between positive internal safety audits and subsequent catastrophic events have been 
well documented in other heavy industrial plants (Hopkins, 2000, 2008, 2011). External audits, on 
the other hand, can provide a more detached and impartial assessment of the status quo. An 
external audit can expose the safety condition known as work as imagined versus work as done 
(Clay-Williams, Hounsgaard, & Hollnagel, 2015) where safety managers sometimes fail to recognise 
that their supposed excellent internal audit does not correspond with actuality. It may be that an 
integrated management safety system is well-established in an organisation, but in reality, work is 
conducted in an entirely different way. One NZAS manager also highlighted the need for constant 
mindfulness (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007) in a hazardous heavy industry: “…the issue with the systems 
and the fatalities… is that because they’re so infrequent… unless you’re watching them carefully, 
there’s no indicator that you’re coming adrift…” [NZAS 3]. 
 
5.4.1.4  The prioritisation of injury classifications 
Lost-time injuries are the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of safety management. While any injury should be 
prevented, LTIs are often relatively frequent and usually of lesser consequence than life-changing 
injuries (see below). LTIs can be manipulated (Coyle et al., 1995; Oleinick et al., 1993; Probst, 
Brubaker, Barsotti, & Zedeck, 2008; Stiller et al., 2008) to deliver apparently improving safety trends 
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while obfuscating potentially catastrophic eventualities. The NZAS manager who distinguished 
between multiple and single fatalities, and “injury prevention”, was referring to this attention to 
amelioration of LTIs at the expense of preventing more catastrophic events. McDonald (1996) 
dismissed the prevalence of LTI, considering them to be an ineffective measurement of relative 
safety, and in analysing data from Australia’s Industry Commission in 1995, instead proposed three 
classes of injury: 
• Class I Permanent life-changing injuries – accounting for 80% of injury costs 
• Class II Temporary (recoverable) injuries e.g. LTIs - accounting for 19% of injury costs 
• Class III Minor inconveniences – accounting for less than 1% of injury costs 
McDonald (1996) argued that injury prevention effort must therefore focus primarily on Class I 
injuries, for reasons of severity and cost, in preference to the current emphasis on Class II injuries. 
Further, the wisdom of concentrating on prevention of Class I injuries recognises that there is little 
if any relationship between the causal factors for LTIs and those of catastrophic injuries (Manuele, 
2011; O'Neill et al., 2013; Oleinick et al., 1993): prevention of catastrophic events usually requires 
a totally different safety approach. 
 
5.4.2 What are the key issues for safety managers surrounding actual or likely staff redundancy? 
 
5.4.2.1 Redundancy fears and consequences 
Fear of layoffs during recession may increase employee stress, which has the potential to increase 
the probability of injuries (Beale & Nethercott, 1985; Jenkins, MacDonald, Murray, & Strathdee, 
1982; Sharp, 2010). Similarly, the negative effect of redundancy on the psychological wellbeing of 
those who lose their job through plant closure or downsizing has been documented (Milner, Page, 
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& LaMontagne, 2014). In the current study however, while both companies reported considerable 
employee anxiety as a result of imminent redundancies, the reported safety record of both 
companies remained excellent. [It is noted that the original NZAS study (Young, 2014) substantiated 
that company’s exemplary safety improvement; whereas the current qualitative study of both 
companies accepted their reports of continuing excellent quantitative safety records.]  
 
According to Boone, van Ours, Wuellrich and Zweimuller (2011), people who have accidents are 
more likely to be fired and workers may therefore not report injuries for fear of becoming 
candidates for redundancy. At NZAS, one manager related a previous work situation where staff 
were ranked on their suitability for their role and were therefore, at the time of this study, 
apprehensive of being selected for redundancy. While no current suggestion of such practices was 
found at either company, one manager related that some of the older workers sometimes worked 
beyond their physical capabilities, risking a musculo-skeletal disorder, to hide their possible 
unsuitability for the task in hand: “…they really wanted to work in the role incredibly thoroughly, 
and I was having a dreadful time getting them to lift items appropriately…” [NZAS 2]. This propensity 
to hide their relative unsuitability for the job may lead workers to under-report incidents (Boone & 
van Ours, 2006). The effect of under-reporting could be particularly relevant to NZAS during the 
period of financial duress because their incident reporting system and associated remedial actions 
had so effectively contributed to ameliorating hazards in recent years (Young, 2014). Under-
reporting of incidents could lead to compromised safety understanding and an increase in injuries.  
 
One of the first realisations following the redundancies at NZAS was the loss of experience from the 
older workforce (average age over 50 years old): “…we have been very dependent on that 
institutional knowledge… we very rarely have that complete list of all the things that someone 
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does…” [NZAS 1]. The requirements of the health and safety management systems have become a 
challenge for those overseeing safety at NZAS “…because you just don’t have as many people to 
manage the administrative side of all of the checks and balances” [NZAS 1]. 
 
In addition, not all NZAS staff regarded redundancy as a totally undesirable result of the downsizing, 
and this produced its own difficulties for the company. The attractiveness of the redundancy 
package to workers approaching retirement age was such that many of the older leaders and 
holders of institutional knowledge took voluntary redundancy, thereby exacerbating the reduction 
of composite safety expertise. This is a common problem when companies downsize since the 
length of experience in a given function is positively related to knowledge sharing behaviour 
(Nesheim & Gressgård, 2014). This has clear implications for the safe completion of many customary 
work tasks. 
 
5.4.2.2 Implications for morale 
Evans, Hammersley and Robertson (2001) noted that in second order change – where change is 
transformational, radical and complex – there is a need for management to imbue a shared sense 
of the impending crisis in all employees. This effect is clearly evident in the Alcoa statements, where 
staff knew that their fate was sealed. Perception of personal safety is, at least in part, related to 
employee perceptions of leaders’ commitment to safety (Evans et al., 2001). 
 
Shared, transparent communication of the pending redundancies, consistent with second order 
change noted by Evans et al. (2001), was seen as a key contributor to both companies’ continuing 
safety success. At Alcoa, the understanding that employees at every level were about to lose their 
jobs appeared to have produced a communal spirit in adversity: “…we said, ‘we’re all in this 
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together… we’re all going through the same issues’, and I think that’s really made a close working 
team this year…” [ALCOA 1]. While closure or a significant program of redundancies can deliver a 
devastating blow to communities surrounding the affected plant (Lambert, 2004), the findings of 
this study suggest that looming redundancies need not lead to an inevitable loss of morale and a 
possible deterioration in safety performance. 
 
5.4.2.3 Efficacy of behaviour-based safety programs 
 
Alcoa attributed much of their successful safety record to one particular proprietary BBS program. 
One NZAS manager, on the other hand, was seeking to rationalise their BBS systems by preparing a 
chart comparing Geller’s (2005) seven criteria for an effective BBS, mapping each of their existing 
and former proprietary systems against the criteria: “…we’ve got lots and lots of safety systems that 
we use… so I could clearly see where one was working and where one wasn’t…” [NZAS 2]. Using the 
work of Geller (2005), the manager observed that, “from our 20-odd systems, we’ve actually only 
got… 5…that are actually looking at the work as it is being done.” [NZAS 2]. The authors’ research did 
not identify nor record any conclusion from this analysis, but the logical application of peer-
reviewed research to the efficacy of proprietary BBS programs is nevertheless noteworthy. 
 
5.4.3 Do the benefits derived from hierarchy of control methodology continue in times of financial 
difficulty? 
5.4.3.1 Hierarchy of controls 
Safety managers from both companies believed their long-term and continuing investment in 
higher order controls such as elimination or isolation for hazard mitigation was central to the 
companies’ successful management of safety through all economic climates. With respect to hazard 
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mitigation, NZAS has had an excellent long-term commitment applying funds to the upper end of 
the hierarchy of controls (Young, 2014). Qualitative evidence from both companies in this study 
indicated that this focus on upper level of controls was continuing – even in the most difficult 
financial conditions. This is in stark contrast to more than 80% of large companies, who typically 
rely on lower order controls for hazard mitigation (Behm & Powell, 2014). 
 
Furthermore, the persistent emphasis on using upper level controls in both companies was made 
more successful by both companies’ use of effective and transparent incident reporting. Health and 
safety systems work more effectively when the users of a safety solution are involved in the system 
design (Molineux, 2014). Both companies reportedly continued their open communication across 
all levels of their organisations with respect to hazard identification and mitigation, enhancing the 
application of upper level hazard controls. In the case of NZAS particularly, a focus on the most 
serious class of potential injury appeared to reinforce a constant mindfulness in the workplace – 
although they acknowledged that they had unintentionally moved away from this until an external 
audit highlighted an erosion of safety checks and balances. 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
There is little guidance available to safety managers who seek to keep their people from injury when 
organisations are facing serious financial duress. This paper used a purposive critical case study of 
two unique research opportunities to consider the answers to three questions of relevant interest.   
Firstly, what are the effects on safety management when lean management practices are subject 
to even further financial duress? NZAS management indicated some uneasiness about the possible 
effect on safety of lean TQM principles. They acknowledged that many of their checks and balances 
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that had served their personnel so well in recent decades (Young, 2014) had deteriorated with the 
elimination of non-value-adding waste. NZAS management also deduced that while their LTI 
frequency rate remained admirably low, some of their systems for mitigation of rare, but potentially 
catastrophic, incidents were being eroded. This was highlighted by an external audit. NZAS 
management acknowledged this insidious and unintended drift into hazardous practice and in 
response to the audit, moved directly to resolve the identified shortcomings. 
Secondly, what are the key issues for safety managers surrounding actual or likely staff redundancy? 
Despite indications from the literature that the stress of imminent or possible redundancies may 
produce a deteriorating safety performance, this study did not find any such result. On the contrary, 
both plants reported better safety records than in previous years. The fear of an increase in injuries 
due to increased employee stress (Beale & Nethercott, 1985; Jenkins et al., 1982; Sharp, 2010) did 
not eventuate. This paper therefore notes that companies need not assume that increased injury 
rates are inevitable in difficult financial times. Despite the unhappy consequence of many job losses 
from the Alcoa plant closure and NZAS downsizing, both companies have performed commendably 
in managing the safety of their staff during this difficult period. Both companies were unequivocal 
in maintaining the right for staff to stop work when they were uncertain of their own safety. This 
was especially important when performing shutdowns and other unusual tasks during closure or 
when downsizing operations. Alcoa ultimately closed their plant with their best ever annual safety 
record. NZAS continued its exemplary safety record through trying times, and, more importantly 
was able to identify where encroaching catastrophe may have been looming. 
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Thirdly, do the benefits derived from hierarchy of controls methodology continue in times of 
financial duress? Both companies reported a strong previous and ongoing commitment to 
investment in higher order hierarchy of controls solutions to mitigate hazards. Capital for 
elimination and isolation of hazards had been invested over many years, and was not withheld 
during the “hard times”. The safety managers interviewed in this research project were unequivocal 
in attributing their ongoing success to previous upper-level hierarchy of controls mitigation of 
hazards. Further, while acknowledging the potentially negative effect of lean management 
practices noted above, the effective application of hierarchy of controls methodology appeared to 
be the prime underwriter of safety in hard times. 
This study therefore offers four recommendations for all industrial plants facing financial duress: 
1. Focus on higher order hierarchy of controls mitigation of hazards. When financial 
conditions deteriorate, previous and continued investment in effective higher order 
mitigation will protect staff from hazards. 
2. While lean management is beneficial in the continual search for company profitability, 
remain mindful of retaining non-value-adding work that may not contribute to 
productivity and profitability, but is crucial for safety. 
3. Despite (and perhaps because of) their rarity, treat prevention of Class I injuries as 
paramount. Prevention of Class II injuries (including LTIs) is desirable but sometimes 
distracting: it is easy to overlook the potential for life-altering Class I catastrophes. 
4. Value external audits. A “fresh set of eyes” can identify the unintentional drift away from 
prudent safety mitigation. A positive response to a negative audit may ultimately save 
lives. 
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A final quote from Alcoa staff who delivered record production levels in their final year sums up 
both companies’ ethos:“…you can’t have one without the other – for us, if we had someone injured, 
all those record production rates mean nothing… they mean absolutely nothing to us…” [ALCOA 1]. 
 
5.6  Acknowledgement, researcher declaration, limitations and opportunities 
 
The researchers acknowledge the cooperation of NZAS and Alcoa managers. The first author’s 
access to NZAS’ complex workplace was a notable strength of both this research project and the 
originating study (Young, 2014). The confidence of NZAS management that both studies would be 
conducted in good faith was founded in the researcher’s long association with the smelter as a 
subcontractor. This study was therefore a further unique opportunity to investigate and affirm 
NZAS’ remarkable safety achievement. The cooperation of Alcoa staff in a bittersweet closure of 
their workplace was also greatly appreciated by the researcher. The study was approved by 
Federation University Australia’s Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC). No financial support 
from NZAS, Alcoa or any other body was sought or received. 
 
As a participative observer, the researcher’s previous association with NZAS is nevertheless noted 
as a possible source of bias. The respondents in the qualitative research were in part, self-selected, 
and the codification of the interview transcripts was performed solely by the researcher. In 
addition, the historical injury data cannot be validated. These may be seen as limitations of the 
study. Further, data from other, similar companies were not available for comparison.  
 
The pragmatic worldview evidence presented herein may contribute to a better understanding of 
industrial safety in general, and in particular, inform plants threatened with closure or 
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rationalisation. Further opportunities for research may add to or enhance the recommendations 
offered in the conclusion. In particular, a further investigation of companies under financial duress 
– including those where safety deteriorated during the time of financial difficulty – may contribute 
more fully to our understanding of safety in hard times. 
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Chapter Six:  The efficacy of the hierarchy of controls 
  
6.1  Conclusions from the longitudinal element of the case studies 
 
In many respects, Safety in Hard Times confirmed Zwerling et al.'s, (1997) point (cited in From Zero 
to Hero above) that many interventions are multi-factorial. It is impossible to isolate every 
intervention at the worksites studied (or any other worksite) and test each for efficacy. The 
complexity and interrelationship of workplace conditions was demonstrated in Table 2 (p.36) and 
Figure 7 (p.38) in From Zero to Hero where the relationships between enablers, modifiers and 
interventions were analysed. The qualitative observations and conclusions of Safety in Hard Times 
were therefore not easy to separate and independently evaluate. Nonetheless, the “backbone” of 
both companies’ continuing safety success appeared to have been represented by the NZAS quote 
“I wonder if that’s just where we are on the safety journey – whether those… big ticket items… have 
been done…” [NZAS 3]. The elimination or isolation of hazards – i.e. higher-level controls – were 
already in place, meaning the continuing high levels of safety performance did not depend on 
human behaviour or morale. Further, both companies showed a willingness to keep investing in 
higher-level controls – even when “times were tough” – because they were committed to hazard 
prevention or control at source. 
Despite this strong perception, Safety in Hard Times also revealed some multi-factorial influencers 
(modifiers) on the potential efficacy of the upper-level hierarchy of controls interventions – 
particularly at NZAS. Interestingly the paper documented previously unrecorded instances of some 
safety management issues before any significant adverse effect had occurred - namely: 
• that lean management practice was observed to be leading to increased risk of injury to the 
workforce 
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• that an external audit can point to failed or missing controls and may thereby foreshadow a 
catastrophic event 
• that staff confidence in previous safety initiatives and achievements can be continued even 
when staff know that their job is about to, or may possibly, be terminated. 
Lean management has been shown to have adverse effects on workplace safety (Longoni et al., 
2013), but this has never been detected before any significant adverse effect has been noted. 
Similarly, safety audits (particularly external audits) are generally supposed to detect variations 
from a company’s safety management systems. The literature abounds with retrospective accounts 
of a supposedly satisfactory audit being followed by a catastrophic event [see for instance, Hopkins 
(2000, 2008, 2011)] but the author is unable to find any instance where this has been acknowledged 
in advance of a significant adverse effect and rectified before an injury occurred.  
The generalised contributions to the research project from this paper therefore include: 
• higher-end hierarchy of controls solutions ensure a more robust response to WHS hazards 
during times of economic uncertainty 
• all investment decisions, including safety interventions, are more closely examined during 
difficult economic times 
• stakeholder values are critically examined during times of economic hardship 
• restraint of capital investment must not include withholding ongoing investment in upper 
hierarchy preventive measures. 
Planning for, and resourcing something that may or may not happen, i.e. occupational injury, is 
sometimes seen as an “optional extra” or a “nice-to-have”. In times of recession or when a company 
is experiencing financial difficulties, safety and its associated activities are often casualties of 
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financial rationalization. Despite the challenging financial circumstances faced by these operations, 
both plants continued their exemplary safety records.  
The paper also considered the availability of capital for safety hierarchy interventions, related 
return on investment (ROI), and the impact on safety of lean thinking. This paper therefore 
contributes to the documentation of safety integrity within the organisational model, as well as 
being an informative insight into “safety in hard times”. The Federation University Australia ethics 
approval for this research is included in Appendix A. 
Findings from this study were incorporated into the following presentations: 
• Young, S.A. (2015) Safety in hard times – how do good companies maintain their high 
levels of safety performance when faced with an extremely harsh economic 
environment? International keynote speaker, Safety 360 conference, Auckland, New 
Zealand; March 16-17, 2015. 
• Young, S.A. (2016) Safety in hard times: how can companies retain an excellent safety 
record through times of financial constraint? 6th International Symposium on Energy 
Challenges & Mechanics (ISECM) – Towards a Big Picture, Inverness, Scotland, United 
Kingdom; August 14-18, 2016;  
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6.2  Evidence of efficacy 
 
Part One of this research project sought to answer the question, “How may contemporary evidence 
demonstrate the efficacy of the safety hierarchy?”  
Despite its almost universal acceptance in principle as a self-evident doctrine, the upper levels of 
the safety hierarchy are mostly ignored in safety interventions intended to prevent injury and 
disease (Behm & Powell, 2014). This will also be revealed as a key finding of Part Three, Chapter 
Thirteen of this research: a survey of one industry’s understanding of hazard mitigation which 
revealed that while some understanding of the hierarchy of controls exists, the application of the 
doctrine to their specific hazards was virtually non-existent. 
Nevertheless, rather than convince safety professionals that the safety hierarchy should be used 
when it is currently being frequently ignored, a more positive approach was presented in Part One 
by confirming its efficacy in particularly hazardous workplaces. The paper From Zero to Hero – 
Chapter Three – therefore explored the paradigm of a successful ZAV, and demonstrated how an 
effective ZAV utilised higher order controls inter alia to achieve an almost injury-free workplace, 
within a notoriously hazardous industry. 
Further, the temptation for sceptics to suppose that From Zero to Hero was an exceptional instance, 
arising coincidentally from a highly successful and profitable enterprise, was dispelled by revisiting 
the same workplace years later when the same company was placed under extreme financial duress 
and the plant was under threat of closure. The paper Safety in Hard Times also explored another 
similar (competing) workplace which, despite facing actual closure, still maintained its excellent 
safety performance as it wound down to its final day. The second paper was complementary to 
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From Zero to Hero because, using qualitative methods exclusively, it reported the enduring effect 
of previously instigated, higher order safety interventions, as observed by the active participants. It 
also highlighted how easily such gains could be forfeited under lean management when 
organisations are considering withdrawing from the higher order controls.  
Both papers represented a unique opportunity to investigate and analyse high-hazard workplaces 
achieving safety excellence in good times and bad. Both demonstrated that, insofar as possible in a 
non-randomised study, a long-term commitment to safety interventions based primarily on higher 
order controls does result in exceptional safety performance. 
 
6.3  Towards an understanding of why the success of the safety hierarchy is generally 
ignored 
Part Two will examine the constraints on understanding of the hazard vector and its representation 
within the hierarchy of controls. But before this is considered in depth, it is appropriate to ask, “Why 
are successful applications of the safety hierarchy generally ignored?” As international keynote 
speaker to the March, 2015 Safety 360 conference in Auckland, New Zealand, the candidate posed 
this question to the community of safety managers in the country where much of the data examined 
in Part One was gathered. The text of the presentation was also published in New Zealand 
Management magazine and is included as Appendix D. This article is not a peer-reviewed 
contribution to this research project but nonetheless represents a caution to New Zealand’s 
managers in regard to their apparent failure to learn from the NZAS example. 
New Zealand has an unenviable occupational safety record when compared to other OECD 
countries (Figure 11).  
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Figure 11. Comparison of fatalities per 100,000 workers in comparable OECD countries 2001-2010. 
Data sourced from Statistics New Zealand 
 
Strangely, few other large New Zealand organisations – many of which display a zero harm logo as 
a key part of their organisation’s identity – appear to have contacted NZAS to understand how they 
can all but eliminate workplace injury when others cannot. Why would safety managers in that 
country not seek to emulate the success of NZAS? Clearly the candidate’s unfettered access to that 
workplace and the company’s willingness to have their achievements examined and published must 
indicate a propensity to share their safety paradigm and pragmatic methodology? (In the author’s 
experience, this is certainly the case across the aluminium smelting industry generally.) 
The presentation to the conference made the following key points as a challenge to the delegates 
as to why they were not following NZAS’ example (the full text is included as Appendix D): 
• Most supposed law-abiding companies in New Zealand follow the “kind wish 
school of safety”. Typically, they spend money on signs and slogans exhorting 
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their employees to “be safe!” often without explanation of what this may mean. 
They provide training for their employees that “changes behaviour” when there 
is limited evidence that (a) behaviour can be irreversibly changed in most work 
situations, or (b) that behaviour is the problem in the first place.  
• While worker behaviour is integral to the complex aetiology of occupational 
injury and ill-health, exclusive focus on the actions of individuals in workplace 
safety has limited legitimacy. It would be difficult for people to “work safely” 
when an explosion was pursuing them at supersonic speed, or a heavy load 
falling on them from above. Because companies do not actively wish to hurt their 
own people, we call this mode of safety the kind wish: in this circumstance 
companies profess a wish that their employees suffer no injury, but provide only 
limited mitigation for the ever-present hazards that lead to injury and ill-health.  
• So what is the alternative? The answer lies in the simplest of ideas – one that 
most safety professionals claim to follow but few actually do: the hierarchy of 
controls. The higher levels of control such as eliminating or even isolating the 
hazard are frequently ignored in safety analyses under the guise of 
“impracticality”. This is a “get-out-of-jail-free card”, embedded in our legislation, 
for many companies that simply appear reluctant to confront a significant hazard 
in the workplace. Instead, they point to the lowest order of controls: signs, 
warnings, rules, training… the “non-hierarchy of control”. 
• Post-Pike River (in 2012, 29 miners perished in New Zealand in an explosion of 
the Pike River coal mine), every well-meaning safety professional and regulator 
asked, “How can we improve safety in New Zealand?” But they generally asked 
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people who earn their living by training workers in the kind wish school of safety. 
The writer often observed the trainers recommend “more training” (a lower 
order control) as the answer.  
• I am not suggesting that we discontinue all safety training programs in New 
Zealand; but I am suggesting that as a lower order control, training may help 
people avoid injury, but can never assure any injury avoidance. There is 
considerable evidence that we can increase people’s knowledge, but there is 
little evidence that this will result in different behaviours – or even that a 
different behaviour would have prevented the injury at all. 
• Some may point to NZAS’s corporate ownership as providing the requisite funds 
for such mitigation and success (in using the hierarchy of controls paradigm). 
There are three answers to this:  
1. There are many (albeit  in some companies only) successful examples of the 
hierarchy of controls being used to mitigate hazards, without spending huge 
amounts of capital 
2. Sometimes, large amounts capital are required – but in 2012, NZAS lost $49 
million after tax – yet still kept its exemplary safety record 
3. The third answer is simply, “so what?” Where the cost of safety is high, let’s 
be honest about it.  
 
We need to abandon the kind wish school of safety and embark on a highly 
considered and evidentially based program of workplace injury mitigation in New 
Zealand. Just like NZAS. 
 Chapter Six:  The efficacy of the hierarchy of controls 
 
 
 
101 
 
 
The presentation provoked much discussion but the author is not confident that this challenge 
achieved a sea change in New Zealand safety management. Part Two presents a more thorough 
investigation of the constraints on understanding the hazard vector as it relates to the safety 
hierarchy. 
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PART TWO:   What are the 
constraints on understanding the 
hazard vector as it relates to the 
safety hierarchy? 
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Chapter Seven:  Introduction to Part Two 
 
In reviewing the literature relevant to the key question of this research project, the history 
and progression of safety writing in general was briefly reviewed and summarised in Chapter 
One: Background to the study. This summary was offered as a contextualisation for the 
investigatory process and intended to identify where the gaps in safety knowledge lay. It was 
noted that the design and assessment of theoretical frameworks for organisational safety is 
limited (Goldenhar et al., 2001; Haas & Yorio, 2016; Robson et al., 2001; Shannon et al., 1999; 
Zwerling et al., 1997) and that safety practitioners are often confused as to which they should 
use and why (Underwood & Waterson, 2013). A dichotomy in the literature was also noted 
between the ergonomic or energy damage model, and the anthropocentric (or egocentric) 
behaviour-based safety approach. In order to more fully understand the efficacy of the 
hierarchy of controls, a more detailed examination of the literature was then conducted to 
focus on the etymology and everyday usage of the word cause and the multi-disciplinary 
sociological ramifications of injurious events. This literature review paid particular attention 
to the language surrounding the multi-faceted use of the word cause – including 
philosophical, legal, and physical aspects of the concept. If the hazard vector (Figure 2, p.11) 
is to be more clearly understood, the etymological background to the construct of cause must 
be investigated more thoroughly. This focus led to the more specific review of the use of the 
word cause submitted in the next chapter, Chapter Eight: The Root Cause Fallacy. 
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Having investigated the concept of cause in occupational disease and injury, the most 
common version of the hierarchy of controls used in Australian workplaces is then 
deconstructed in Chapter Nine in order to consider the potential for confusion and 
misunderstanding. A simplified version is offered to ameliorate such misunderstanding by 
mapping the model directly to the hazard vector (Figure 13, p.139). This reconsideration will 
also seek to simplify and streamline the hierarchy into a three-stage generality. The 
background to the hierarchy is briefly described, followed by a discussion on the variance and 
problems associated with the existing, often misinterpreted safety hierarchy. A simplified 
version is recommended as an easily understandable maxim for all to use, while still 
encompassing all the requisite features. The aim of providing yet another version is not to 
further the confusion, but to focus attention on the core functionality of the technique and 
how it may be applied most effectively to all hazardous work situations. 
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Chapter Eight:  The Root Cause Fallacy – a literature review 
 
8.1  Abstract 
The idea of causation is not supported by most philosophers, but the concept of cause is 
ubiquitous throughout safety law and in safety practice. The attribution of blame is pervasive 
in both negligence law and in occupational safety. This paper advocates the avoidance of 
anthropocentrism in occupational injury investigation and rejection of root cause analysis. 
While it is acknowledged that accident investigators may continue to use cause as a 
description of the circumstances surrounding an occupational injury, they should recognise 
that it is an approximate and uncertain construct. Caution should therefore be exercised in 
using perceived cause as a basis for subsequent workplace interventions. 
 
8.2  Introduction 
“All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the fundamental axioms 
or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced sciences such as gravitational 
astronomy, the word cause never occurs... The law of causality, I believe, like much that 
passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, 
only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm” (Russell, 1913, p.387). 
Perhaps embracing the concept of cause in safety does harm people. Perhaps the fixation of 
most safety practitioners with determining the “root cause” of an occupational injury is 
erroneous. The purpose of this paper is not to provide a definitive philosophical discourse on 
the nature of causality, nor a legal determination of fault and negligence, but to emphasise 
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the uncertainty and fallibility of deterministic causal analysis in safety. The word cause 
appears almost inevitably in all safety writing – from peer-reviewed literature to minor 
accident reports – but guidance on the meaning and origin of the word is virtually absent.  
This paper therefore seeks to highlight the inadequacy of simplistic, often arbitrary attribution 
of the word cause; analyse the word’s origins, and consider whether a more rational model 
could be employed to understand occupational injury.  
In his analysis of the BP Texas City Refinery explosion, Hopkins (2008) writes, “There are no 
root causes, only points at which we stop asking, ‘Why?’. Too often we stop prematurely” 
(p.51). The conventional models supporting our understanding of safety (and accidents) have 
been challenged in recent years. There has been a call for new anti-dualist metaphors in the 
pursuit of occupational safety (Dien et al., 2012; Le Coze, 2013). Calling for “new models for 
new times” Le Coze (2013) concluded, “…some important developments have not been 
represented… including… epistemological and philosophical perspectives” (p.216). Further, 
Hollnagel (2014) has pointed out that “new types of accidents have been accounted for by 
adding new types of causes…” (p.22) and adds, “An alternative approach would, of course, be 
to challenge or change the basic underlying assumption of causality, but few have entertained 
that” (p.22). This paper will address that challenge by outlining the popular use and 
philosophical misuse of cause in an explanation of the fallacy of identifying the root cause.   
 
8.3  A short history of cause 
An introductory quote will serve to highlight how the word cause is used more as a literal 
device than as a definitive active verb. When discussing the impetus for Australian 
colonisation, A Short History of Australia describes conditions in England, Scotland, and 
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Ireland as “…a society of extreme inequality (where) the degrading poverty of the masses 
caused crime to flourish” (Clark, 2006, p.15). Few would disagree with this statement, yet no 
absolute link or cause can be established between poverty and crime other than as an 
intuitive observation.  
Our understanding of the word cause has changed little over the centuries. Religion, myth, 
and magic have driven popular interpretation of injury causation as manifestations of divine 
punishment and retribution (Guarnieri, 1992; Haddon, 1973). Anthropological texts have 
referred to groups of people reverting to superstition where their understanding of their 
known world takes precedence over their ability (or inability) to comprehend new fields of 
knowledge (Guarnieri, 1992; Heinrich, 1931; Malinowski, 1948). In a similar manner, accidents 
have customarily been regarded as purely random events, communicating a mixture of ideas: 
injury, property loss, unexpected events, and unintended results (Guarnieri, 1992; Loimer & 
Guarnieri, 1996). 
An Aristotelian description defines causation as a relation between two things, agent and 
patient, where one by its power effects a change in the other (Falcon, 2012; Wahl, 1980). 
Kant’s [1724-1804] law of the connection of cause and effect and Mill’s [1806-1873] law of 
causation continued the deterministic explanation of a proactive link (a causing effect) 
between one event and another (Norton, 2007). David Hume [1711-1776], on the other hand, 
postulated that because only correlation can be observed, causation cannot be proven 
(Norton & Norton, 2007). Hume argued that causation itself is a meaningless phenomenon – 
a series of conjoined events that we presume to be causally related, but one that may equally 
be presumed not causally related (Norton & Norton, 2007). Russell (1913, 1948) also stated 
that, over and above an actual physical force between two objects or events, causation 
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cannot be demonstrated. “There are a large number of such approximate regularities which 
are assumed in our every-day behaviour, and it is from them that our causal laws arose… 
(they) remain valid so long as they are only regarded as asserting probabilities” (Russell, 1948, 
p.327).  In effect, the philosophers Hume and Russell initiated the contemporary scientific 
dismissal of association masquerading as cause. 
Yet, along with the rejection of the word accident as an inadequate descriptor of workplace 
injury (Doege, 1978, 1999; Gibson, 1961; Haddon, 1970, 1973; Haddon et al., 1964; Heinrich, 
1931; Robertson, 1992), a call for a popular rejection of the word cause is no more likely to 
succeed. While concurring with Russell’s dismissal of the technical concept of cause, Norton 
rehabilitates the notion somewhat by maintaining that “causes and causal principles are… 
heuristically useful notions… a kind of folk science” (Norton, 2007, p.13) where negative 
(sceptical) and positive (constructive) theses can be considered and adopted or rejected 
according to the evidence. Subsequently, Russell (1948) and Norton (2007) maintained that 
an assertion of cause can be regarded as a false, but approximately true, folk theory. It is the 
story we tell each other, to explain the uncertain. 
Sociological theorists expanded on this discursive reciprocity, albeit within a variety of 
theoretical constructs. The positivists were led initially by Comte [1798-1857] who wrote, "By 
speculating on causes, we could solve no difficulty about origins and purpose. Our real 
business is to analyse accurately the circumstances of phenomena, and to connect them by 
the natural relations of succession and resemblance" (Turner, 2001, p.32).  Marx [1818-1883] 
– regarded as a critical realist – "makes no assumption that social laws express themselves as 
causal regularities… social theory has to rely on the force of abstraction alone . . . realists (do 
not) regard causation as positivists do, as clear-cut dependencies between separate entities 
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and events"  (McLennan, 2001, p.51). The divergence of sociological schools in respect to 
cause is clear, but more recently a collaborative mechanistic explanatory approach appears 
to have been forged where mechanisms are special types of causal  laws that generate “…a 
predictable outcome in a given environment” (Zhao, 2001, p.387). 
The philosophers who did accept the notion of cause, proceeded to clarify this difficult 
concept with a series of elucidating characteristics. Mill pointed out that causes were 
commonly complex, comprising a number of individually necessary conditions required to 
constitute one necessary cause (Norton, 2007). Therefore only the complex of conditions 
could be called the cause. He asked why, in everyday life, we are inclined to pick out one 
rather than another of the jointly sufficient elements and give the name cause to that (Norton 
& Norton, 2007; Norton, 2007).  John Mackie [1917-1981] re-examined the contemporary 
concept of cause in the 1960s – introducing the INUS concept: insufficient but non-redundant 
parts of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect 
(Mackie, 1974). The acronym INUS is commonly interpreted thus (Weber & Weber, 2005): 
• IN – insufficient but necessary (such as oxygen in a fire – its presence is insufficient for 
a fire to start, but is necessary for continued combustion) 
• US – unnecessary but sufficient (a faulty gas heater may be sufficient to initiate a fire, 
but it is unnecessary in the sense that other phenomena may also initiate a fire). 
These concepts enhance our understanding of the interaction between phenomena and 
events, but do not supplant the scientific method in the interpretation of our world: the laws 
of quantum physics explain the exact nature of energy exchange; chemical and biological 
evidence guide our understanding of pathological injury. Human abstractions of relationships 
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between multiple events, over and above principles of scientific method, are speculative folk 
science. We call these abstractions cause. 
 8.4 The blame game 
“Causation is an anthropocentric phenomenon” (Price & Corry, 2007, p.5). Russell (1913) 
compared cause to volition since, as he asserted: people generally require “an intelligible 
nexus between cause and effect” (p.392). The philosopher Nagel [1901-1985] (as cited in 
Norton, 2007 p.20, Nagel's emphasis) stated that the principal of causality is “a maxim for 
inquiry rather than a statement with definite empirical content”; while Norton further 
described the human need to assign anthropocentric explanations to events and their 
precursors as a “…constant conjunction or functional dependence within actual experiences” 
(Norton, 2007, p.21). 
Perhaps this is the basis for workplace safety law, negligence, and associated compensation 
claims. In their 1959 seminal book Causation in the Law, Hart and Honoré admitted that the 
scientist may look for sufficient conditions, but point out that that in everyday life questions 
about cause of some single event will normally be answered quite differently. They suggested 
that, “In distinguishing causes from mere conditions, two contrasts are of prime importance: 
the contrasts between what is abnormal and what is normal in relation to any given thing or 
subject-matter, and between a free deliberate human action and all other conditions” (Hart 
& Honoré, 1959, p.31). The perceived abnormality of any situation will resonate with safety 
professionals: a negative feedback loop in supervisory management highlights abnormal data 
as a basis for corrective action; while “free deliberate human action” will also be familiar to 
those who follow the “human error school” of occupational injury analysis. 
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For fault to be attributed, negligence must be proven. Negligence is predominantly (but not 
always) required for compensation for personal injuries. The tort of negligence depends on 
the establishment of liability from fault attributed to the defendant (Davies & Malkin, 2008). 
Having proven such negligence, the plaintiff must then establish that the defendant’s 
negligence caused his or her injuries. Davies & Malkin (2008) quote two judges who wrote, 
“In the realm of negligence, causation is essentially a question of fact, to be resolved as a 
matter of common sense” (p.108).  This statement is clearly inconsistent with the 
philosophical interpretation of cause. Further, it is incomprehensible to safety professionals 
who lament the application of common sense to complex, uncommon phenomena. 
The but for test asks, ”Would the plaintiff’s injuries have been suffered but for the defendant’s 
negligence?” (Davies & Malkin, 2008, p.108).  “The issue of causation requires a plaintiff to 
prove what would probably have eventuated had the defendant’s negligence not occurred. 
This is necessarily a hypothetical question and involve(d) an evaluation of circumstances 
which did not in fact happen” (p109). Davies and Malkin point out that the “but for test is 
better at identifying what is not cause than it is at identifying what is the cause of (an) 
accident” (p109). Given the legal importance of establishing negligence to determine blame, 
it is not surprising that the but for test is normally overwhelmingly anthropocentric. For the 
safety analyst, this focus on negligence in determining cause often appears unjust (Dekker, 
2007; Reason, 2000). Worse still, it offers little understanding of the nature of the 
circumstances surrounding the event, and even less understanding of what should be done 
to prevent similar circumstances recurring in the future. Perhaps sardonically, Hopkins (2000) 
comments that, in a legal investigation, analysts “…stop when causal analysis is no longer of 
assistance in attributing legal liability” (p.23) and, “Blaming the operator implicitly assumes 
Chapter Eight: The root cause fallacy  
112 
 
the stop rule that once we have identified a deliberate unsafe act or violation by an operator 
we can stop our inquiry” (p.16). 
8.5  Cause in safety 
In his pioneering paper, The Epidemiology of Accidents, Gordon (1949) called for the 
development of “specific preventive measures directed towards causes… remedy must be 
suited to the whole of cause, as it lies in the host, agent, and environment” (p.504). Previously, 
the rising casualty statistics from the industrial revolution, the increasing popularity of 
psychiatry as a presumed solution to the problems of mankind in the 19th century, and even 
the temperance movement, all began to focus on the worker as the cause of accidents: 
“People were responsible for their own safety, and the victim shared the guilt for his or her 
injury” (Guarnieri, 1992). In the 19th century, and well into the 20th century, British factory 
inspectors were primarily concerned with the breakages of machinery and plant involved in 
any accidents, since they regarded that any other causes could not be reasonably prevented 
(Hale, 2014). 
Many of these anthropocentric concepts were included in Heinrich’s influential work 
Industrial Accident Prevention (Heinrich, 1931). The enduring legacies of this book and its 
1941, 1950, and 1959 reissues are two ratios that prevail throughout safety management. 
The first is Heinrich’s causation theory: 88:10:2, where the causes of accidents are identified 
as: 88% unsafe acts of persons; 10% unsafe mechanical or physical conditions; and 2% 
unpreventable. The second is Heinrich’s loss control triangle: 300:29:1 which indicates that 
the existence of a “base” of 300 nil-injury accidents will portend 29 minor injuries in a 
workplace which will in turn, portend 1 major injury. Heinrich (1931) stated that, 
“…psychology lies at the root of any sequence of accident causes…” (p.127), and, having 
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delivered his 88:10:2 causation model, he advocated prevention through “…identifying the 
first proximate and most easily prevented cause in the selection of remedies” (p.45). Since 
Heinrich deems 88% of accidents to have been caused by human error, he is clearly focusing 
on human error as the key preventive measure. Yet, Heinrich’s data and analysis are not able 
to be substantiated (Manuele, 2011). If there ever was any epidemiological basis for 
Heinrich’s ratios, it has been lost forever. While Heinrich contributed much to our 
understanding of preventive measures through management of production equipment, we 
cannot rely on his anthropocentric assertions of accident causation. 
Writers in the behavioural sciences continued to work on their interpretation of the 
relationship of human beings to their work environment insofar as it relates to occupational 
injury (Rasmussen, 1982; Rasmussen et al., 1987; Rasmussen & Jensen, 1974; Reason, 1990). 
Perhaps with the realisation that human error is often an ill-defined or vague expression, 
Rasmussen (1982) pointed out that, “…the analyst will not have the information – or 
psychological background – which is necessary to trace through the human performance in 
the explanatory backtracking process to find a possible causal input” (p.313). Reason (2000) 
noted that in the system approach, “Errors are seen as consequences rather than causes” 
(p.768). Rasmussen (2003) called for “…a reconsideration of human error: research should be 
focused on a general understanding of human behaviour and social interaction in cognitive 
terms in complex, dynamic environments, not on fragments of behaviour called error” 
(p.383). 
It can be seen here that Reason and Rasmussen increasingly focus on analyses of 
organisational factors and system-oriented measures for injury prevention, rather than on 
personal factors and individuals’ propensity for error, previously regarded as causation. 
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Reason (2000) points out that “…(although) we cannot change the human condition, we can 
change the conditions under which humans work” (p.768). Rasmussen (2003) writes “The 
error is a link in the chain, in most cases not the origin of the course of events” (p.377). 
Nevertheless, a large number of papers written towards the end of the 20th century continued 
to build on the causal construct of human error, often without any definition of what was 
meant by the term. 
Meanwhile, evaluating the effects of occupational health and safety intervention has become 
central to ongoing safety improvement (Goldenhar & Shulte, 1994; Haas & Yorio, 2016; 
Zwerling et al., 1997). Intervention research may be defined as the study of planned and 
applied activities designed to produce designated outcomes (Windsor, Baranowski, Clark, & 
Cutter, 1984). Prevention effectiveness research includes identifying efficacious and effective 
strategies to reduce morbidity and mortality (Goldenhar & Shulte, 1994). The literature 
proposing theoretical frameworks for devising or assessing safety interventions is limited 
(Goldenhar et al., 2001; Goldenhar & Shulte, 1994; Rivara & Thompson, 2000; Roelofs et al., 
2003; Shannon et al., 1999; Zwerling et al., 1997). Goldenhar and Shulte’s (1994) review of 36 
occupational health and safety intervention studies called for increased measurement of 
reliability and validity of intervention data. These reservations regarding contemporary safety 
intervention inferentially point towards a reconsideration of the very nature of cause; for if 
we misinterpret the concept of the cause of an occupational injury, surely our intervention 
designed to prevent a recurrence is misguided at best and foolish at worst? 
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8.6  Specious supposition or dispassionate discourse? 
Many models of safety have been introduced and examined as exemplars of incident 
investigation and intervention over the past 30 years [see for instance, Katsakiori, 
Sakellaropoulos, and Manatakis’ (2009) evaluation of accident investigation methods]. Safety 
practitioners are often confused as to which they should use and why. Rather than elevating 
one model above all others, Le Coze (2013) suggests there is room for alternative models 
based on complementary insights from several areas of study – not to replace the existing 
models but to “sensitise phenomena differently, to open up new interpretations but also help 
to guide more precisely, or more analytically, than was previously the case, where and what 
to look at” (p.216). Existing incident and intervention research is too often based on 
researchers’ intuition and experience rather than on theory and evidence (Goldenhar & 
Shulte, 1994; Shannon et al., 1999). In the analysis of the sequence of events leading up to an 
incident, a timeline is frequently constructed as a basis for understanding. Yet the 
identification and interpretation of the events is too often specious and the supposition that 
the timeline represents an exhaustive understanding of everything that took place is generally 
inadequate. 
The theory of causal attribution explains how a person’s position in an organisational 
structure can affect the way safety is perceived or analysed within that organisation (Edwards 
& Potter, 1993). In particular, incident analysis may result in errors or bias according to the 
analyst’s position in the organisational structure (DeJoy, 1994; Gray, 2009; Gyekye, 2010). 
Critically, subjective attribution of causation becomes central to blame and responsibilisation 
(Gray, 2009). Moreover, Gray (2009) argues that workers are being forced to adopt a rights-
defined identity where they are regarded not only as the victims of industrial injury, but also 
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the key offenders in causing accidents by not working safely. He attributes this to the neo-
liberal concept of individual responsibility, highlighting Ontario’s ticketing system for worker 
violations, and safety-oriented behavioural programmes, such as DuPont’s STOP® (these 
programmes penalised individuals for their perceived behavioural errors). 
Carroll (1995) describes the incident review process as, “a window on collective sense making 
around problems, troubles, and disappointments”; the incident is ‘understood’ yet “before 
the incident occurred, the same events did not have the same meaning” (p.176). Carroll 
identified the root cause seduction (p.175) as evidence of the “attractiveness of linear cause-
effect thinking” (p.180). Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) noted that in incident reviews, “Causes 
precede effects, but effects are seen first and are used to predict their prior causes” (p.10). In 
explaining how and why an injury occurred, investigators’ “…attributional reasoning may be 
unnatural, unspontaneous, and produced by asking them to make causal inferences that they 
might not otherwise have done or in a form that they might not have freely chosen” (Edwards 
& Potter, 1993, p.29). This quote is especially evocative of popular incident investigation 
software where the investigator is required to select a cause from a drop-down box. 
Buss (1978) also summarised the important distinction between cause and reason. The 
participant and the commentator related to any situation are engaged in fundamentally 
different processes when attempting to explain that situation; the participant gives a reason 
explanation for his/her participation in the event, whereas the commentator gives a causal 
account.  
Further, the confirmation bias highlights our inclination to reject information that is not 
consistent with our prejudices and to actively look for evidence that is: “Our natural tendency 
seems to be to look for evidence that is directly supportive of hypotheses we favour” 
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(Nickerson, 1998, p.211). This is commonly referred to in safety as WYLFWYWF: What you are 
looking for is what you will find (Lundberg, Rollenhagen, & Hollnagel, 2009). To expeditiously 
conclude an investigation with a commonly accepted or intuitive attribution of cause or blame 
is a frequent outcome of accident investigations.  A further manifestation of the confirmation 
bias is to conclude an incident investigation as soon as the investigator finds a condition or 
characteristic that is familiar: “…no objective stop rule exists to terminate the causal back 
tracking in search of a root cause. The search stops when an event is found for which a cure 
is known to the analyst” (Rasmussen, 1999, p.1).  
Notwithstanding the philosophical objections to the notion of cause, these artefacts of 
anthropocentricism dilute the efficacy of understanding and intervention. An alternative to 
the misanthropic attribution of blame may enhance our understanding of the sequence of 
events leading up to an incident. Le Coze (2013) argued that, “…to cope with complexity, 
increasing our ability to see with different lenses clearly justifies the need to elaborate 
alternative models to those that already exist” (p.209). To develop a more dispassionate 
understanding of the timeline, a more comprehensive discourse is required. It has been 
demonstrated that decreasing the processing ease of an argument (disfluency) can reduce the 
effects of the confirmation bias (Hernandez & Preston, 2013). When analysing a sequence of 
events, a different lens may lead to a disinclination to accommodate expedient 
anthropomorphism or the heedless assignation of cause. 
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8.7  Whereto for accident investigation? A discussion 
What are we trying to do when we investigate a workplace accident? Surely we are 
attempting to (1) identify what went wrong in that one work instance; and (2) recommend 
remedial measures to prevent a recurrence within a similar instance of that work. Two 
weaknesses arise within this model: 
1. What went wrong is generally fraught with confusion involving loose concepts of 
cause [these include issues of taxonomic variation due to use of language generally 
(Lindhout, van Gulijk, & Ale, 2011), root cause, and anthropocentrism] 
2. Therefore the “remedial measures” are equally confused and, by implication, of 
questionable efficacy. 
There have been numerous models of accident investigation proposed and prescribed (Sklet, 
2004; Underwood & Waterson, 2014). Hovden, Albrechtsen and Herrera (2010) asked, “Is 
there a need for new theories, models and approaches to occupational accident prevention?” 
(p.950). Perhaps the multiplicity of investigation techniques is confusing for those charged 
with identifying specific characteristics of traumatic occupational events and thereby 
proposing preventive recommendations for the future. These models – particularly systemic 
accident analysis models – are not widely used by accident investigators (Underwood & 
Waterson, 2013). Moreover, there is no certainty that the circumstances leading up to one 
investigated accident will be replicated in another similar incident – therefore there can be 
no assurance that the remedial measures will be effective (Hopkins, 2014). So where does this 
place us in work intervention techniques assumed to prevent future accidents? Do we need 
yet another accident investigation methodology? It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
recommend a new investigation technique; or to recommend one existing accident 
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investigation methodology over another. The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to 
the limitations and distortions that can be introduced by any accident investigation 
methodology that tries to identify cause, root cause and blame – regardless of which 
technique is employed.  
Incident investigators generally consider that they presently investigate thoroughly, fairly, 
and non-judgementally within whatever methodology they use. Yet most assessments of any 
accident investigation reveal an anthropocentric bias, and an assignment of cause based on 
no measureable relationship between objects, people, or events. These causes are primarily 
descriptions of sociological constructs, which may be appropriate to describe the context of 
that accident, but are not necessarily transferrable to interventions devised to prevent similar 
future events. Hollnagel (2014) wrote, “We have… through centuries become so accustomed 
to explaining accidents in terms of cause-effect relations – simple or compound – that we no 
longer notice it. And we cling tenaciously to this tradition, although it has become increasingly 
difficult to reconcile with reality” (p.22). And yet, it is self-evident that reality is what we seek 
– for how else are we to provide effective workplace interventions? It is accepted that both 
philosophically and sociologically, the linking of occupational injury events to preceding 
circumstances will generally continue to be known as causes: there is a social need to 
associate contiguous conditions and events with a significant injury. Yet accident investigators 
must acknowledge that these concepts are often approximate and uncertain. 
Initially, a rejection of anthropocentrism – the seemingly universal need to attribute blame – 
is counterintuitive; it is convenient to speculate that if someone had acted differently, then 
the injury would not have happened. Yet we could equally introduce the prima facie absurdity 
that if the injured party was not present he/she would not have been injured. This is perhaps 
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the source of the notion that 88% of injuries are “caused by human error” (Heinrich, 1931). 
Heinrich’s “88%” claim is frequently incorporated into contemporary literature (Barkan, 
Zohar, & Erev, 1998; Korolija & Lundberg, 2010; Murphy, DuBois, & Hurreu, 1986; Reason et 
al., 2006; Shappell et al., 2007; Sheridan, 2008; Simard & Marchand, 1995; Wright & van der 
Schaaf, 2004; Zohar, 2000). Does the human error claim simply mean that people were there 
at the time? If exactly the same exchanges of energy occurred and a potential victim was 
absent, does that not constitute the same potential hazard? What use is anthropocentrism in 
preventing a recurrence except to warn a worker not to go to work? Far from being reductio 
ad absurdum observations, the very questions of “What are we doing?”, and “Why are we 
here?” often provide us with the essence of safety in an occupational environment. A 
conscious avoidance of anthropocentrism minimises the effect of attribution and 
confirmation biases. Using more carefully structured language and a more objective analysis 
of the circumstances surrounding an occupational injury provides a disfluency which may slow 
down impulsive or intuitive judgements and reduce the effects of biases (Hernandez & 
Preston, 2013).  
The seeking of a cause, particularly a root cause, appears to be a noble quest: if you could be 
the one to “slay the dragon”, would you not be seen as a hero? Yet all but for factors in a 
timeline are equally critical in preventing a similar event in the future. There may be dozens 
of but fors: the elimination, addition, or control of the most undramatic or invisible factor is 
equally as effective as similar treatment of a more noticeable factor (the “dragon”). The 
identification of a singular root cause is almost always an absurdity. 
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Finally, what is to be made of the uncertainty of introducing remedial measures for future 
work processes based on a causal investigation of a previous negative event (accident)? 
Perhaps rather than focussing on the cause or root cause of catastrophic events, safety should 
focus on the dynamic non-event (Weick, 2011) of a hazardous industry working with 
significantly fewer injuries than that of comparable organisations. Hovden et al. (2010) 
suggested that “one may need to supplement with models representing alternative mindsets 
in order to spark the imagination and creativity required to solve the accident risk problems” 
(p.954). As a final observation, this paper recommends that increased attention to 
organisations that are quietly succeeding may be preferable to dwelling on major accidents 
where organisations have clearly failed. For instance, Young (2014) described a significant 
reduction in a particularly hazardous smelting environment through interventions based (at 
least in part) on non-anthropocentric incident investigations and the assiduous adoption of 
inferential remedial recommendations at the higher end of the safety hierarchy. 
 
8.8  Conclusion 
When Russell (1913) wrote (perhaps facetiously) “The law of causality… (survives) like the 
monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm...” (p.387), his repudiation 
of causality over and above scientific method precipitated a sober caution to those seeking 
to establish cause in safety. Many believe that we need to perpetuate the notion of cause to 
explain the world around us. That may be so, but in accepting a need to determine a 
paramount root cause, or a need to assign blame, we miss the comprehensive reality of the 
situation – and thereby miss opportunities to prevent a recurrence of occupational injury, or 
even the occurrence of the injury in the first instance. Effective accident prevention 
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methodology – drawn from negative feedback loops – offers a simple broadening of the but 
for test without the simplistic focus on one event in time (the cause) or the anthropocentrism 
of blame attribution. The adoption of less anthropocentric investigation techniques – without 
the preordained requirement for a root cause enhances investigative reasoning through a 
more dispassionate and rational approach.  
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8.10 Future opportunities 
 
Further qualitative research into organisations’ use of anthropocentric language in incident 
reports – including an acknowledgement of attribution and confirmation biases, their use of 
cycle of improvement feedback loops, and their (mis)understanding and use of cause as a 
concept – may extend our awareness of how occupational injury can be reduced. 
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Chapter Nine: Alignment of the hierarchy of controls with the hazard 
vector 
 
9.1 A reconsideration of the safety hierarchy 
This section will turn to a consideration of why the hierarchy of controls is frequently not 
understood or simply ignored in workplaces. 
To begin, the simple “mechanical procedure” of the hierarchy of controls may be stated thus: 
• Once a hazard has been identified in the workplace, the hierarchy of controls 
promotes a prioritised series of control measures, of decreasing effectiveness, for 
mitigation of that hazard. The intent is to only progress to a lower level of mitigation 
when the completion of a higher level is impossible.  
The multiplicity of versions of the hierarchy of control has been noted in Chapter One, Section 
1.4 (pp.10-11). The various versions of the safety hierarchy do not arise from a research base 
(although limited evidence is gradually becoming available – some  as part of this research 
project), but appear to have simply grown out of the experience and consensus of safety 
professionals  (Barnett & Brickman, 1986, pp.49-52). Therefore, what is to be made of the 
diverse, and potentially confusing multiplicity of hierarchy descriptions and procedures? Why 
is a universally agreed hazard mitigation technique conspicuous by its absence? 
This thesis acknowledges the commonality behind the many versions of the hierarchy, but 
also seeks to more effectively align the concept to the hazard vector (Figure 2, p.11) within 
the context of the energy damage model of incident analysis. In the light of the previous 
chapter The Root Cause Fallacy, it is important to clarify that the hazard pathway of the 
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hazard vector is not a targeted trajectory whereby the receiver of any unsustainable force is 
somehow inevitably injured as a result of an active and purposeful cause. That is, while the 
hazard pathway may continually facilitate the transmission of the energy from the hazard 
source to the potential receiver (through say, an absence of interventions), an attribution of 
cause (of any injury) must never contain any assumption of inevitability or unavoidability. 
This chapter briefly describes the intended purpose of the hierarchy, offers a discussion on 
the variance and problems associated with the hierarchal application, and links the hierarchy 
to the energy damage model and hazard vector. A simple version is proposed as an easily 
understandable maxim for all to use, while still encompassing all the requisite functionality of 
the hierarchy. The aim of providing yet another version (although the hierarchy suggested 
herein is similar in form to some other versions) is not to further the confusion, but to focus 
the attention of academics, safety professionals, students, and managers on the core 
functionality of the technique and how it may be applied most effectively to all hazardous 
situations. 
Once a hazard has been identified in the workplace, the hierarchy of controls generally lists a 
series of control measures, of decreasing effectiveness, intended to control that hazard. The 
origin of this methodology is often attributed to Alice Hamilton’s 1925 book Industrial poisons 
in the United States (Gafafer, 1943) and has underpinned practices in occupational hygiene 
ever since. Beyond industrial hygiene, self-managed intervention into general WHS in the 
middle decades of the 20th century appears to have been relatively uncommon: workplace 
health and safety was driven primarily  by the imposition of measures specified by the many 
and varied prescriptive industrial laws. This may explain the apparent obscurity of the 
analytical hierarchy of controls methodology during this period. Until the 1970s, WHS 
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legislation around the world was largely prescriptive – detailing laws, regulations, and 
procedures for each and every industry or hazard. In 1972, the U.K. Robens report initiated a 
significant shift in OHS legislation in most western nations – recommending  a move away 
from strict prescriptive and prohibitive laws to a self-regulating performance-based system 
(Robens, 1972). In most OHS jurisdictions thereafter, organisations were required to manage 
their own hazards – requiring “…the basic and overriding responsibility of the employer to 
provide a safe working system including safe premises, a safe working environment, safe 
equipment, trained and competent personnel, and adequate instruction and supervision” 
(Robens, 1972 para.129-130). Organisations therefore required an accepted methodology 
such as the hierarchy of controls to evaluate hazard interventions in order to meet this 
statutory responsibility. 
As an Australian example, in his  review of the State of Victoria’s Occupational Health and 
Safety Act, Maxwell (2004) exemplifies the traditional hierarchy of control as: 
“Eliminate (or engineer out) hazards. If that is not practicable, duty-holders must reduce the 
risk by processes of -   
• Substitution 
• Isolation 
• Engineering controls 
Administrative controls and personal protective equipment may be used, but only as a last 
resort, to support the control of risk by these other means” (p.159) 
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Maxwell’s wording of the hierarchy of controls is very considered, but this hierarchy of 
controls methodology has been generalised by most legislatures in Australia – representing 
the same six stages in a straight-line list: 
1. Elimination  
2. Substitution  
3. Isolation  
4. Engineering  
5. Administration  
6. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). 
 
Two observations can be made by comparing this generalisation with Maxwell’s (2004) 
description. Firstly, Maxwell distinguishes between elimination and reduction of risk (using 
substitution, isolation, and engineering) whereas the generalisation simply includes 
elimination as the first stage of the hierarchy, then goes on to list substitution, isolation, and 
engineering without any qualification that these represent measures for the reduction of risk. 
Secondly, Maxwell nominates administrative controls and personal protective equipment only 
as a “last resort” (p.159); whereas the generalisation simply includes them as lower 
alternatives in the hierarchy. While the generalised version preserves the order of the 
hierarchy as per Maxwell’s explanation, it does not represent the nuance of the three distinct 
stages contained in Maxwell’s description. 
While it is accepted that many companies use these six categories (or similar) within their 
hierarchy of controls consideration, the researcher suggests that a simpler three-stage 
hierarchy (as per Maxwell’s determination) could produce a more understandable process for 
Chapter Nine: A deconstruction and reconstruction of the hierarchy of control 
127 
 
hazard control, and more adequately meet the intent of the Robens-derived legislation. If a 
six-stage (or similar) hierarchy was applied with the same clarity as Maxwell’s description 
above, then the efficacy of the resulting intervention would be identical (to a simpler three-
stage hierarchy); but the following deconstruction of the six stages of the commonly used 
hierarchy highlights the need for a simpler version. 
 
9.2  Elimination 
The elimination of a hazard is unequivocal. The hazard is either present or absent. There are 
no degrees of elimination – it is an absolute concept. Elimination should therefore be the first 
item in any hierarchy of controls. It is often (but not inevitably) true that the possibility of 
elimination is relatively infrequent; indeed, a hazardous process or material capable of 
producing an injurious force often features as an indispensable part of the work situation. But 
the dismissal of the possibility of hazard elimination in a workplace is one of the most 
common errors in safety management. Ellenbecker (1996) made the point that considering a 
hazard as a product of a static worksite and therefore difficult to alter, is a mistake. There are 
many excellent examples of instances where a carefully considered analysis identified a 
means of hazard elimination – often at minimal cost, which not only resolved the possibility 
of the hazard resulting in an injury, but even provided dramatic increases in productivity and 
profitability to the company.  
For instance, one of the researcher’s clients became concerned that his ten truck drivers – 
each carrying  loose wood chips repetitively over a very short distance in an Australian city, 
had to climb up several metres onto their trucks to tie and untie a tarpaulin covering their 
load (to prevent the chips blowing over into the city streets). The client identified that a driver 
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would eventually fall and sustain an injury during the course of this repetitive work. He and 
his staff therefore designed and installed a battery-powered framework securing a net which 
could be quickly raised and lowered to contain the wood chips in transit. The initiative cost 
approximately $1,500 per truck and eliminated the potential hazard of a driver falling from 
his truck. Notably, the initiative also meant a saving of 10 minutes at both ends of each short 
trip, allowing one further trip per day per truck – resulting in an annual increase in profit of 
almost $300,000 – an annual return on investment of 200%. 
This example demonstrates a novel and profitable application of the top level of the hierarchy 
of controls to eliminate an identified hazard. This is sometimes referred to as safety by design 
(Culvenor, 1997): the hazard is simply designed out. Clearly, hazards should ideally be 
identified while designing the workplace and/or the mechanism of the work performance; 
but as circumstances change in workplaces, new hazards may arise. For instance, the 
retrofitted trucks could previously have been used for hauling logs and there would have been 
no need for the drivers to climb up on their trucks; but the securing of the woodchips did 
initially expose drivers to the hazard of falling. This was then resolved with the automated net 
system. 
While elimination is an absolute concept, it is not necessarily a permanent one. A further 
example will demonstrate the continual need for hazard identification and an effective (i.e.  
higher level) application of the hierarchy of controls. Legionnaires’ disease presents a severe 
hazard in water distribution systems such as those used by large industrial plants or office 
blocks (Cunha, Burillo, & Bouza, 2016). While the pathogens leading to Legionnaires’ disease 
can be eliminated, a program of monitoring for a reappearance of the pathogens must be 
conducted and the elimination process may have to be repeated. Therefore, while elimination 
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is an absolute concept, hazard identification may require constant vigilance and monitoring 
to maintain the elimination. 
Further, advances in knowledge may present hazards in work situations where previously, no 
hazard may have been identified. The use of asbestos in workplaces was once commonplace, 
and thought to be benign. The subsequent linking of mesothelioma to some types of asbestos 
required people to be at least isolated from the hazard, or preferably, the hazard should be 
eliminated by complete removal of the substance from the workplace. 
In many organisations, the concept of elimination is often misunderstood, or more accurately, 
is misrepresented by assumptions that PCBU administrative actions such as enacting rules or 
training staff constitute elimination of a hazard. That is, PCBUs often assume that their rules 
or staff training (lower order controls) will inevitably result in avoidance of injury from the 
hazard – thereby eliminating the hazard. Chapter Thirteen records such an example where 
60% of the respondents to a survey said they used “elimination” as means of controlling a 
particular hazard when it was self-evident that the hazard in question was an inherent part of 
the process and worksite and could not be eliminated. This may represent a recurring theme 
of this research i.e. work as imagined compared with work as done (Clay-Williams et al., 2015) 
where the PCBU may imagine that they have eliminated the hazard when in fact, all they have 
done is made an administrative directive which, if followed, would provide a lower-level 
mitigation. 
 
9.3  Substitution 
Substitution may be a useful part of a hazard control checklist, but substituting one hazard 
with an alternate process or material merely takes the analyst back to the start of the 
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hierarchy i.e. the substitute must also be assessed as a potential hazard in its own right. 
Hollnagel (2008) explained this well when he wrote, “The substitution principle expresses the 
common assumption that artefacts are neutral in their effects and that their introduction into 
a system therefore only has intended and no unintended consequences” (p. 222).There are 
many instances when a substitution has replaced one hazard with another unforeseen hazard 
with unintended consequences. For instance, the researcher is aware of a large industrial 
plant where the soap supplied was identified as a major contributor to the incidence of 
occupational dermatitis in many staff.  The WHS staff identified and procured a “gentler” soap 
which appeared to solve the problem; but a closer examination of the substitution revealed 
that the new soap contained benzene – a known carcinogenic – and therefore presented a 
considerably more significant hazard. A more careful analysis of the originally identified 
hazard and a completely new analysis of the proposed substitution could have avoided such 
an error of judgement. The substitution category is therefore inherently part of the 
elimination stage – or a cue to begin an entirely new hierarchy of controls analysis.  
 
As an example, the substitution of a quad bike on a farm can indeed remove the hazard. 
Substitution with a trail bike or side-by-side (a low wheel base vehicle, usually with seatbelts 
and a roll-over protection device – offering more stability, and a greater level of driver and 
passenger protection in the event of an overturn) is a reasonable mitigation. Nonetheless, 
while the quad bike is a demonstrably more significant hazard (Lower, Pollock, & Herde, 2013) 
and is undoubtedly worthy of elimination, any alternative may also present its own set of 
hazards and must be assessed in its own right.  
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9.4   Isolation 
Isolation is de facto elimination. If the hazard can be effectively separated from the person, 
the hazard vector is interrupted before the energy source reaches the possible recipient, 
thereby preventing an injury. Isolation may be achieved by the installation of a guard such as 
a barrier between the energy source and the worker – e.g. a guard to protect people from 
burns from sparks; or simply by distance – e.g. staff are working a sufficient distance from the 
source of the sparks ensuring no possibility of the sparks reaching them. While isolation may 
be the “next best thing” to elimination, the supposed intervention in the hazard path may 
nonetheless be nullified by actions of people in unusual circumstances. For instance, pressure 
to complete a task in the allotted time or to complete maintenance on a faulty machine may 
induce a worker to venture inside a guard, or move towards the hazard, in contravention to 
the intent of the isolation. 
For example, in his previous profession as a video producer, the researcher was asked to 
record the performance of a particular machine in an abattoir. The machine was called the 
eviscerator since it automatically and very effectively eviscerated a carcass by scooping out 
the entrails in one efficient downward sweep of a large robotic spatula as the carcass passed 
through the cutting room. The manufacturers had installed a particularly effective guard 
which, they assured the researcher, could only be bypassed by password entry into a keypad. 
Nonetheless, since they required video footage of the eviscerator performing its task 
satisfactorily and the guard prevented any clear shot of the operation (while it was 
eviscerating), the operators of the machine happily entered the password into the keypad, 
opened the guard, and indicated a spot where the camera operator could obtain a clear close-
up shot of the operation. The researcher declined the invitation. While the guard normally 
Chapter Nine: A deconstruction and reconstruction of the hierarchy of control 
132 
 
performed a very effective isolation of the machine, the unusual but not unforeseen 
circumstance of shooting a video prompted a potentially catastrophic violation of the 
isolation. The guard normally worked very well as a functional barrier but on occasion, 
became merely a symbolic barrier (Hollnagel, 2008).  
9.5  Engineering controls 
The inclusion of “engineering” controls in a hierarchy of controls is unnecessary. The analyst 
should always consider the use of engineering controls to mitigate the effects of a hazard, but 
the process of engineering can be applied to any level of the orthodox hierarchy – from 
elimination to PPE; it is simply a technique to invest a level of permanence in an intervention 
(although note the eviscerator guard example in the previous section), rather than a 
hierarchal stage in itself. For instance, the process of engineering can be used to eliminate a 
hazard through automation; to isolate the hazard through implementing a guard; or to 
minimise a hazard by specifying and fabricating or acquiring personal protection.  
For example, the researcher participated in an initiative to prevent the occurrence of potline 
asthma at a New Zealand aluminium smelter  (O'Donnell, 1989, 1995) (see also Chapter 
Three). It was resolved that the suspected fume that resulted in potline asthma was unable 
to be eliminated, but also that the (paper mask) PPE then being used as staff protection from 
the fume was wholly ineffective. The subsequent re-specification (or specification for the first 
time) of the micron size of the particulate that the PPE was required to exclude resulted in a 
world-wide search for a new form of breathing apparatus that would meet the required 
specifications. This was eventually found and implemented at the smelter. With a 
combination of cognitive behaviour change through staff education and both transformative 
and transactional leadership (Locke & Latham, 2002), the compulsory wearing of the new PPE 
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resulted in a reduction and an apparent disappearance of potline asthma from the worksite 
(O'Donnell, 1989, 1995). 
How then, should this intervention be defined? It is certainly an exercise in engineering since 
the micron size of the particulate was precisely specified and the resulting breathing 
apparatus was selected and manufactured on the basis of its ability to meet those 
specifications. It was also PPE (see below) for it replaced one form of PPE with another; but 
because of the importance of this means of protection, wearing of the PPE was strongly 
enforced through the transactional leadership function. The difference between the former 
and the replacement PPE was as a result of engineering. Interestingly, the intervention was 
later categorised by the team dealing with the hazard as isolating PPE (see Chapter Three) – 
illustrating that engineering is a superfluous category, and highlighting that if wearing PPE is 
assured (see below), PPE can be categorised as isolation. 
To include engineering in the hierarchy is no more relevant than including creativity or 
regulation as stages in the hierarchy – all are simply part of every stage of the hierarchy. 
9.6  Administration 
If elimination (or substitution) or isolation (or engineering) is not possible, then administrative 
skill will be required to minimise the hazard. Without elimination or isolation, a requirement 
to work beside or within the hazard is implicit. It is therefore incumbent on the person 
conducting the business undertaking (PCBU) to administer the hazardous situation in order 
to reduce the likelihood of injury as much as possible. Imposing alternate work practices such 
as limited shifts to reduce exposure to a potential hazard may be an effective way of 
minimising that hazard. For example, without PPE, exposure to a noise level of greater than 
85 dbAeq  over an eight-hour day or longer may result in noise-induced hearing loss (NIHL) to 
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people working in the affected area; whereas exposure to 85 dbAeq or lower levels for limited 
periods per day would not normally result in NIHL. Administrative skill is therefore required 
to (1) ensure that the noise levels are known and understood, and (2) ensure that the duration 
of worker exposure to potentially damaging noise levels (when not wearing PPE) are 
understood and managed to prevent the possibility of NIHL. 
Administrative controls may also include symbolic barriers such as signs, work permits, 
warnings, alarms etc; and incorporeal barriers such as rules, restrictions, laws, social or group 
pressure (Hollnagel, 2008). These are problematic due to their dependence on human 
behaviour for efficacy, and must, as Maxwell (2004) points out, only be used as a “last resort” 
(p.159). Writers such as Robertson (1992) and Wagenaar (1998) have opined that the means 
by which behaviour can be changed within a workforce have not been demonstrated. Other 
writers may disagree with this, but in any event, rules such as a directive to “stay away” from 
a hazardous machine, training workers to understand and avoid hazardous behaviour by 
teaching methods of driving, lifting, using stairways etc. all constitute administrative 
interventions designed to minimise the hazard: no guarantee of protection can be assured 
since all administrative controls depend upon compliance by the worker. The hierarchal stage 
normally called administration thereby requires people to work directly beside or within the 
hazard. Administrative interventions can therefore do no more than minimise the potential 
for injury from any hazard. 
9.7   Personal protective equipment (PPE) 
As with the engineering category of the hierarchy of controls, the use of PPE is a specific 
means of hazard mitigation rather than an intelligible stage in the hierarchy. It is customarily 
positioned as the lowest level of the hierarchy because there can be no guarantee that people 
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will wear PPE, thereby rendering any potential protection ineffective if not worn correctly or 
not worn at all. Since it is entirely dependent on human behaviour for its efficacy, the wearing 
of PPE should therefore not be placed above or below administrative measures since it is no 
more or less effective than any other administrative measure i.e. people are still required to 
work beside or within the hazard; and how they behave (with respect to wearing their PPE) is 
the primary determinant of whether the intervention is effective or not. It is also noted above 
in Chapter Three that PPE was categorised by the study participants as an engineered means 
of isolation for the prevention of potline asthma (when wearing of the PPE could be credibly 
assured) – further demonstrating the confusion between the six-level categories of the 
customary hierarchy of controls. 
 
9.9 A simpler conceptualisation of the hierarchy of controls 
 
The phrase in the final sentence of the previous section: “PPE was used as an engineered 
means of isolation” may indicate the propensity for confusion in the six-stage hierarchy of 
control. The six stages are often difficult to distinguish and confusing to explain.  
From the discussion of the six stages of the hierarchy of control examined above, we can 
develop a simpler, more understandable model consisting of only three levels: 
• Elimination 
• Isolation 
• Minimisation 
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Indeed, these are generally the three elements that guide much of occupational health and 
safety legislation in the world – yet they are obfuscated with a potentially confusing 
multiplicity of hierarchal categories. A reconciliation of the proposed safety hierarchy with 
the orthodox version, based on the discussion above, is demonstrated in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6. Reconciliation of the proposed safety hierarchy with the orthodox safety hierarchy 
Proposed safety 
hierarchy: 
Orthodox 
 safety hierarchy: 
Eliminate Eliminate Substitute 
Isolate Isolate Engineering 
Minimise Administration Personal Protective Equipment 
 
The proposed simpler categorisation may contribute to a more comprehensible appreciation 
of the hazard analysis process. For instance, Figure 12, p.137 may be used as a workplace 
poster or as a training slide for all personnel on site – simply yet comprehensively explaining 
the hazard mitigation process. 
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Figure 12. The hierarchy of controls workplace poster 
 
 
9.10 The hazard vector’s relationship to the energy damage model and to the 
hierarchy of controls 
For a further interrogation of the concept of the hierarchy of controls as an intervention 
methodology, this section will examine both the three-stage and the orthodox hierarchies in 
the context of the energy damage model and the associated hazard vector. It will demonstrate 
how the hazard vector can represent the hazard’s inherent force and thereby substantiate 
the relative efficacy of a proposed WHS intervention. 
The introduction to the thesis briefly referred to the energy damage model and its 
contribution to 20th century understanding of WHS. Part One of the thesis sought to 
demonstrate the efficacy of the hierarchy of controls within the ZAV by documenting the 
successful application of the energy damage model in a large industrial plant. The paper From 
Zero to Hero identified NZAS’ clear preference for ergonomic interventions over egocentric 
interventions. The analysis of the interventions identified NZAS’ ergonomic interventions as 
being a manifestation of interrupting the energy damage model with the application of the 
higher levels of the hierarchy of control; while the mostly-rejected (by NZAS) egocentric 
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interventions were understood as behaviour-based safety and constituted the lower levels of 
hierarchy of control. The conclusion of this first peer-reviewed paper stated “In particular, the 
control of unintended energy exchange through ergonomic rather than egocentric measures 
has been shown by the NZAS experience to be the most effective mode of intervention”. 
The energy damage model (Haddon, 1970, 1973; Viner, 2013) portrays the flow of energy 
from the identified hazard to a potential receiver; it therefore implies a timeline representing 
the hazard itself, the hazard route, and the potential receiver. This is represented in this thesis 
as the hazard vector. An understanding of the hazard vector must therefore consider some 
sort of hypothetical timeline for the potential transfer of energy. The duration of the timeline 
will vary according to the nature of the hazard. For instance, a timeline for fatal electrocution 
could have a duration of a fraction of a second; whereas a timeline for noise-induced hearing 
loss or asbestosis could span many decades. 
Timelines associated with the energy damage model were developed during the 20th Century. 
In Australia, Viner (1991) referred to the space transfer mechanism - clearly implying a 
timeline for the transfer of force to the potential receiver; while MacDonald  (1991) 
developed his analysis reference tree-trunk (ART-T®) model representing the following time-
bound stages of the transfer of force inherent in the energy damage model: 
1. Development of predisposing conditions 
2. Situation commences (a catalyst for progression of the timeline) 
3. Metastable (control could still be regained) 
4. Unstable (control is lost and cannot be regained) 
5. Damage occurs 
6. Recovery 
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7. Situation stabilised 
(McDonald, 1991) 
The conceptualised timeline representing the transfer of damaging force can be designated 
the hazard vector. An alignment of the hazard vector with the energy damage model and the 
alternate safety hierarchies discussed above, is represented in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Alignment of the energy damage model, the hazard vector, and alternate safety 
hierarchies 
 
The alignment of the safety hierarchy with the hazard vector provides a clearer 
conceptualisation of our ability to intercede in the path of energy inherent in the hazard 
vector. 
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9.11   Where should any proposed intervention apply in the hierarchy? 
 
A discussion of the many and varied means of intervention to arrest the force inherent in the 
hazard vector is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, a consideration of where any 
chosen intervention should be interposed may also add to both the efficacy and the 
understanding of the hierarchy of controls. It has been established above that the upper levels 
of the hierarchy of controls (such as elimination and isolation) are the most effective areas of 
intervention.  Haddon (1973) highlighted this (without an actual reference to the hierarchy of 
controls) in his paper Energy Damage and the 10 Countermeasure Strategies. Table 7, p.141 
attributes a stage of the hierarchy to each of the 10 countermeasures. 
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Table 7. A comparison of Haddon’s 10 countermeasures and the proposed hierarchy 
of controls classifications 
 Haddon’s (1973) ten countermeasure strategies for 
the prevention of losses through energy transfer 
Hierarchy of controls 
classification 
1 Prevent the marshalling of energy in the first place Eliminate 
2 Reduce the amount of energy marshalled Eliminate/Isolate* 
3 Prevent the release of energy Eliminate/Isolate* 
4 Modify the rate of spatial distribution of release of the 
energy from its source 
Isolate 
5 Separate, in space or time, the energy being released 
from the susceptible structure 
Isolate 
6 Separation by interposition of a material barrier Isolate 
7 Modify appropriately the surface or subsurface of the 
energy ‘target’  
Isolate 
8 Strengthen the structure that might otherwise be 
damaged by energy transfer 
Isolate/Minimise 
9 Counter continuation and extension of any damage 
that has occurred through energy transfer 
Minimise 
10 Remediate damage after the energy exchange has 
occurred  
Minimise 
 
It should be noted that these starred (*) classifications in Table 7 above can be described as 
elimination if the terms prevent and reduce the marshalling of energy are regarded as 
sufficient to render the potential force as of no potential consequence [see the researcher’s 
comment on page 6:  “…it is not the energy or the mass that creates the hazard per se, but 
the potential for a person to be exposed to a force (greater than the body’s capacity to 
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withstand) which constitutes the hazard”]. If those two measures are not sufficient to 
depower the potential force to a state of no potential consequence, then they may be 
regarded as isolation. Similarly, it could be argued that the final three measures could 
represent either isolation or minimization, depending on the actual intervention used; but in 
any event, all ten countermeasures can be represented by the three proposed categories of 
the hierarchy of control. 
The incumbent requirement on the safety professional to intervene in the most effective 
manner implies use of one or more mitigations from the upper level of the hierarchy of 
controls. Nevertheless, the safety professional often has conflicting pressures on his/her 
choice of interventions: these include cost, practicability, restriction of options from 
employers etc. While none of these pressures can change the relative efficacy of the hierarchy 
of controls classification of the intervention(s) chosen, they may certainly distort the safety 
practitioner’s choice of intervention. For instance, Behm and Powell’s (2014) analysis of  249 
incident investigation reports from seven U.S. organisations revealed that 87.55% of the 
controls recommended as interventions were administrative.  These conflicting pressures 
may be a further incentive to simplify the hierarchy of controls so it may be easily understood 
by everyone from the board of directors to the shop-floor staff. 
The choices are represented in common law and statute law by the imposition of a ubiquitous 
phrase: “as far as reasonably practicable” when referring to the PCBU’s duty of care to 
ameliorate hazards in the workplace. For instance, where a potential injury is of no particular 
concern, such as a minor paper cut, it is clearly unreasonable and impractical to expect the 
elimination of all paper from an office in order to prevent such an injury. While this is a trivial 
example, many PCBUs invoke a not reasonably practicable defence (or excuse) for failing to 
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intervene in a moderately hazardous situation – or even one that is potentially catastrophic. 
Chapter Thirteen has documented such a hazard – attributing the lack of intervention partly 
to the infrequency of the occurrence of the hazard, partly to a simple ignorance of the 
hazard’s existence (perhaps because of the infrequency of a resulting injury), and partly to 
the perceived impracticability of mitigating it. 
 A purist analysis of the hierarchy of controls may dismiss the omission of a lack of 
intervention based on “practicability”, but the effect must be acknowledged as a constraint 
on understanding of the methodology. It also provides further justification for a simpler, more 
understandable expression of the hierarchy of controls. 
Furthermore, a clearer understanding of the hierarchy of controls may ultimately lead to the 
introduction of an intervention, or a suite of interventions, which are interposed on the 
hazard vector timeline at the most appropriate point. For instance, the researcher 
participated in a study of the hazard presented by the use of sledge hammers at NZAS. While 
the potential injury (to feet in particular) was eliminated in some tasks by the use of 
automation, there were other tasks which necessarily required staff to wield sledge hammers. 
An exhaustive study concluded that where sledge hammers had to be used, steel-capped 
boots were the most appropriate intervention since no-one could prescribe, or even imagine, 
a higher-level mitigation. As with the respiratory PPE example cited above, NZAS described 
this as isolating PPE since both the potential force of the sledge hammer and the required 
protection were understood and the use of appropriate footwear was enforced.  
9.12 Conclusion 
The hazard vector has been used throughout this thesis to explain the relationship between 
hazards and potential WHS injury. The alignment of the hazard vector with the energy damage 
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model, Haddon’s (1973) ten countermeasure strategies, and with the hierarchy of controls 
provides an opportunity for greater understanding of workplace safety intervention. The 
orthodox six-stage hierarchy may provide an adequate structure for analysing and classifying 
proposed interventions, but the inherent ambiguity of the six categories and lack of direct 
alignment with the hazard vector and energy damage model may also confuse the whole 
concept of the hierarchy of controls. A simpler three-stage hierarchy, clearly aligned with the 
energy damage model and the associated hazard vector is recommended as a means of 
greater understand and efficacy when using the hierarchy of controls. 
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Chapter Ten:  Constraints on understanding of the safety hierarchy  
 
Part Two sought to identify the possible constraints on understanding of the hierarchy of 
controls. In Chapter Eight, a targeted literature review focused on the concept of cause and 
demonstrated that cause: 
• does not exist as an active agent capable of spontaneously effecting change 
• is considered a necessary construct to establish blame and therefore the legal tort 
of negligence 
• is a form of narrative used by most people to construct reasons to explain an event, 
and is therefore characteristically used in the case of a traumatic event such as an 
occupational injury – often presenting a distorted and inaccurate folk tale around 
the occurrence. 
Critically, the review found that the concept of a root cause, used pervasively throughout the 
safety profession to nominate one specific state or condition that exclusively caused the event 
in question, is a fallacy. It is beyond the scope of this research project to nominate alternatives 
to root cause accident investigation methodology, but the review has highlighted a significant 
weakness in the understanding of the hazard vector which underpins the hierarchy of 
controls. Importantly, the review found that a focus on human error as a cause of 
occupational injury is a manifestation of distorted anthropomorphism – incompatible with 
professional analysis. 
Chapter Nine presented a fundamental deconstruction of the most common form of safety 
hierarchy used in Australia. It sought to explain why certain elements of the hierarchy were 
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often confused as prioritized stages of intervention, thereby rendering the use of the 
hierarchy ineffectual, and oftentimes disingenuous. A simple version of the safety hierarchy 
was proposed as a substitute. This three-element safety hierarchy is closely mapped to the 
hazard vector, and is explained in very simple terms – without excluding any stage of possible 
intervention in hazard amelioration. While the three-element hierarchy is not claimed as an 
original construct – it is similar to other manifestations of the hierarchy from the past – it is 
nevertheless generally not represented in contemporary safety literature, accident 
investigation techniques, company safety procedures, nor safety teaching in Australia.   
Rather than presenting the stripped down safety hierarchy as a fait accompli, it was presented 
to an inquisitorial forum (ASSC 2015 conference – see below) where it was not only mapped 
to the hazard vector, but also to the polarized process safety versus personal safety 
disconnection.  
The three-stage mapping of the safety hierarchy to the hazard vector was also included in the 
author’s presentations at the following conferences: 
• Young, S.A. (2015) The Price of Work – Is occupational injury a necessary toll on the 
work we do? VIOSH International Research Symposium, Federation University 
Australia, July 10-11, 2015 
• Young, S.A. (2016) How do we lift the knowledge state for safety practitioners? 
Safety Institute of Australia’s (SIA) National Safety Convention, Melbourne, Australia, 
September 17, 2015.  
• Young, S.A. (2017) Watching the train wreck - Why are we still failing to prevent 
occupational injury and disease? 15th World Congress on Public Health, Melbourne; 
April 4, 2017. 
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The acknowledgement received from these conference presentations, and from the 
acceptance of the paper for ASSC proceedings publication (ASSC 2015, Brisbane 27-29 May 
2015), supported the author’s exploration of the use of the simplified hierarchy in a real-life 
practical application. This contributes to the substance of Part Three. 
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Chapter Eleven:  A hierarchy of controls consideration of the CO2 
hazard in the fermentation industry 
 
11.1 A recommended hierarchy of controls approach to mitigation of the CO2 hazard 
 
Based on the evidential efficacy of the safety hierarchy presented in Part One, and the 
deconstructive and reconstructive analysis presented in Part Two, it is incumbent on this 
research project to actively assess a specific industry in relation to the hierarchy of controls 
(i.e. in addition to the case studies featured in Part One). Part Three therefore provides a two-
part case study, investigating a specific industry to evaluate the approach to hazard 
mitigation, and how a potentially catastrophic hazard is understood in the context of the 
safety hierarchy. It addressed the subordinate research question, “What is the current 
understanding of hazard mitigation in a selected industry and how may the safety hierarchy 
be implemented to ameliorate a key hazard?” 
Many safety professionals (or industry newcomers) do not have detailed knowledge specific 
to one particular industry; and of those that do, many are often guilty of maintaining the 
status quo i.e. simply doing what has always been done, and anticipating that the absence of 
injuries will continue indefinitely. In reality, safety management is often an exercise in 
noticing frequent incidents resulting from common hazards in an industry, and trying to avoid 
the consequences of the presence of these hazards. This appears to be particularly so when 
an industry is young and growing rapidly, when even the orthodoxy of commonly accepted 
truisms relating to injury avoidance has not been fully established (see Chapter Thirteen). 
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A chance meeting of fellow academics at Federation University Australia presented the 
opportunity to study one such industry. While brewing is an old, established industry around 
the world, in Australia there has been a rapid proliferation of new, owner-operated 
businesses producing specialist beers and wines. Many small enterprises – particularly 
boutique breweries – have been established in recent years. Carbon dioxide (CO2) is produced 
naturally as part of the fermentation process; and it has long been recognised that the often 
unpredictable and spontaneous production of elevated levels of this gas – harmless at normal 
atmospheric levels – can result in asphyxiation. Fatalities from this hazard are not common 
but have been well documented (see Chapter Twelve). Discussion on this potentially 
catastrophic hazard involved the following academics: 
• the PhD candidate Stephen Young, Program Coordinator for the Graduate Diploma in 
Occupational Hazard Management, Federation University Australia 
• Peter Aldred - PhD, BSc(Hons), DiplBrew, Associate Professor and Program 
Coordinator – Brewing, Federation University Australia 
• Mani Naiker – PhD, BAppSc (Hons),  Lecturer in Chemistry, Faculty of Science and 
Technology, Federation University Australia 
• Jennifer Blitvich, PhD, Associate Dean Research, Faculty of Health, Federation 
University Australia. 
As a result of this conversation, the doctoral candidate undertook to analyse this hazard 
within the context of a hierarchy of controls approach. Specialist advice on the chemistry and 
processes of the brewing industry was sought from the other collaborators but the bulk of 
the analysis and writing was undertaken by Stephen Young (see Appendix E for a statement 
confirming relative contributions of the authors). 
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The resulting paper follows as Chapter Twelve, and is largely identical to that published in the 
Journal of Health, Safety and Environment in 2015: 
• Young, S., Naiker, M., & Aldred, P. (2015). Brewers and vintners beware!: Mitigation 
of the carbon dioxide hazard in the fermentation industries using hierarchy of 
control methodology. Journal of Health Safety and Environment, 31(3), 193-206.  
The paper submitted in Chapter Twelve differs slightly from that published – for example, the 
footnotes that appear in the published paper have been represented within parentheses in 
the body of the following text. The paper as published in the journal is included as Appendix 
F. 
11.2 Current understanding of hazard mitigation in the fermentation industry 
 The paper Brewers and Vintners Beware! prompted a further aspect to the question of how 
the hierarchy of controls relates to a specific industry. One reviewer questioned whether the 
potential for asphyxiation from elevated levels of CO2 was indeed a significant hazard in 
Australia – asking for “evidence that this is in fact so”. While the Brewers and Vintners Beware! 
paper provided evidence that the hazard was a well-recognised phenomenon overseas – and 
the authors were deducing that logically, there was a distinct likelihood of a catastrophic 
asphyxiation occurring in Australia, it was true that there was no tangible or recognisable 
evidence of such. Elevated levels of CO2 in the fermentation process occur infrequently, often 
spontaneously, and usually unpredictably. It was therefore unlikely that a simple sampling 
survey of atmospheres in and around a number of fermentation businesses would reveal 
levels of CO2 that were immediately and inevitably hazardous. The authors therefore resolved 
to undertake a survey of how the owner-operators of the rapidly growing boutique brewery 
industry in Victoria and Tasmania identified and mitigated their hazards – with particular 
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reference to the intermittent possibility of elevated levels of CO2. This survey was conducted 
during 2016 and the resulting paper follows as Chapter Thirteen. 
The paper was published in the Journal of Health Safety and Environment in 2017: 
• Young, S., Blitvich, J., Naiker, M., & Aldred, P. (2017). Is that the light at the end of the 
tunnel, or is it an oncoming train? An obsession with obvious hazards may blind us to 
approaching catastrophe. Journal of Health Safety and Environment, 33(1), pp.53-71. 
The paper submitted in Chapter Thirteen differs slightly from that published – for example, 
the footnotes appearing in the published paper have been represented within parentheses in 
the body of the Chapter Thirteen text. The paper as published in the journal is included as 
Appendix G. 
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Chapter Twelve:  Brewers and Vintners Beware! Mitigation of the 
carbon dioxide hazard in the fermentation industries using hierarchy of 
control methodology. 
 
Young, S., Naiker, M., & Aldred, P. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper suggests that elevated levels of CO2 are a widely underestimated occupational 
hazard for those working in the fermentation industries. The generation of CO2 as a natural 
by-product of fermentation, and the input of additional CO2, are examined and the potential 
CO2 hazard highlighted. The need for the rapidly growing fermentation industries to 
understand and mitigate this hazard is emphasised. A robust application of hierarchy of 
controls methodology is employed to effect a best-practice mitigation of the CO2 hazard. 
The paper concludes with a strong recommendation for the use of automated monitoring 
linked to lock out mechanisms as the most effective means of assuring worker safety with 
respect to elevated levels of CO2 in the workplace.  
 
 
12.1  Introduction 
 
During fermentation processes, carbon dioxide (CO2) levels inside vats and tanks can rise to 
up to 100% of the internal gas composition. A person entering such an atmosphere - even 
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quickly looking inside a tank – can lose consciousness in seconds, and often dies within a few 
minutes (La Harpe, Shiferaw, Mangin, & Burkhardt, 2013).  
There has been a significant increase in the number of small, craft breweries and boutique 
wineries in recent times.  One industry source estimates that 70% of Australia’s wine 
companies were established in the last 25 years (Winetitles.com.au, 2015), and there has 
been a 500% increase in breweries in the last 20 years (Watne & Hakala, 2013). Many of these 
new entrants are owner-operated businesses, whose principals may have a limited 
understanding of the hazards presented by CO2 in brewing and wine-making. From the 
authors’ experience in visiting breweries and wineries, very few production companies have 
installed CO2 monitoring. A lack of understanding of this hazard by production companies and 
a lack of awareness by workers is common in this type of industry (Guillemin & Horisberger, 
1994). There is a gap in the knowledge regarding the extent of exposure to the CO2 hazard, 
but anecdotal evidence suggests that supposed industry safeguards against asphyxiation, 
poisoning, and other hazards associated with CO2 may rely on low level controls such as rules, 
signs, vague procedures and inadequate or long-forgotten training.  
In the production of alcoholic beverages, CO2 is usually present in two distinct manifestations: 
1. As an (output) by-product of the fermentation process. In alcoholic beverage production, 
CO2 is generated as part of the natural fermentation process.  In wine-making, the 
addition of yeast to the sugar contained in the grapes results in the production of alcohol 
and CO2. One litre of grape must produces between 45 and 60 litres of CO2 (La Harpe et 
al., 2013). Similarly, the fermenting of the sugar-rich wort in beer production also 
produces alcohol and CO2. The fermentation of a normal gravity beer will produce 
approximately 25-30 grams of CO2 (or approximately 20 litres) per litre of beer (Priest & 
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Stewart, 2006). It is the unpredictable nature of the elevated CO2 levels that presents an 
extreme hazard to people in and around the fermentation industries (Kettner, 
Ramsthaler, Juhnke, Bux, & Schmidt, 2013).  
 
2. As an (input) additive. 
 
i. In both winemaking (Tooma, 2000) and brewing beer (Priest & Stewart, 2006), CO2 
is used to prevent oxidation during production. CO2 is also used to purge lines, 
vessels, filters, and de-aerating water (Kourtis & Arvanitoyannis, 2001; Priest & 
Stewart, 2006). 
 
ii. Carbon dioxide is also used as a preservative and taste enhancer (Halpern, Raskin, 
Sorkine, & Oganezov, 2004; Langford, 2005). Both alcoholic and non-alcoholic 
beverages are often distributed in vessels with CO2 at high pressure. Some of this 
CO2 dissolves in the beverage which is then said to be carbonated or fizzy. The CO2 
is normally stored on site in cylinders and conveyed through hoses into the 
appropriate vessel using a pressure regulator.  
 
iii. Carbon dioxide is used as a coolant within the fermentation process. In wine 
production, dry ice (CO2 at a temperature lower than -78.5oC) is sometimes added 
to cool the grapes for a period of three to five days in order to slow the fermentation 
process without adding further water and to improve the taste. Such manipulation 
of the rate of fermentation may result in a very high rate of natural production of 
CO2: up to 545 litres of CO2 gas per kilogram of dry ice (La Harpe et al., 2013).  
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Both manifestations of CO2 in brewing and wine-making i.e. CO2 production as a natural part 
of fermentation, and introducing CO2 gas or dry ice for production purposes, have the 
potential to produce unpredictable atmospheres capable of killing. Mitigation of this hazard 
is essential in every workplace where such a build-up of CO2 is possible. This includes all 
premises where alcoholic beverages are produced. 
While CO2 poisoning and asphyxiation has been documented in both natural volcanic 
occurrences (Langford, 2005) and in large-scale industrial uses such as  refrigeration (Gill, Ely, 
& Hua, 2002; Halpern et al., 2004), fire extinguishers (Gill et al., 2002), CO2 sequestration  
(Wilday, Wardman, Johnson, & Haines, 2011),  and in associated transport and storage of CO2 
(Wilday et al., 2011), the increasing scale of the alcoholic beverage production industry 
around the world presents the most likely source of exposure to elevated levels of CO2. This 
paper will review the current knowledge surrounding the CO2 risk, and provide a hierarchy of 
controls approach as a recommended methodology for prevention of fatalities.  
 
12.2  Health effects – what could possibly go wrong? 
 
Carbon dioxide is the fourth most common gas in the earth’s atmosphere and presents no 
hazard to humans in normal or temporarily elevated concentrations in well ventilated spaces. 
Carbon dioxide is absorbed passively through the lungs, and small amounts occur naturally in 
the plasma and blood. Along with the carbon dioxide produced by the natural metabolism of 
the body, it is eliminated principally through the lungs, with a small amount excreted through 
the kidneys (Langford, 2005).  High levels of CO2 will produce immediate and serious acute 
sickness, and in many instances, death. This can occur in two ways.  
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Firstly, significant increases in CO2 concentration at a cellular level alter the cell’s buffering 
capacity, changing its pH (Langford, 2005). Inspiration of an elevated concentration of CO2 
triggers adverse effects in the respiratory, cardiovascular and central nervous systems (Wilday 
et al., 2011). Symptoms include headaches, hyperventilation, dizziness, drowsiness, and 
sweating. In excessive concentrations convulsions, loss of consciousness, coma, and 
ultimately death will occur (Kettner et al., 2013; Langford, 2005).  
Secondly, high concentrations of CO2 simply displace oxygen in confined atmospheres, 
causing asphyxiation (Kettner et al., 2013). The recommended or permissible exposure limit 
for CO2 is up to 15 times the naturally occurring concentration; and a short-term exposure of 
up to 100 times natural CO2 concentration is determined to be unlikely to produce harm to 
people in normal circumstances (Scott, Kraemer, & Keller, 2009). However, higher CO2 
concentrations can produce acute sickness and/or death through either poisoning or 
asphyxiation. A post mortem may reveal dual aetiology of death due to a worker entering a 
confined space with high CO2 levels: presenting a very high concentration of CO2 in blood gas 
analysis through excessive absorption of CO2, and a low level of oxygen in the blood 
representing asphyxiation through oxygen displacement by carbon dioxide (Guillemin & 
Horisberger, 1994; La Harpe et al., 2013). 
While the normal concentration of CO2 in our atmosphere is only 330 parts per million (ppm) 
(Kettner et al., 2013), it is recommended that people should not work an eight-hour day in 
concentrations exceeding 5,000 ppm. Even a short term exposure exceeding 30,000 ppm is 
regarded as hazardous to health; while levels exceeding 40,000ppm are regarded as 
immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH). Table 8, p.159 lists the recommended 
exposure limits. When CO2 levels rise above the Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDHL) 
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levels indicated in Table 8, people within or near the workplace will be either poisoned or 
asphyxiated, or both. Approximate relationships between CO2 levels and symptoms are 
shown in Table 9.  
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Table 8. Carbon dioxide concentrations and associated occupational exposure limits 
[NB See Glossary – Table 10, p.173, for an explanation of these terms] 
 
Measurement Workplace Exposure Limit (WEL) 
Concentration1 
Source 
 Parts per 
million 
(ppm) 
Percentage 
concentration 
Milligrams 
per cubic 
metre mg/m3 
 
Normal 
concentration 
in air 
330 ppm 0.033% 600 mg/m3 Kettner et al., 2013; 
Scott et al., 2009  
Permissible 
exposure limit 
(PEL-TWA) 
5,000 ppm 
Time 
Weighted 
Average 
(TWA) 
0.5% 
TWA 
9,000 mg/m3 
TWA 
Occupational Safety 
and Health 
Administration (OSHA) 
[U.S.A.] 
Recommended 
exposure limit 
(REL-TWA) 
5,000 ppm 
(TWA) 
0.5% 
TWA 
9,000 mg/m3 
TWA 
National Institute for 
Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH) 
[U.S.A.] 
Threshold limit 
value (TLV-
TWA) 
5,000 ppm 
TWA 
0.5% 
TWA 
9,000 mg/m3 
TWA 
American Conference 
of Governmental 
Industrial Hygienists 
(ACGIH) [U.S.A.] 
Workplace 
exposure limit 
(WEL-TWA) 
5,000 ppm 
TWA 
0.5% 
TWA 
9,000 mg/m3 
TWA 
Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) [U.K.] 
Short term 
exposure limit 
(STEL) 
30,000 ppm 
 
3% 54,000 
mg/m3 
National Institute for 
Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH), 
ACGIH [U.S.A.] 
Immediately 
dangerous to 
life or health 
(IDLH) 
40,000 ppm 4% 73,000 
mg/m3 
NIOSH [U.S.A.] 
[Based on (Scott et al., 2009)] 
                                                     
1 WEL in mg/m3 = (WEL in ppm x MW)/24.05526 (Aw, Harrington, & Gardiner, 2007). 
Molecular Weight of CO2 (MW) = 44.01  
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Table 9. Carbon dioxide concentrations and toxicity – based on Langford (2005).  
Concentration (%)  
Effects Parts per million 
(ppm) 
Percentage 
concentration 
Milligrams per 
cubic metre 
mg/m3 
 
330 ppm 
 
 
0.033% 
 
600 mg/m3 
 
Normal concentration. No 
effect. 
 
20,000 – 50,000 
ppm 
 
2-5% 
 
36,000 – 90,000 
mg/m3 
Headaches, dizziness, sweating, 
dyspnoea (shortness of breath) 
 
60,000 – 100,000 
ppm 
 
6-10% 
 
109,000 – 
180,000 
mg/m3 
Hyperventilation, tachycardia 
(increased heart rate), 
worsening dizziness 
 
110,000 – 
170,000 ppm 
 
11-17% 
 
200,000 – 
300,000 
mg/m3 
Drowsiness, muscle twitching, 
loss of consciousness 
 
Greater than 
170,000 ppm 
 
>17% 
 
 
Greater than 
300,000 
mg/m3 
 
 
 
Convulsions, coma, death 
 
Throughout history, fatalities resulting from CO2 have generally been under-reported (Suruda, 
Pettit, Noonan, & Ronk, 1994; Williams, 1958). Even in the 21st century, the hazards posed by 
CO2 are underestimated and under-represented in occupational health and safety taxonomies 
(Wilson, Madison, & Healy, 2012). Carbon dioxide levels in blood are sometimes difficult to 
detect in post-mortems due to hemolysis [the destruction or dissolution of red blood cells, 
with subsequent release of haemoglobin (The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English 
Language)], suggesting that diagnoses of fatalities resulting from exposure to CO2 are difficult 
to determine unequivocally, and probably continue to be under-reported (La Harpe et al., 
2013; Suruda et al., 1994; Wilson et al., 2012).   
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Perhaps because CO2 occurs naturally, and plays an important part in the metabolism of 
humans, many workers exposed to variable levels of CO2 in their occupation believe that it is 
harmless (Scott et al., 2009). Yet it is this underestimation or indifference to the CO2 hazard 
that poses the greatest threat to their occupational survival. 
 
12.3  Hazard mitigation 
 
12.3.1  The hazard of CO2 in confined spaces 
 
Working in confined spaces is one of the most serious occupational risks faced by operatives 
(Youakim, 2006). In the wine and beer industries, production unavoidably utilises storage and 
fermentation tanks and thereby has the potential to expose personnel to potentially 
hazardous levels of CO2 in confined spaces.  
A confined space may be defined as a space which, by design: 
1. has limited openings for entry or exit 
2. has unfavourable natural ventilation  
3. is not intended for continuous employee occupancy. 
(Manwaring & Conroy, 1990; Suruda et al., 1994)  
An analysis of deaths in confined spaces in the U.S.A., 1983-1989, found that almost half of 
fatalities were caused by asphyxiation (Manwaring & Conroy, 1990). Within the fermentation 
process, CO2 has the potential to increase at unpredictable rates to undetectable levels 
(where chemical monitoring is inadequate). Within a confined space, this hazard can be lethal. 
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Investigations of fatalities occurring in confined spaces within the wine industry have 
identified concentrations of CO2 of more than 100,000 parts per million (ppm) – more than 
285 times the naturally occurring level (Youakim, 2006). 
Further, CO2 is heavier than oxygen and will therefore accumulate in low points such as 
cellars, pits, tunnels and pipes (Wilday et al., 2011). Simply opening a door or similar opening 
in a confined space before entry will therefore not necessarily dissipate a higher-than-normal 
concentration of CO2 (Guillemin & Horisberger, 1994). Workers often enter a tank head first, 
facing downwards, so that their head enters the toxic gas layer below the entrance (Guillemin 
& Horisberger, 1994; La Harpe et al., 2013). This can result in almost instant death.  
Detection of CO2 without specific testing devices is impossible (Kettner et al., 2013). Therefore 
any claims that workers are “experienced” or “have had no problems in the past”, must be 
discounted. Manwaring and Conroy (1990) found that in 80% of companies that had 
experienced a confined space fatality, the same type of entry had been performed in the past 
without adverse effects. Furthermore, any reliance on informal rescue from supervisors or 
fellow workers must also be discounted as a mitigation measure, because of the risk of further 
fatalities. The Manwaring and Conroy paper also identified that 39% of fatalities were workers 
attempting to rescue another worker [Suruda et al.’s (1994) paper found 36% of persons who 
died in confined spaces were attempting rescue]; and 35% of confined space fatalities were 
workers with supervisory responsibilities. In one event, three supervisors died (Manwaring & 
Conroy, 1990). “Rescuing a worker from a confined space is a low-frequency, high-risk 
operation that is both time sensitive and technically challenging” (Wilson et al., 2012, p.121). 
Since death from contact with high levels of CO2 can be almost instantaneous (Scott et al., 
2009), rescue of workers overcome by CO2 (through the displacement of oxygen) in confined 
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spaces is virtually impossible without dedicated rescue equipment and rescue personnel 
instantly available.  
In view of the potential for unanticipated and rapid elevations of CO2 in the fermentation 
industries, it is appropriate to expand the customary definition of a confined space. When 
vats and tanks have extremely high concentrations of CO2, in the absence of adequate 
ventilation, the rooms in which the vats and tanks are situated may also have elevated CO2 
concentrations. Without ventilation, the atmosphere of the whole workplace – the beer or 
wine production spaces, barrel cellars and bottling rooms – may become perilously high in 
CO2 overnight, or even temporarily during normal production times. During the active 
fermentation process therefore, closed buildings may in themselves, become confined 
spaces. 
 
Contractors and allied workers are also endangered by a lack of awareness or proper 
mitigation techniques. Almost half of confined space fatalities are suffered by workers 
cleaning, repairing, or inspecting these spaces (Guillemin & Horisberger, 1994; Manwaring & 
Conroy, 1990). Further, in all the fatalities, no atmospheric testing of the confined space was 
performed, none of the confined spaces were labelled or posted with confined space warning 
signs; and in only two of the events was the confined space ventilated prior to entry 
(Manwaring & Conroy, 1990). With CO2 asphyxiation, there are no warning signs to indicate 
possible overexposure; therefore workers working alone and losing consciousness through 
asphyxiation will continue to inhale CO2 until death (La Harpe et al., 2013).  
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12.3.2  Hierarchy of control mitigation of the CO2 hazard  
 
This paper takes a simple three-stage hierarchy of control approach to mitigation of the CO2 
hazard in the fermentation industries: 
1. Elimination 
2. Isolation 
3. Minimisation 
 
This simple mitigation hierarchy, introduced as Figure 12 in Chapter Nine is again portrayed 
in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14. The hierarchy of controls for hazard mitigation 
 
Since the two manifestations of CO2 in the fermentation industries are distinct and different, 
(as a controlled input from CO2 in cylinders and CO2  as dry ice, and as a natural output from 
Chapter Twelve: Brewers and Vintners Beware! 
165 
 
fermentation), mitigation of the hazard using the hierarchy of controls requires separate 
analysis. 
12.3.3  Mitigating hazardous quantities of introduced CO2  
Where CO2 is introduced to the fermentation process for purposes of flavouring, carbonating 
(fizziness), or cooling (dry ice) – to slow down the rate of fermentation, CO2 is normally 
introduced either as a commercially-available gas stored in pressurised cylinders, or as a solid 
in the form of dry ice. Consideration of full safety procedures for pressurised gas cylinder 
handling is beyond the scope of this paper, and detailed precautions are available elsewhere 
(Dubois & Mayer, 2001; Rauscher, 2003). Leakage or spillage of CO2 from pressurised cylinders 
presents potential for hazardous levels of CO2 in the workspace. In addition to exposure to 
high levels of CO2, gas cylinders can also result in injury due to explosion if a fire was to occur, 
or through the torpedo effect from a mishandled cylinder releasing high pressure gas which 
could drive the cylinder with high force toward people or equipment – resulting in significant 
injuries and damage. 
Dry ice is the solid form of CO2 and is usually used as an additive to slow fermentation. It is 
much denser and colder than frozen water and usually exists at a temperature below -78.5oC 
(-109.3oF) (Continental Carbonic Products, 2009). Since dry ice will sublimate [at normal room 
temperature, dry ice will transform directly from a solid to a gas (Dry ice, 2009)] to an 
atmospheric gas at room temperature, it also presents the possibility of producing 
unintended elevated levels of CO2 in the work atmosphere. Narcosis has been recorded 
through sublimation of relatively small quantities of dry ice in an enclosed space (Leikin, 
Mitton, & Freedom, 2009). Dry ice can also cause severe skin damage through frostbite burns 
(Chiu, Nelson, Perry, & Burd, 2009). A hierarchy of controls approach to the mitigation of 
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hazards presented by both the use of pressurised CO2 in cylinders and the use of dry ice must 
be implemented. 
Elimination 
Storage of pressurised CO2 cylinders and inventories of dry ice should be kept to a minimum 
using just-in-time stock management principles (Kros, Falasca, & Nadler, 2006), thereby 
eliminating a significant proportion of the explosion hazard from fire (cylinders) and 
sublimation of dry ice to atmospheric gas. 
Isolation 
Minimum inventories of pressurised cylinders should be isolated in fire-protected rooms or 
cupboards. This will also isolate the cylinders from the possibility of collision with forklifts etc. 
When CO2 is introduced into the fermentation process, it must be reticulated using a regulator 
and hose from the cylinder to the inside of the fermentation vessel. Dry ice must be stored in 
a freezer capable of maintaining its temperature below sublimation temperature -78.5oC (-
109.3oF) (Continental Carbonic Products, 2009). Consideration must be given also to 
maintaining the integrity of the dry ice packaging so that the material can be moved to the 
fermentation area without any possibility of contact with skin or eyes. 
Minimisation 
Staff must be well trained and supervised in the transportation and storage of both 
pressurised cylinders and dry ice. Cylinders must be strapped to any barrows used in moving 
the CO2 from the cylinder storage area to the areas adjacent to the fermentation vessels; 
mishandling or inappropriate transport of cylinders may produce the torpedo effect described 
above. Shifting dry ice from the freezer storage facility to the areas adjacent to the 
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fermentation vessels presents the possibility of spillage resulting in burns or elevated 
atmospheric levels of CO2. Staff must be well trained and supervised in the storage and 
transportation of dry ice.  
12.3.4 Mitigating hazardous quantities of CO2 produced naturally by fermentation 
 
Elimination 
The only way to eliminate the hazard of naturally produced fermentation is to not allow the 
process to commence – clearly not an option when undertaking the fermentation of materials 
to intentionally produce an alcoholic beverage. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 
unintentional fermentation may be prevented and a significant part of the hazard eliminated 
through the timely disposal of fruit that is not required. For instance, unwanted or excess raw 
stock, by-product etc., may be disposed of before fermentation commences (or continues), 
thereby eliminating a potentially hazardous, and possibly unnoticed, source of CO2. 
Unintentional fermentation is a commonly occurring hazard in general agricultural situations 
such as grain storage or silage storage (Cook, 2009), or in the fermentation industry itself: in 
a salient example of how rapidly the CO2 hazard can manifest itself, during the writing of this 
paper, two French wine makers died after being asphyxiated when treading grapes with their 
bare feet in the traditional manner (Daily Mail Australia, 2014). Wherever fermentable 
produce is stored in preparation for processing, the CO2 hazard exists. It may therefore be 
possible to eliminate a large proportion of the risk by efficient stock (produce) management, 
including just-in-time process management and timely disposal of fermentable excess 
produce and by-products. 
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Isolation 
Undertaking an intended fermentation process will, however, inevitably produce often 
unpredictable quantities of CO2. Since it is impossible to eliminate CO2 production from the 
process, the next level in the hierarchy of controls is to isolate a hazardous level of CO2 from 
people.  
There are three primary techniques of isolating the workplace from elevated levels of CO2:  
1. automated capture of CO2 from fermentation vessels. This is sometimes used in larger 
breweries as the captured CO2 can be purified, compressed, and reused in the brewing 
process 
2. ventilation of the workplace through extraction apparatus designed and set to 
automatically begin extraction when CO2 levels reach elevated levels 
3. automatic lock-out of the workplace when detectors sense elevated levels of CO2 
within the confined space. 
None of these mitigation techniques rely on human judgment or operator actions – either 
from personnel unqualified to assess the risk, or from those qualified to do so. Together, these 
interventions represent a highly effective isolation from the CO2 hazard. Clearly, the success 
of this hazard isolation depends on ensuring the implementation of appropriate engineering 
measures: 
• dependable CO2 monitoring instruments suitably calibrated with displays outside the 
potential confined space 
• adequate exhaust installations linked to the calibrated monitoring instruments 
• lock-out systems linked to the monitoring instruments 
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• periodic assurance that the automated systems are operating as intended. 
Any manual intervention in these automated processes will diminish the effectiveness of the 
isolation, and should therefore be prevented.  
A manual system of isolation, such as enabling access by personnel – who believe that CO2 
levels are acceptable by (say) using a mounted or hand-held detector – represents a low level 
of protection from the hazard. The potential for a system over-ride by people who do not 
understand the hazard must be recognised and acknowledged as a lower-order isolation. 
Properly calibrated CO2 monitors must be present and operating satisfactorily wherever a 
hazardous accumulation of CO2 may occur – with associated alarms and displays positioned 
outside the potentially hazardous area. But where staff or contractors are able to override 
any automatic access restrictions, or where manual access is possible, isolation cannot be 
guaranteed. 
Minimisation 
Minimisation of the hazard comprises the least effective means of hazard control. It involves 
behaviour-reliant measures to manage the risk of occupational injury e.g. warning signs, rules, 
supervision, training, use of personal protective equipment (PPE), permits, standard 
operating procedures etc. These measures are generally regarded as the least effective 
because they cannot be assured – people are always able to bypass these measures, and 
eventually, someone does. Suruda et al. (1994) recommended a lock-out entry system to 
prevent the worker from entering until all appropriate confined space entry procedures 
(below) have been completed. Yet, most of the isolation measures listed in the Suruda et al. 
paper represent low level administrative or minimisation measures only. Any mitigation 
measure that depends upon human judgment is open to failure through operator, supervisor, 
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or observer misunderstanding, lack of hazard knowledge, pressure of work, and a myriad of 
other possibilities for omission (Reason, 2000).  
Fermentation tanks often have pressure relief valves and accordingly, gas levels may rise 
unexpectedly in nearby process areas where people may be working. All people working 
within or in support of the fermentation industries must comprehend that even briefly looking 
inside a vessel with an elevated CO2 level can induce unconsciousness and death (La Harpe et 
al., 2013).  Within the room, monitoring instruments must be mounted wherever there is a 
possibility for CO2 leakage and accumulation. The instruments must be calibrated below 
permissible levels (see Table 8, p.159) and linked to alarm systems so that personnel are able 
to exit the worksite readily before the gas levels accumulate to hazardous levels. Because of 
the hazard presented by elevated levels of CO2 being undetectable by people, the 
fermentation rooms must be considered as potential confined spaces. The declaration of a 
confined space indicates the critical need for application of confined space procedures. These 
explicit procedures require a high level of understanding and are beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, there are many excellent sources of information on working in confined 
spaces readily available in safety books, regulatory safety websites, and peer reviewed papers 
[see for example (Cook, 2009; Griffin, 2014; Smith, 2014)]. People who have not been highly 
trained in confined space procedures may be in mortal danger when entering a room with 
elevated levels of CO2. For instance, since CO2 fatalities appear to be primarily the result of 
asphyxiation rather than poisoning, the use of an air-purifying respirator is futile – since in a 
hazardous CO2 concentration there is insufficient oxygen to purify.  Manwaring and Conroy 
(1990) found that in 16% of confined space fatalities, either the wrong type of respirator was 
being used or an air-supply respirator was being used improperly. 
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12.4  Conclusion 
Suruda et al. (1994) identified an average of 89 deaths (in the U.S.A) per year from confined 
space incidents between 1980 and 1988 – more than 10 per year in one country alone. 
Although not all deaths were necessarily caused by CO2, underreporting of CO2 asphyxiation 
and poisoning through misunderstanding of both the pathology and the incidence of such 
injury appears to indicate that brewers and vintners should be more aware of this hazard. 
Further, the inadequate level of knowledge about the hazard presented by this seemingly 
harmless gas appears to be a significant threat to those involved in the rapid growth of 
boutique wineries and craft breweries. 
Elevated levels of CO2 from both process by-product (naturally occurring CO2 from the 
fermentation process) and process additives (pressurised gas cylinders of CO2 and dry ice) 
frequently produce atmospheric conditions that are critically hazardous and usually not 
survivable. This paper has highlighted the potentially catastrophic effect of this invisible and 
undetectable (in the absence of technical monitors) hazard within the alcoholic beverage 
production industries. Further, a lack of understanding of working in confined spaces – even 
the definition of a confined space – has prevented appropriate mitigation of this hazard. 
Common safety practices are more often than not restricted to a nebulous regard for 
“experience” and for procedures that have “always been the way”.  
This paper has employed hierarchy of controls methodology to objectively unpack the CO2 
hazard and offer a more professional analysis for hazard elimination or control. Higher order 
controls are preferred to unreliable lower level controls such as depending upon human 
behaviour. The use of automated monitoring linked to automated lock-out of production 
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spaces is strongly recommended as the optimum mitigation measure. Such production areas 
can become confined spaces simply by a natural elevation of CO2 levels due to the normal 
fermentation process. Automated lock-out until automatic or remotely controlled ventilation 
has occurred, is therefore the best protection from this hazard. Brewers and vintners are 
therefore urged to consider this methodology and apply it to their own production processes 
and people. While they may not have had a serious incident to date, they should nevertheless 
be aware of the volatility of CO2 production in the fermentation process, and its potential for 
harm.  
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12.5  Glossary 
Table 10. Glossary of exposure limit terms 
Occupational Health 
terminology 
Abbrev. Definition (Source) or use 
Immediately 
Dangerous to Life or 
Health 
IDHL The exposure to airborne contaminants that is "likely 
to cause death or immediate or delayed permanent 
adverse health effects or prevent escape from such 
an environment” (NIOSH, 1994). 
Milligrams per cubic 
metre 
mg/m3 Used for reporting the concentration of solids in the 
worker’s atmosphere (as mass per volume of air) 
(Beasley et al., 2011). 
Permissible exposure 
limit 
PEL See Workplace Exposure Limit below 
Parts per million ppm Parts of vapour or gas per million parts of air by 
volume at 25oC and 760 torr (atmospheric pressure) 
(Beasley et al., 2011). 
Recommended 
Exposure Limit 
REL See Workplace Exposure Limit below 
Short-term Exposure 
Limit 
WES-
STEL 
The 15-minute exposure standard. Applies to any 
15-minute period in the working day and is designed 
to protect the worker against adverse effect of 
irritation, chronic or irreversible tissue change, or 
narcosis that may increase the likelihood of 
accidents. The WES-STEL is not an alternative to the 
WES-TWA; both the short-term and time-weighted 
average exposures apply (Beasley et al., 2011). 
Threshhold Limit 
Value 
TLV See Workplace Exposure Limit below 
Time-weighted 
average 
TWA The maximum concentration of an air-borne 
substance averaged over a reference period (often 8 
hours), to which employees may be exposed by 
inhalation (Aw et al., 2007). 
Workplace Exposure 
Limit 
WEL The maximum concentration of an air-borne 
substance averaged over a reference period (often 8 
hours), to which employees may be exposed by 
inhalation (Aw et al., 2007). 
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Abstract 
A mixed method survey of owners of commercial breweries in Victoria and Tasmania 
(Australia) was conducted (n=45). The purpose of the study was to gain an understanding of 
how the breweries mitigated for the hazards they identified – in particular, asphyxiation from 
elevated levels of CO2. The survey comprised a questionnaire regarding the breweries’ age, 
staff numbers, how brewery owners assessed a significant hazard, and their methods of 
recognition and mitigation of the CO2 hazard. The research methodology also encouraged and 
recorded qualitative responses. The research intended to gain an understanding of how the 
breweries mitigated for the hazards they identified – in particular, asphyxiation from elevated 
levels of CO2. Contradictions between the respondents’ questionnaire (quantitative) and 
qualitative responses were noted.  A discontinuity between the respondents’ awareness of 
potential Class I injuries and their safety processes was discussed – in particular, the 
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distinction between high frequency and high consequence hazards. Accordingly, the paper 
suggests a polar area graph for mapping hazards in small businesses generally, to highlight 
rare but potentially catastrophic injuries among known industry hazards. 
 
13.1 Introduction 
 
Much has been made of the inadequacy of lost-time injury (LTI) as an indicator of workplace 
safety (Oleinick et al., 1993; Probst et al., 2008). LTI reduction usually targets the frequency 
axis of the risk matrix rather than the consequence axis (see Figure 17, p.192 for the 
commonly-used format of the risk matrix); and reductions in reported high frequency injuries 
are typically regarded as success (Behm & Powell, 2014; McDonald, 1996; O'Neill, Flanagan, 
& Clarke, 2016). While LTIs can include injuries and illness of high consequence, Safe Work 
Australia states, “LTIs reflect high-frequency, low-consequence injuries but provide little 
insight into disabling injury or illness” (O'Neill & Wolfe, 2017, p.60). In our enthusiasm to 
reduce LTI frequency therefore, are we neglecting the potential catastrophes that destroy 
lives and businesses? Such catastrophes are often easy to identify in hindsight (Hopkins, 2000, 
2008)  but are seldom predicted in the bustling day-to-day workplace of the safety 
professional.  
 
The authors of this paper recently published an exploration of the potential hazard of 
asphyxiation due to elevated levels of CO2 in the fermentation industry (Young, Naiker, & 
Aldred, 2015). The paper provided a review of relevant literature, presented an analysis of 
the potential problem and proposed a practical workplace solution. (Asphyxiation can result 
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from an elevated concentration of CO2 displacing oxygen to the extent that people are simply 
unable to receive sufficient oxygen to sustain life. Human beings normally require their 
immediate atmosphere to contain approximately 21% oxygen to function normally.) Some 
peer-review comment was received questioning whether it was indeed a credible threat 
within the industry concerned, and whether it was worthy of such attention. Literature and 
guidance on the hazards specific to the brewing industry are largely unavailable – a 
vulnerability in itself to new owner-operators of boutique breweries.  The authors therefore 
devised a survey and subsequent analysis intended to establish the hazards that brewers 
themselves identify in their workplaces, and how they set about mitigating them.  
The authors conducted a survey within the Victorian and Tasmanian (Australia) brewing 
industry, to determine how hazards are identified, prioritised, and prevented. The results 
were analysed and discussed in comparison with existing literature on confined spaces, 
asphyxiation, and hazard identification generally, and conclusions drawn on the suitability of 
current hazard identification and interpretation methods within the brewing industry. The 
analysis focussed on the general implications for improving safety within small, but rapidly 
growing, workplaces. 
 
Investigation of the developing craft brewing industry, usually managed and operated by the 
owners, seems ideal for an analysis of emerging and possibly unfamiliar hazards: “…growth in 
the past two years has been remarkable; scores of small breweries have expanded, upgraded 
or taken on additional brewers” (Smith, 2012, para.3). Exploration of this rapidly growing 
industry with relatively small, owner-operator workforces may provide a useful insight into 
not only the brewing industry, but management of hazards in many small businesses. 
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13.2 Methods 
 
Participants and procedures 
 
A search of online media located as many Victorian and Tasmanian commercial (i.e. not home-
based) breweries as possible. All breweries for which details could be found were contacted 
by telephone to initially determine the most appropriate person (defined as the person most 
likely to understand their organisation’s safety processes) to complete a survey relating to 
hazard mitigation in their brewery. Respondents were informed of the identity of the 
researchers and purpose of the study. All surveys were allocated a random number and 
respondents were advised that their personal and identifying information would remain 
confidential. The surveys were then emailed to respondents who agreed to participate, or, if 
requested by the respondent, were conducted immediately by telephone. Ethical approval 
(A16-008) for the study was received from the university’s Human Research and Ethics 
Committee and participant informed consent was obtained prior to participant 
commencement of the survey. 
Survey instrument 
The survey posed 18 questions related to health and safety in breweries: the size and age of 
the business; their methodology of identifying and ameliorating hazards (including the 
possibility of CO2 asphyxiation); and their safety awareness generally. In several of the 
questions, respondents were offered space and time to provide alternative responses (i.e. as 
an alternative to the 4 – 8 answers offered for selection). The final question simply asked “Is 
there anything you’d like to add regarding safety in breweries?” Where the surveys were 
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conducted by telephone, the research assistant recorded, without prompting, any answers 
offered by the respondents which could be classified as other.  Survey questions are included 
in Appendix H. 
The survey was reviewed and refined between the authors; but no piloting was possible since 
there was no cohort available whose response was dispensable i.e. the ultimate respondents 
(n=45) were a purposive sample (Teddlie & Yu, 2007). This limitation was regarded as an 
unavoidable consequence of surveying a relatively small purposive sample. 
Data analysis 
To ensure anonymity, all surveys were identified by a random number during data entry and 
analysis. Data entry was checked for accuracy, and frequency and multiple frequency tables 
were prepared for cross-tabulation.  
Qualitative data recorded were coded according to themes emerging from the participants’ 
responses. Quotes identified as being rich in detail and contextual meaning were highlighted 
(Patton, 2002). These themes were inserted into the Excel spreadsheet containing 
respondents’ survey data. The resulting composite analysis was then summarised to provide 
an insight into identification, prioritisation, and prevention of hazards in the brewing industry. 
13.3 Results  
 
13.3.1 Quantitative results 
 
Contact details for 64 breweries were located. Details for some breweries were difficult to 
find, but it is reasonable to assume that there were fewer than 90 breweries in Victoria and 
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Tasmania in 2016. Therefore the research sample represented 60-70% of Victorian and 
Tasmanian breweries. Of the research sample, data were available from 70% of breweries 
contacted (see Table 11). The data therefore represent approximately half the breweries in 
Victoria and Tasmania. 
Table 11. Response of breweries approached 
Declined to participate 5      
Data unavailable 
 
19 
 
30%   
Emailed survey not returned 14 
     
Emailed survey returned 5  
Survey data available 
 
45 
 
70%   
Completed phone survey 40 
     
Total 64  64  100% 
 
While almost half (49%) of breweries had been operating for more than six years, the survey 
also found that 40% had been in business for less than three years. Almost two thirds of the 
breweries employed fewer than five people, with the majority reporting that they were 
owner-operated. 
The results of the survey request to identify and rank the most significant hazards in their 
brew room are represented in Figure 15. This graph represents the six most significant hazards 
identified in ordinal rank. The most commonly selected second- and third-ranked hazards are 
represented alongside as more deeply shaded grey bars respectively. 
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Figure 15. Selection of ‘most significant’ hazards 
 
Burns were, by far, identified most frequently as the ‘most significant’ hazard (57%), followed 
by manual handling (18%). Slips, trips, and falls (as one category), and forklifts were identified 
as third and fourth (9% and 7% respectively); with explosions and asphyxiation identified as 
fifth and sixth (both 4%). 
Two-thirds of respondents ranked three or more most significant hazards. Therefore it was 
considered appropriate to sum the scores for each hazard category to establish a more 
comprehensive understanding of hazard identification among respondents. By combining the 
data for the first three categories, burns remained the most significant hazard, selected in the 
top three hazards by 82% of respondents. Manual handling was ranked second (69%), 
followed by slips, trips and falls (51%) and forklifts (20%).  
Asphyxiation was identified as the most significant hazard by only 4% of respondents, and 
only 16% rated it in the top three hazards. Poisoning was also rated in the top three hazards 
(9%), and confusion between asphyxiation and poisoning from CO2 may have accounted for 
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the low ranking of asphyxiation; but even if these responses were grouped together, they 
were still only rated in the top three hazards by a quarter of respondents. The possibility of 
confusing asphyxiation and poisoning can be discounted somewhat by a question which asked 
whether respondents were aware that CO2 “may be harmful in elevated concentrations”; to 
which 78% responded “Yes, if the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is high enough, 
people may be asphyxiated” (see Table 12 below). These results indicated that asphyxiation 
is therefore not generally regarded by brewers as a significant hazard when compared to 
burns, manual handling, and slips, trips, and falls. 
Respondents were asked to report the methods they used to deal with hazards. Seven 
methods were offered for selection and respondents were asked to choose “all that apply”. 
The responses are represented in Figure 16 below. Using personal protective equipment (PPE) 
was the most common method utilised (87% of survey respondents), with training ranked 
second (76% of respondents). Other results of note are detailed as percentages in Table 12. 
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Figure 16. Methods of dealing with hazards 
 
Table 12. Other key findings from survey 
Survey question Answer selected Response 
While Carbon Dioxide is harmless to people as a 
normal part of the atmosphere we breathe, are you 
aware that it may be harmful in elevated 
concentrations? 
Yes, if the concentration of 
Carbon Dioxide in the 
atmosphere is high enough, 
people may be asphyxiated 
 
78% 
How do you ventilate the fermentation area? Permanent natural ventilation 76% 
Do you have any atmospheric monitoring apparatus in 
your fermentation area? 
No monitoring 69% 
There appears to be increased focus on ‘safety’ in 
industry generally. What is your opinion of this 
increased awareness? 
Absolutely necessary  
76% 
How do you ensure the safety of visitors/tradespeople 
etc.? 
Supervision by authorised 
personnel 
67% 
 
In addition, the following aggregated responses were recorded: 
• 62% had no means of measuring or estimating levels of CO2 in the fermentation area 
(i.e. neither by personal judgment nor technical monitoring apparatus). 
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• All respondents reported that people other than staff were permitted to enter the 
fermentation area; 27% reported that anyone was able to walk into the fermentation 
area at any time; 51% reported that the area was locked, but multiple keys were 
available. 
• 71% had no confined space procedures (see also qualitative results below on 
response to finding an unconscious person). 
 
Question 16 in the survey asked “Have you heard of the ‘safety hierarchy’, or ‘hierarchy of 
controls’?” Responses are detailed in Table 13. A total of 73% had either not heard of these 
terms, or had heard of them, but did not employ this methodology for dealing with hazards 
in their brewery. 
Table 13. Hierarchy of Controls Awareness 
Answer selected Number Percentage 
Yes, we use this to deal with hazards in the brewery. 12 27% 
Yes, but we don’t use it. 14 31% 
No. 19 42% 
  
Results from the older and larger breweries were also tabulated to establish whether 
differences existed between the newer, smaller breweries and the more established 
breweries. Of the 45 breweries surveyed, 24 had been operating for more than six years 
and/or employed more than 10 staff. These older and/or larger breweries revealed some 
slight differences but these were not significant given the relatively small overall sample size. 
An interesting exception to this was that only half as many respondents in the older and/or 
larger breweries were aware that asphyxiation was a significant hazard compared to the total 
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sample. A comparison between the older/larger breweries and the total sample is set out in 
Table 14. 
Table 14. Comparison of older/larger breweries (only) with total sample 
 
 Older +/or larger 
breweries (only) 
Total sample 
‘Most significant hazards’   
Burns 79% 82% 
Manual handling 63% 69% 
Slips, trips and falls 46% 51% 
Forklifts 29% 20% 
Explosions 13% 11% 
Asphyxiation  8% 16% 
   
No CO2 monitoring apparatus 67% 69% 
   
No confined space procedures 63% 71% 
   
Safety focus ‘absolutely necessary’ 79% 73% 
 
13.3.2 Qualitative results 
While 76% of respondents chose “absolutely necessary” as their opinion regarding the 
“importance of an increased awareness of safety in industry generally” (20% chose 
“reasonably important”, 4% chose “not important”), many qualitative responses were 
received which did not indicate a commitment of support for safety at management/owner 
or supervisory level. These were characterised by comments on common sense, individual 
responsibility, and bureaucracy and paperwork – spread across both the newer, smaller 
breweries, and the older, larger breweries. These are quoted in Table 15. 
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 Table 15. Selected qualitative responses 
“Common sense” 
“No amount of regulation can replace common sense” 
“…common sense is necessary” 
“Safety is common sense; accidents caused by not thinking” 
“Common sense - don't put yourself in a predicament” 
“Common sense” 
“Can't teach common sense” 
“Individual responsibility” 
“…hope that people take responsibility for their own actions” 
“Often 'one size fits all' approach to brewery safety procedures doesn't work and create(s) a 
reliance on a procedure rather than the human perception of the possible hazard.” 
“We work in a dangerous industry yet many brewers are unaware of their hazards or how to control 
them. Many seem happy to work unsafely believing nothing bad will ever happen to them. 
Awareness training and legal responsibility training might be a good start.” 
“Paperwork and Bureaucracy” 
“Make people aware but not having too much paperwork so people lose track of job and 
awareness” 
“Bureaucracy (is) probably more dangerous than any physical danger you can face in your 
brewery” 
“No to draconian single use products or procedures by city council bylaws” 
 
Respondents were asked what action they would take on finding some unconscious on their 
brewery floor. Their comments are categorised in Table 16. 
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Table 16. Confined space procedures 
Question 14:  “If you saw someone unconscious on 
your brewery floor, what would you do?” 
 Number 
of 
responses 
Percentage 
Move to help the unconscious person (eg. “try and 
help them”) 
18 56.2% 
Call emergency services (“Call 000”) 2 6.3% 
Move to help the unconscious person and call 
emergency services 
(eg. “Call 000 – administer first aid”) 
10 31.2% 
Leave or only enter to remove the person ‘if safe to 
do so’ (eg. “Check the atmosphere before entering 
the area. Only enter to remove the person if it is 
safe to do so”) 
2 6.3% 
 32* 100.0% 
[*Most people did not answer the question directly, but 32 respondents offered qualitative data by way 
of explanation.] 
 
 
13.4 Data analysis and induction 
 
The contradiction between an overwhelming 96% of respondents answering that safety is 
either “absolutely necessary” (76%) or “reasonably important” (20%), and the many negative 
qualitative comments about safety generally, is worthy of further analysis. The qualitative 
responses quoted in Table 15 indicate a strong preference for “common sense” and 
“individual responsibility” as a means of achieving safety in a brewery, and an aversion to 
“paperwork” and “bureaucracy”. No survey questions asked anything to directly prompt any 
such responses: all the quotations in Table 15 were offered as spontaneous, supplementary 
comments, or as an answer to question 18: “Is there anything you’d like to add regarding 
safety in breweries?” 
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At least 78% of respondents understood that elevated levels of CO2 could cause asphyxiation, 
but all allowed access (mostly without any form of CO2 monitoring installed) to the 
fermentation area by outside parties. Further, 67% responded that supervisors and managers 
were “mostly responsible for safety” at their brewery (question 15), but usually appeared to 
regard individuals to be responsible for their own safety – see Table 15, p.184 for recurring 
qualitative responses. It is difficult to see how common sense or individual responsibility could 
protect visitors or staff from possible asphyxiation in the fermentation area when 69% of 
breweries reported having no CO2 monitoring, and CO2 is impossible to see or smell (Kettner 
et al., 2013). For the participants in this study, these obvious contradictions indicate that 
persons conducting a business undertaking (PCBU) in brewing have a disconnection between 
their knowledge and their safety actions. Their comments on paperwork and bureaucracy 
indicated a strong aversion to any rule- or regulation-based mitigation of fermentation area 
hazards. Respondents inexplicably felt that individuals should be responsible for their own 
safety, even when those individuals were unaware of an undetected gas that could result in 
their asphyxiation. 
 
It is clear that while brewery PCBUs may acknowledge asphyxiation from CO2 as a potentially 
catastrophic occurrence, very few have any meaningful procedures to ameliorate this hazard. 
This research project set out (inter alia) to determine whether the relatively rare but 
potentially catastrophic occurrence of elevated CO2 levels was regarded as a significant 
hazard, and should therefore be subject to assiduous mitigation in breweries. The 
contradictions noted above indicate that a multiple-fatality asphyxiation is a real possibility, 
in the absence of such mitigation. 
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In addition, 71% of respondents reported having no confined space procedures, should a 
person collapse from oxygen depletion. [Note - confined space procedures are designed to 
exclude people from a work area with a potentially hazardous atmosphere, or rescue 
someone who has been overcome in such a situation. The authors’ previous paper 
recommended that all fermentation areas should be declared confined spaces due to the 
potential hazard of elevated CO2 levels (Young et al., 2015)]. Of the 32 quotes concerning 
what the respondent would do if they saw someone unconscious on their brewery floor (Table 
16, p.186), only 2 could be regarded as professional and potentially effective responses. These 
2 responses were submitted from breweries with more than 5 staff – perhaps indicating a 
slightly greater knowledge about confined spaces procedures by some larger breweries than 
the overall sample.  Of the others, 27 indicated that the respondent would move to aid the 
unconscious person immediately – whereas it has been reported that more than a third of 
confined space fatalities are suffered by people who were attempting to rescue another 
person, and many of these were workers with supervisory responsibilities (Manwaring & 
Conroy, 1990).  Furthermore, 14 respondents answered that they would “call 000” 
(emergency services), whereas the confined spaces literature indicates that, unless 
emergency services with specialised equipment and personnel are available almost 
immediately, any reliance on external professional help is unlikely to prevent a fatality (Scott 
et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2012). Therefore, without any suitable monitoring and associated 
mitigation of elevated levels of CO2 in a brew room, a sufficiently elevated level of CO2 is likely 
to result in a fatality; and without appropriate confined space rescue procedures, multiple 
fatalities are possible.  
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Further contradictions for safety intervention appeared from analysis of the data regarding 
methods used to deal with hazards. Burns, manual handling, and slips, trips, and falls were 
reported as the most significant hazards, but PPE was reported as the most common means 
of mitigation identified. It is difficult to understand how PPE can be used as protection against 
manual handling injury, and slips, trips, and falls, or even for burns (except perhaps for gloves 
and visors). Regarding the CO2 hazard, and in relation to 78% of respondents acknowledging 
the possibility of asphyxiation from elevated levels of CO2, only a supplied-air respirator 
or a self-contained breathing apparatus with a full face-piece can protect from asphyxiation 
due to oxygen depletion or the Bohr effect [the Bohr effect explains that haemoglobin’s 
oxygen binding affinity is inversely related to acidity and the concentration of carbon dioxide; 
thereby causing death through physiological depletion of oxygen as a result of elevated 
carbon dioxide levels (Rossi-Bernardi & Roughton, 1967)]. In response to the question, “If you 
saw someone unconscious on your brewery floor, what would you do?”, one of the larger 
breweries responded, “…we have gas masks available”; clearly an ineffective intervention 
against elevated levels of CO2, and/or the depletion of oxygen (except for a supplied-air 
respirator or a self-contained breathing apparatus with a full face-piece – virtually unknown 
in the industry). 
 
Ventilation of the brew room also presented some contradictions. Several respondents 
reported having whirligigs in the roof as a means of extraction of CO2 (whirligigs are extractor 
fans, sometimes powered, sometimes wind-activated, and generally intended to allow rising 
heat and fumes to exit through the roof). Since CO2 is heavier than air, higher than normal 
levels of CO2 will flow into lower areas of the work area (Wilday et al., 2011). The use of 
whirligigs is therefore a dubious mitigation. Further, many breweries reported being well-
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ventilated with open doors and windows. Again, without definitive CO2 monitoring in most 
brew rooms, any passive ventilation constitutes a very inexact means of dissipation at best 
(Guillemin & Horisberger, 1994). How can dependence on an optional opening of doors and 
windows to introduce more oxygen or dissipate (usually unmeasured and undetectable) CO2 
possibly constitute a credible defence against asphyxiation? 
 
The survey set out to understand how the brewing industry identified and mitigated 
significant hazards: in particular, that of potential asphyxiation from elevated levels of CO2. 
The results revealed a remarkable divergence between the industry’s awareness of hazards 
and their proposed mitigation methodology. While the quantitative results of the survey are 
of interest, a key finding of this paper must be to comment on this divergence and the safety 
implications for the industry concerned, and for small to medium sized businesses generally.  
The survey analysis therefore prompted three questions worthy of further discussion for 
brewers, and other PCBUs in small to medium businesses. 
 
1. What is a ‘significant hazard’? 
2. How do persons conducting a business undertaking mitigate identified hazards? 
3. Why do PCBUs think safety is important, but not their concern? 
 
These questions are examined in Section 13.5. 
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13.5 Discussion 
 
13.5.1 What is a significant hazard? 
 
The concept of most significant hazard is central to the findings of this paper. It would not be 
unreasonable to deduce that the respondents interpreted most significant hazard as most 
frequent, or most likely hazard. The ubiquitous risk matrix model (see Figure 17 below) 
compares hazard likelihood against hazard consequence. While no definitive data are 
available to substantiate the frequency of hazards in the brew rooms surveyed, the 
experience and responses of the survey participants could perhaps be taken as indicative of 
relative frequency and therefore likelihood. There is little doubt that burns, manual handling 
injuries, and slips, trips, and falls, are more likely to occur frequently in a brew room than 
asphyxiation, but asphyxiation is surely a more consequential event. While burns, manual 
handling, and slips, trips, and falls may sometimes result in life-changing injuries or fatalities, 
the frequency of resulting injuries is likely to be made up of relatively minor injuries. 
Asphyxiation, on the other hand, is highly likely to result in at least one fatality (Guillemin & 
Horisberger, 1994; Kettner et al., 2013).  
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 Consequence 
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
1 2 3 4 5 
Health and Safety Near miss, 
First Aid 
Injury (FAI) or 
one or more 
Medical 
Treatment 
Injuries (MTI) 
One or more 
Lost Time 
Injuries (LTIs) 
One or more 
significant 
Lost Time 
Injuries (LTIs) 
One or more 
fatalities 
Significant 
number of 
fatalities 
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
5 Possibility of 
repeated events  
(1 x 10-1 per year) 
Significant 
risk 
Significant risk High risk High risk High risk 
4 Possibility of 
isolated incidents  
(1 x 10-2 per year) 
Moderate 
risk 
Significant risk High risk High risk High risk 
3 Possibility of 
occurring 
sometimes  
(1 x 10-3 per year) 
Low risk Moderate risk 
Significant 
risk High risk High risk 
2 Not likely to occur 
(1 x 10-4 per year) Low risk 
 
Low risk 
 
Moderate risk 
 
Significant risk 
High risk 
1 Rare occurrence  
(1 x 10-5 per year) Low risk 
 
Low risk 
 
Moderate risk 
Significant risk High risk 
  
Figure 17. The risk matrix 
 
This raises questions of how hazards should be identified for amelioration. By significance, do 
we mean frequency/likelihood, or do we mean consequence? Although many organisations 
use the likelihood/consequence matrix to assess and treat hazards, does it inform us in any 
meaningful way? McDonald (1996) argues strongly that consequence is more important. He 
classified occupational injury or disease as represented in Table 17 below. Recent publications 
from Safe Work Australia have supported McDonald’s work (O'Neill et al., 2013; O'Neill & 
Wolfe, 2017). 
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Table 17.  McDonald’s (1994) injury consequence classifications 
 
The injured person’s life is… The injury should be described as… 
Permanently altered Class I 
Temporarily altered Class II 
Inconvenienced Class III 
 
McDonald’s (1994) analysis of Australian occupational injuries and diseases in 1992-3, 
classified according to his three class definitions showed that while Class I constituted only 
13% of the injuries and diseases, it constituted 82% of the cost. Class II accounted for 87% by 
frequency, and only 18% of the cost. [Class III occupational injuries (inconvenience only) were 
presumably frequent, but cost virtually nothing and were therefore ignored.] Therefore, while 
the incidence of Class II (and Class III) injuries are clearly more frequent, the consequence of 
Class I in terms of cost are overwhelmingly more significant. Further, the analysis calculated 
monetary cost, but not ethical cost; surely, any Class I injury has a higher ethical cost 
(irrecoverable, permanent disability or fatality) to any community than a Class II (temporary, 
recoverable incapacity). McDonald therefore argued that the grossly higher costs (monetarily 
and ethically) of Class I injuries are significantly more important than the nominal artefact of 
frequency tabulation. He stated it more bluntly: “Unless these Class I occurrences are directly 
confronted, safety is fiddling” (p.5). 
 
How then, may this Class I distinction be represented, communicated, and considered? There 
have been calls for more diverse and sophisticated models of WHS safety (Dien et al., 2012; 
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Le Coze, 2013). Safe Work Australia point out that “…the need to direct attention to the 
prevention of Class I injury/illness (fatal and permanently disabling) is particularly critical. 
Alternative methods of risk rating to guide officers’ due diligence are required” (O'Neill & 
Wolfe, 2017, p.29). One such model may be represented by a polar area graph – originally 
developed for a parallel dilemma in the dissemination of critical decision-making data. 
Florence Nightingale, basing her diagrammatic description of Crimean War mortality on her 
colleague William Farr’s medically-informed statistical expertise, added a radial dimension to 
a segmented pie chart, thereby adding a weight of importance to selected frequency 
segments. [Nightingale also originated and utilised many innovative diagrammatic techniques 
to impart understanding of complex health issues (Magnello, 2012).] In her words, she 
highlighted, “what we fail to convey to the public through their word-proof ears” (Magnello, 
2012 p.31). At least in part, the consequence of Nightingale’s work (see Figure 18) was that 
the British government and the British public came to understand that “the majority of 
soldiers died not from war wounds… but of fever, cholera, diarrhoea, dysentery, and scurvy” 
(Magnello, 2012 p.31).  
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Figure 18. Florence Nightingale’s polar area graph 
Downloaded from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/17/Nightingale-mortality.jpg 
 
There are strong parallels between Nightingale’s representations of the most important 
drivers of British mortality in the Crimean war, and the most important drivers of Class I injury 
in the modern workplace. Surely the likelihood of a sprained ankle should not be given more 
importance than asphyxiation in a pie chart of identified potential hazards, simply because it 
is more likely. It is acknowledged that the consequence axis on the risk matrix (Figure 17, 
p.192) provides an indication of this weight – but this paper contests that the relevant 
importance of the risk estimation is often subsumed by the overwhelming frequency 
measurement. This may be explained by the continuing reliance on Heinrich’s triangle in many 
workplaces as a preventive strategy for occupational injuries (Heinrich, 1931, 1941). The 
dictum of Heinrich’s triangle suggests that more serious and less likely occupational injuries 
or fatalities can be prevented by significant reduction of frequent minor injuries; but this 
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accepted wisdom has been found to be unsubstantiated and contrary to peer-reviewed 
evidence (Bellamy, 2015; Manuele, 2011; Oleinick et al., 1993). Stated simply, prevention of 
50 minor injuries in a year is unlikely to prevent a potential Class I life-changing (or life-ending) 
injury. 
 
The findings of the current study showed that 78% of respondents acknowledged that 
elevated concentrations of CO2 in their brewery could asphyxiate people, but 69% had no 
means of measuring CO2 levels, and 76% relied on natural permanent ventilation to protect 
themselves and visitors from this hazard. It appears that a full understanding of serious 
consequence was simply not acknowledged or communicated. This paper therefore 
recommends a polar area graph be employed when explaining the potential for Class I injury 
and illness in risk assessment. While burns, manual handling etc., can be serious and 
debilitating, the majority are not. For instance, the American Burn Association notes in 
relation to 2015 burns in the United States: “More than 75% of the reported total burn sizes 
were less than 10% TBSA (total body surface area) and these cases had a mortality rate of 
0.6%” (American Burn Association, 2016, p.12). Asphyxiation from elevated levels of CO2 on 
the other hand, is very likely to be fatal. This can be represented in a conceptual graph as 
demonstrated in Figure 19 below. As with Florence Nightingale’s polar area graph, the radii 
of the frequency pie chart segments can be extended to draw attention to the more extreme 
potential outcomes such as asphyxiation and explosions. These may be rare, but the 
catastrophic consequences of these potential hazards warrants such emphasis. It may be that 
depending on the nature of the business, other classifications (such as burns, forklifts, manual 
handling, and slips, trips, and falls), could also in some circumstances result in a Class I injury. 
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Assessment and communication of a potential Class I injury can therefore be at the discretion 
of the safety professional, but should never be ignored.   
 
Figure 19. Polar area chart – depiction of Class I & Class II potential hazards 
 
13.5.2 How do PCBUs mitigate identified hazards?  
 
This survey and subsequent analysis set out to discover which hazards brewers identify in 
their workplaces, and how they mitigate them. While only 27% of respondents reported that 
they used the hierarchy of controls to deal with hazards in the brewery, it is not reasonable 
to assume that the other 73% should be aware of this preferential method for hazard 
amelioration (as say, may be expected of a safety professional). Nonetheless, and 
notwithstanding the above discussion on significance, some observations can be made on 
how the brewers approach the hazards that they do identify. Analysis of the methods the 
brewers reported using showed that 66% employed controls regarded as lower order i.e. 
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training, signs/rules, PPE, and management/supervision – commonly classified as 
administrative. Since these are the least effective controls of the safety hierarchy, this is 
perhaps disappointing, although it is noteworthy that other more mature industries are no 
more likely to employ higher order controls (Behm & Powell, 2014). Many respondents (60%) 
reported using elimination (the highest order in the hierarchy of controls) as a means of 
hazard mitigation, but without any evidence of actual elimination of hazards, it is difficult to 
substantiate this. With respect to the hazard of elevated levels of CO2, no intervention can 
prevent the production of CO2 in a brewing workplace, so it can be concluded that elimination 
cannot apply to potential asphyxiation. 
The use of lower end controls as perceived interventions may be a manifestation of the work-
as-imagined versus work-as-done principle (Borys, 2009; Clay-Williams et al., 2015). Brewery 
owners or managers may create rules or assumed behavior norms that, whether or not they 
are communicated to other staff, may be arbitrary and ineffective. For instance, one 
respondent made a comment about staff: “…many seem happy to work unsafely believing 
nothing bad will ever happen to them” and “…every employee is responsible for their own 
safety and the safety of others”. Despite 67% reporting that supervisors and managers were 
mostly responsible for safety (in their breweries), it seems that many of the respondents 
assume a level of knowledge and behaviour in their staff or visitors that is simply not there. 
There appears to be no formal identification and communication of serious hazards; instead, 
a general familiarity with injuries that have happened in the past seems to suffice as hazard 
identification, and a reliance on common sense seems to serve as the key means of hazard 
mitigation.  
 
Chapter Thirteen: Is that the light at the end of the tunnel, or is it an oncoming train? 
199 
 
13.5.3 Why do PCBUs think safety is important, but not their concern? 
 
The mixed method approach to this survey i.e. recording both qualitative and quantitative 
data, produced some interesting contradictions. In comparing the qualitative responses (i.e. 
“common sense”, “individual responsibility” and the stated aversion to “bureaucracy” and 
“paperwork”) with the quantitative results of the survey, it appears in general that many 
PCBUs assume that the safety function can be devolved to individuals. This is despite 67% 
stating safety was mostly the responsibility of supervisors and managers. There seems to be 
considerable animosity about the safety function generally. For instance, the following quotes 
appear to openly question the very need for any formal safety considerations: 
 
“Often 'one size fits all' approach to brewery safety procedures don't work and create a 
reliance on a procedure rather than the human perception of the possible hazard.” 
“Bureaucracy (is) probably more dangerous than any physical danger you can face in your 
brewery” 
“…must be mindful rather than rely on procedure” 
“One size doesn't fit all; common sense is necessary” 
“…don't put yourself in a predicament” 
There is very little in the safety literature to inform us why this conflict between common 
practice and the principles underlying the hierarchy of controls exists. Further research is 
needed to answer this question. 
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13.6 Conclusion 
 
This survey and subsequent analysis set out to ascertain the hazards brewers identify in their 
workplaces, and how they set about mitigating them.  In particular, the researchers found 
that brewers’ focus was more on mitigating relatively minor and common day-to-day hazards 
than being concerned about the relatively rare, but potentially catastrophic hazard of 
asphyxiation. More general observations were derived from the contradictions between the 
formal answers to the survey questions and the ad hoc comments made by respondents. 
These contradictions told a story of confusion and uncertainty when trying to answer the 
following questions. 
1. What is a significant hazard? 
2. How do persons conducting a business undertaking mitigate identified hazards? 
3. Why do PCBUs think safety is important, but not their concern? 
 
The answers to these questions cannot be determined by one survey of one small, but rapidly 
growing industry, although some framing of the questions and possible answers have been 
attempted by comparing the survey findings and contradictions to relevant literature. It is 
clear that more research must be undertaken to provide greater insight into these questions 
and their answers. It is also evident that, without effective intervention, one or more fatalities 
from asphyxiation in the brewing industry are inevitable.  
The metaphorical light at the end of the tunnel could be a progression toward a perceived 
safety goal, or it could be an oncoming train – a fatal incident that was unforeseen, 
unexpected, and catastrophic. 
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13.7 Research declaration, limitations and opportunities 
No financial support from any corporation, organisation, or any other body was sought or 
received for this research. 
The sample size of the survey was large enough to be representative of the brewing industry 
in two Australian states, but not to draw specific conclusions that may necessarily apply to 
other industries. Nonetheless, the results of this paper raise questions that prompt research 
topics for the future, leading to a better understanding of safety in small to medium 
businesses.  
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Chapter Fourteen: The boutique brewing industry – a triumph of 
imagination over reality?   
The second paper making up Part Three, Is that the light at the end of the tunnel, or is it an 
oncoming train? was published in the Journal of Health Safety and Environment in 2017 
(Young, Blitvich, Naiker, & Aldred, 2017). This paper produced a deeper insight into how a 
relatively new but rapidly growing industry understood and mitigated its hazards. The first 
paper, Brewers and Vintners Beware! also published in the Journal of Health Safety and 
Environment in 2015 (Young et al., 2015) presented a theoretical view on how a rare but 
potentially catastrophic hazard could be mitigated through assiduous application of the 
hierarchy of controls. In the course of introducing innovative upper level interventions in that 
paper however, the brewing expert co-author, Associate Professor Peter Aldred, sometimes 
commented “…but it wouldn’t normally be done that way…”. The debate between the 
authors then resulted in the consensus that the normal way of operating is not necessarily 
the most appropriate for the mitigation of the unusual, but highly significant hazard of 
unforeseen and elevated levels of CO2. The first paper therefore presented methodologically 
correct ways of mitigating for the hazard – according to the hierarchy of controls. 
But the Associate Professor’s point was nonetheless well-made and relevant. The real world 
of this rapidly expanding industry did not normally (inter alia) declare their fermentation 
rooms as confined spaces – with the associated specialised procedures and precautions. The 
authors then resolved to identify the gap between the methodologically ideal mitigation of 
the inherent hazards of the brewing industry and the practitioners’ understanding or normal 
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practice in their worksites. The survey did identify significant deficiencies in their 
understanding – as might have been expected – but also revealed a disturbing incongruence. 
The difference between the quantitative results i.e. respondents’ selections from a range of 
answers offered in the survey, and the qualitative results i.e. respondents’ supplementary 
comments to the research assistant, was of particular interest. 
The second paper identified that PCBUs did have a partial understanding of the hazard in 
question, but that in general, their mitigation response was at best, ineffective, and at worst, 
disingenuous. Analysis of the inconsistencies inherent in their responses led the resulting 
paper further than a consideration of the gap in respondents’ understanding, and into a 
deliberation on why this may be so. The paper therefore posed three supplementary 
questions: 
1. What is a ‘significant hazard’? 
2. How do persons conducting a business undertaking mitigate identified hazards? 
3. Why do PCBUs think safety is important, but not their concern? 
 
The first question prompted an important consideration of prioritisation of hazards in terms 
of greatest potential for harm. This was presented using a polar area pie chart so that 
potential severity was not subsumed by likelihood or frequency. Using this technique, the 
likelihood or frequency can be illustrated within a customary pie chart, but the potential 
consequence may be emphasised by extending the radius of the most consequential hazard.  
The second question revealed a confirmation that the basic principles of the hierarchy of 
controls were, in general, simply not understood or ignored.  
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The third question revealed a dichotomy between what people said about safety generally 
and what they actually did. Further, while the research assistant reported on the whole a 
friendly and cooperative response to the survey and its qualitative component, respondents 
disclosed an unexpected animosity towards safety and its perceived implications. This finding 
was beyond the scope of the research topic, but presents an interesting area for further 
research. 
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Chapter Fifteen: Conclusion: The Trouble with Safety 
 
15.1  Review of the thesis 
 
Despite being recognised by most safety advisers as the underlying canon of health and safety 
practice, the hierarchy of controls seldom appears in the safety literature. This thesis is unique 
in that it sequentially provides a validation of the hierarchy’s efficacy, an examination of the 
underlying assumptions and precepts of the hierarchy, and a contemporary demonstration of 
the misunderstanding surrounding the concept. Together, these three components 
constituted the three major parts of the thesis – for the first time, presenting an overview of 
the efficacy and understanding of the safety hierarchy of controls.  
In pursuit of a more purist paradigm, the concept of risk was largely excluded from this study. 
While the hierarchy of controls may be a tool in the business of risk management, the reverse 
is not necessarily the case. As an epistemological concept, risk is uncertain and differs 
according to the context of the situation and the heuristics of the analyst; whereas hazards 
or potential hazards are ontological realities in the workplace and can be managed using the 
hierarchy of controls with some confidence. This exclusion of a consideration of risk, with its 
inherent limitations, has contributed to a greater understanding of the efficacy of the 
hierarchy of controls by demonstrating the added value of a focus on hazard management.  
 
The safety community has a difficult relationship with peer-reviewed literature.  As an applied 
science, it requires the rigour of scientific method. Yet its constituency – safety practitioners 
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working with workforces and their employers – requires simplicity, accessibility and 
transparency. In a study of systemic accident analysis models, Underwood & Waterson (2013) 
reported that most of the systematic models are not widely used by accident investigators. 
With the lack of any relevant alternative evidence, it appears that the levels of safety 
governance in the boardroom are no more robust. 
 
This thesis is predicated on the expectation that much of this uncertainty is due to confusion 
over the understanding and efficacy of the safety hierarchy. The research project therefore 
proposed conducting a mixed method study of the hierarchy of controls within the following 
context: 
 
• collecting and analyzing original qualitative data on successful real-world 
applications of the hierarchy 
• collecting and analyzing original quantitative data on the current state of 
understanding of hazard mitigation in a rapidly growing industry 
• re-conceptualising the application of the hierarchy in selected contemporary 
workplaces 
• contextualising the real-world application within the existing literature 
• developing pragmatic models for integration into the contemporary Australasian 
workplace. 
 
The concept of the safety hierarchy is frequently acknowledged in both theory and 
commercial practice; yet soundly-based theoretical or generic models of the hierarchy seldom 
appear in the safety literature. Further, case studies highlighting the relative efficacy of the 
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safety hierarchy (or lack thereof) are rare. It seems that despite safety professionals’ wish to 
disseminate effective solutions based on the safety hierarchy, the safety community has little 
peer-reviewed evidence on which to base their recommendations. 
 
This research project is significant in that it provides both strong evidence of the efficacy of 
the safety hierarchy and an evidential base for functional and pragmatic safety intervention. 
The inclusion of a series of peer-reviewed publications which are contextualised within 
contemporary worksites and the existing literature may significantly contribute to real-world 
injury prevention. 
 
15.2  A re-statement of the research question(s) 
This research project set out to answer the key question: 
 “What constrains understanding of the efficacy of the safety hierarchy?”  
In order to answer this question, the research was divided into three manageable parts, each 
asking a more specific question: 
1. How may contemporary evidence demonstrate the efficacy of the safety hierarchy? 
2. What are the constraints on understanding the hazard vector as it relates to the 
safety hierarchy? 
3. What is the current understanding of hazard mitigation in a selected industry and 
how may the safety hierarchy be implemented to ameliorate a key hazard? 
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15.3 The confirmation of efficacy 
Part One asked the question, “How may contemporary evidence demonstrate the efficacy of 
the safety hierarchy?” An unequivocal demonstration of efficacy is problematic, since a 
laboratory-like experiment to hypothesise and then substantiate the efficacy of the hierarchy 
of controls is impossible. Clearly it would be unethical and impractical to set up an experiment 
comparing the use of the hierarchy of controls in one workplace while at the same time not 
using this acknowledged mitigation methodology in an identical workplace next door. Instead, 
Chapter Three contextualised the remarkable safety journey of a large, hazardous industrial 
plant within the zero accident vision, and drew an association between that plant’s near-
absence of injury over a prolonged period of time and their use of the hierarchy of controls 
to inform their safety interventions. The contextualisation found a number of enablers, 
modifiers, and interventions that clearly drove the injury rates down to zero or near-zero 
levels; but the overwhelming commonality running through these interventions was an 
assiduous application of the higher levels of the hierarchy of controls.  
As an additional demonstration of efficacy, Chapter Five added a longitudinal dimension to 
that apparent success. The same plant, along with a similar industrial workplace, was 
qualitatively studied to ascertain whether their previous safety gains were merely a 
temporary golden patch or whether they represented a sustainable gain – even under 
conditions of financial duress. The paper Safety in Hard Times described the experiences of  
two plants’ safety  managers as they steered their way through very difficult times while 
maintaining exemplary safety records. Personnel from both plants pointed to their respective 
company’s application of the safety hierarchy in previous interventions as the key driver for 
their continuing success. 
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Part One established the following key findings in answer to the question, “How may 
contemporary evidence demonstrate the efficacy of the safety hierarchy?”: 
• a successful ZAV (i.e. an achievement of zero or near-zero occupational injuries in a 
workplace over an extended period of time) is achievable 
• a major focus on the elimination stage of the hierarchy of controls can be credited as 
a critically important component of the success of the ZAV 
• The source of a hazard, the recipient of an injury, and the pathway between the two, 
can be termed the hazard vector 
• a rejection of the human error explanation for any accident or injury pervaded virtually 
all health and safety practice at NZAS, and widely contributed to the ZAV 
• higher order, ergonomic controls were demonstrably more effective in preventing 
occupational injury than lower order, egocentric controls 
• NZAS management of their ZAV was consistent with peer-reviewed best-practice goal 
theory 
• qualitative evidence from both NZAS and Alcoa emphasised both companies’ 
commitment to the use of upper level hierarchy of controls interventions wherever 
possible 
• lean management practice has the potential to inadvertently lead to increased risk to 
the workforce, due to termination of previous “unproductive” (higher order) 
interventions intended to intercede in the occurrence of rare but potentially 
catastrophic hazards 
• an external audit can predict and prevent a catastrophic event before it occurs by 
identifying where these higher order interventions had been withdrawn 
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• staff confidence in previous higher order safety interventions and achievements can 
be continued even when staff know that their job is about to, or may possibly, be 
terminated. 
Part One therefore found that contemporary evidence can and does demonstrate the efficacy 
of the safety hierarchy. 
This confirmation of the zero accident vision has made a discernible contribution to the ZAV 
literature. In the years before and since the publication of From Zero to Hero, the ZAV has 
received some criticism both within general safety practice and in the literature. In their 
review of ZAV innovative perspectives, Zwetsloot et al. (2017) have reviewed the relevant 
literature and found that “the ZAV critics do not have a strong scientific case” (p. 264); 
whereas they highlighted several effective ZAV examples. One of these, Young’s (2014) paper 
(included within this thesis) “clearly demonstrates a good example” (p. 266).  
 
15.4 Constraints on understanding the hazard vector 
Part Two posed the question, “What are the constraints on understanding of the hazard 
vector as it relates to the safety hierarchy?” 
Proof of concept often requires a double blind experiment conducted under controlled 
conditions; but the magnitude of association between two conditions can nonetheless be 
embraced as a powerful indication of efficacy. The concept of cause appears inevitably and 
indivisibly linked to considerations of hazards and the hazard vector, but few analyses of WHS 
consider the origin or significance of this word. For instance, the association of smoking with 
cancers and other drivers of mortality is now universally accepted, even though the 
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originating pathological development of cancer is not yet fully understood. See, for example, 
Chang, Corey, Rostron and Apellberg’s (2015) systematic review of Cigar Smoking and All 
Cause and Smoking Related Mortality: their association of cigar smoking with many forms of 
cancer and other mortality is unequivocal (along with many other such links), but they offer 
no explanation of their use of the word cause. Similarly, in a more direct example (to industrial 
safety), Cheng, Lin & Leu’s (2010) paper applying data mining techniques to explore factors 
contributing to occupational injuries “seeks to establish potential cause-and-effect 
relationships…” (p. 214): the association of occupational injuries with a number of prevalent 
conditions is shown to be statistically significant, but cause-and-effect is not demonstrated 
definitively. 
The notion of cause is generally regarded as important in interventions intended to prevent 
occupational injury; but if such interventions are to be effective, the hazard vector must be 
clearly targeted and precisely understood – without the encumbrance of selecting an often 
predetermined cause as a predominant reason for an event. A call to “stop smoking” is 
appropriate to avoid cancer (by way of association), but a call to “stop working” is not a useful 
response to the myriad of potential occupational injuries faced in our workplaces. The 
concept of cause was therefore studied in Chapter Eight in a targeted literature review. The 
review found that the commonly held idea that injuries each have a unique root cause was 
not supported. Instead, the energy damage model was described to examine the conditions 
which had to be present or absent for an energy transfer to take place resulting in an injury. 
The hierarchy of controls was therefore deconstructed and reconstructed to more clearly 
understand and present the application of the concept.  
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Part Two established the following key findings in answer to the question ‘‘What are the 
constraints on understanding the hazard vector as it relates to the safety hierarchy?”: 
• The word cause is often misunderstood as an active agent (the causing effect); 
whereas cause cannot be demonstrated as an active transporter of a hazard to a 
receiver (the victim), but instead, should be regarded as a passive conduit that can be 
managed in a straightforward manner. This is the essence of the hierarchy of controls; 
• The concept of cause in the event of an injury is often obscured in anthropocentric 
attributions of blame. This leads to a misunderstanding and distortion of the hazard 
vector; 
• The commonly cited “cause and effect” is often a contrived construct, required to 
establish perfunctory blame, simplistic rationalisation, and the tort of negligence 
necessary for legal action; 
• The prioritised layers of the customary versions of the hierarchy of controls are not 
always as well-delineated as is commonly assumed. In more effective leadership 
environments, interventions previously regarded as lower level controls could be re-
classified as higher order controls (see for example, the description of isolating PPE in 
Section 3.5.2, pp.41-42); 
• A solitary identification of a deliberately selected, time-bound element of the hazard 
vector is often promoted as a root cause; thereby representing an inadequate 
investigation of occupational injury; 
• Despite a multiplicity of versions of the hierarchy of controls, the three-stage hazard 
vector adequately represents all the various elements of the hierarchy. It therefore 
promotes a clearer understanding of the means by which people are injured. 
Chapter Fifteen: Conclusion – the trouble with safety 
213 
 
• This three-stage version of the hierarchy of controls can be simply represented in a 
workplace poster and/or in WHS education materials. 
 
15.5 The safety hierarchy applied to a relatively young and growing industry – a case 
study 
 
Part Three asked “What is the current understanding of hazard mitigation in a selected 
industry and how may the safety hierarchy be implemented to ameliorate a key hazard?” 
Two research papers were produced. The first offered an ideal application of the hierarchy of 
controls to an acknowledged hazard in a young and rapidly growing industry; the second 
surveyed that industry with respect to the owner-operators’ understanding of mitigation of 
that (and other) hazards. The two papers approached the rare but potentially catastrophic 
hazard of elevated levels of CO2 in a fermentation room from two perspectives: 
 
1. From the abstract point of view of a theorist: demonstrating a solution where the 
hierarchy of controls can be employed to hypothetically intervene in the 
workplace to prevent a catastrophe; and 
 
2. From the real-world point of view of the person conducting a business undertaking 
(PCBU): where day-to-day pragmatism focuses not on the theoretical, but on the 
happenstance of frequent annoyances. 
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The case study, real-world point of view used a quantitative and qualitative survey to analyse 
the layperson’s understanding of hazards generally, and of the CO2 asphyxiation hazard in 
particular. Analysis of the collected data demonstrated that: 
• a hierarchy of controls mitigation of a hazard may not necessarily match with common 
work practices 
• significance of a hazard is often confused with the  frequency of commonplace and 
relatively minor hazards – thereby reducing the utility of the commonly used risk 
matrix 
• there is a danger that potential Class I, or life-altering injuries (including fatalities), may 
be overlooked or underestimated in favour of more frequent Class II & III injuries when 
hazard prevention and control is considered 
• a polar area pie chart may be a more useful representation of these hazards in respect 
to the relative potential harm they may present 
• safety procedures within worksites are often work as imagined rather than work as 
done (Clay-Williams et al., 2015) whereby the PCBUs profess knowledge and intended 
mitigation of a hazard, but in reality, ignore it. 
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15.6 Contribution to the academic literature 
 
The content, comparison, and contrast between the two pairs of peer-reviewed published 
papers is central to the academic contribution of this thesis.  
The two papers constituting Part One document the success of the application of the 
hierarchy of controls in the harsh and hazardous working environment of the aluminium 
production industries. As well as contributing rare ‘real-world’ case studies to the academic 
literature, they provide a direct insight into the means for achieving a remarkably low number 
of workplace injuries, primarily through the efficacious application of the hierarchy of 
controls. Furthermore, the paper Safety in Hard Times demonstrated that using the upper 
levels of the hierarchy of controls in hazard mitigation was not only effective in workplace 
injury reduction, but also sustainable over a prolonged period of time – even in times of 
financial constraint. These findings contribute to the existing literature by establishing that 
not only can the efficacy of the upper-level hierarchy of controls be demonstrated by 
recording significantly reduced injuries (which is commonly accepted but is seldom 
demonstrated), but also that investment in such higher level controls results in a durable 
effect. Even when business cycles and technological disruption produce severe financial 
duress on companies to reduce costs, the efficacy of using higher level controls perseveres. 
Therefore companies need not rely on lower level controls, such as continued or attempted 
human behaviour modification, to remain effective (other than routine audits to ensure such 
controls are still operating as intended). 
Part Two interrogated the nature of the hierarchy of controls by deconstructing and 
reconstructing the concept; and then conducted an in-depth exploration into the 
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understanding of the concept of cause. The two chapters comprising Part Two drew from the 
understanding of the efficacy of the hierarchy of controls documented in Part One to clarify 
and build on the current awareness of how workplace hazards produce workplace injuries, 
and how these can be prevented.  
The thesis then sought to apply this understanding to a newer, smaller industry by introducing 
a second set of peer-reviewed papers as Part Three. The two papers in this section 
investigated a burgeoning new industry – boutique breweries and wineries – and considered 
the sporadic but potentially catastrophic hazard of elevated levels of carbon dioxide. The 
contrast between Part One and Part Three lies in the difference in scale of and expertise 
within the respective organisations. The aluminium workplaces are operated by large multi-
national corporations and have many hundreds of workers, with highly developed safety 
procedures; the boutique breweries and wineries on the other hand, are often small 
companies run by only one or two people who are often newcomers to business and safety 
management. Nonetheless, the paper Brewers and vintners beware! explained how the 
hierarchy of controls could be introduced relatively easily into these smaller workplaces in 
order to mitigate the potentially fatal consequences of elevated levels of carbon dioxide. 
However, in contrast to part One, the second paper in Part Three revealed a troubling lack of 
knowledge in the new, smaller companies of how the hierarchy of controls could be applied 
to this hazard, and an absence of concern for safety in general. In comparing and contrasting 
the large, established workplaces with small, recently-established workplaces, this study has 
shown that the efficacy of the hierarchy of controls can be applied equally in two very 
different organisation contexts, but that the lack of understanding of the enduring nature of 
using the higher level controls in the smaller workplaces, is potentially catastrophic.  
Chapter Fifteen: Conclusion – the trouble with safety 
217 
 
15.7 Understanding and efficacy of the safety hierarchy of controls  
 
“The sources of our knowledge of industrial poisoning in the United States are neither full, 
nor for the most part accurate” (Hamilton, 1925, p.'v'). If we were to substitute the words 
“industrial poisoning in the United States” with “workplace health and safety”, Hamilton’s 
opening words from her 1925 book would be disturbingly accurate almost 100 years later. As 
a formative thinker in how hazards could be ameliorated with a series of prioritised 
mitigations, Hamilton reasoned her way into safety history. Surely she must have had a 
degree of optimism that this simple hierarchal concept of preventing occupational injury or 
disease at the source of the hazard in preference to alerting or offering protection for the 
potential victim was a self-evident way of dealing with workplace health and safety?  
Regrettably, while the simple concept of the hierarchy of controls is a generally accepted 
safety principle in the 21st century, its application as a means for preventing occupational 
injury and disease is largely conspicuous by its absence (Behm & Powell, 2014; Young et al., 
2017). 
The persistent orthodoxy that WHS injury arises primarily from human error and/or a root 
cause is inconsistent with a reasoned interpretation of the hierarchy of controls, and 
therefore inadequate as a driver for safety intervention.  
This research project is a source of both optimism and pessimism with respect to the 
hierarchy of controls.  In the first instance, an extraordinary and continuing exemplary record 
of safety at a very hazardous workplace can be credited largely to an assiduous application of 
the safety hierarchy.  An in-depth examination of the background to the concept of cause and 
the constitution of the safety hierarchy has provided a greater insight into the methodology 
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than has been available previously. But this positivity is tempered with a significant caution: 
unless potentially catastrophic hazards are identified in advance, mitigation for perceived 
workplace hazards may be of limited efficacy – with or without the hierarchy of controls. 
In summary, the hierarchy of controls can be a highly effective methodology for mitigation of 
identified hazards, but only if it is understood on the most fundamental of levels by anyone 
and everyone in and around any workplace. 
 
15.8  Recommendations for further research 
 
The conduct of this research thesis has highlighted the need for further research into these 
areas. 
Part One noted the paucity of industrial WHS case studies generally. The lack of opportunity 
for such case studies, due in part, to many companies’ reluctance to reveal the often-
hazardous nature of their worksites, is acknowledged; but surely there are inherent 
advantages in encouraging Master’s or Doctorate students to study their workplaces. For 
instance, where a company is excelling in providing a workplace with significantly fewer 
injuries than other similar workplaces, surely that company will accrue reputational benefits 
from carefully conducted academic research. And when a company is having difficulty 
mitigating their hazards, surely a well-informed application of the hierarchy of controls will 
provide tangible benefits for both the company and its staff. 
Part Two examined the constraints in understanding the hierarchy of controls – in particular, 
questioning the use of the word cause as it relates to the hazard vector. The inadequacy of 
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the word as a key driver for WHS is perhaps the most challenging aspect of this thesis, and 
may arouse the most controversy. The concept of cause is therefore open to further 
examination – particularly as it relates to the hierarchy of controls, the hazard vector, and 
proposed interventions to mitigate for WHS hazards.  
Part Three may also provoke some controversy in the safety community. The dual approach 
of constructing an abstract mitigation for a potentially catastrophic hazard; and then, 
surveying the industry to discover the actual nature of the participants’ understanding of the 
hazard – provided some extraordinary contradictions. The questions posed as a result of these 
contradictions are worthy of further investigation.  
Further, the integration of qualitative methods of enquiry into safety research is also strongly 
advocated by the researcher. Chapter Fourteen provided a stark reminder that what people 
say they do and what they actually do are often two different things. Quantitative research is 
extremely important in all fields of science but qualitative methods can complement 
quantitative research by informing the nature and veracity of numerical data. Since research 
into safety is ultimately about people, a mixed method approach is strongly supported by this 
researcher. 
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15.9  Limitations  
 
The limitations of the individual peer-reviewed papers featured above are noted at the end 
of the respective papers. There is a further limitation that should be noted from the overall 
research project and from the presentation of this thesis: 
The three-stage hierarchy is introduced as conceptual only and not as doctrine. It is 
acknowledged that an assiduous application of any version of the hierarchy of controls may 
have as much beneficial effect to a worksite as any version of the hierarchy included in this 
thesis. For instance, the idea of ‘isolating PPE’ arose from the first case study and served 
primarily to demonstrate alternative definitions of each stage of the hierarchy as they were 
examined in that study.  
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orkplacehere is a need to pursue more evidence to support the zero accident vision (ZAV). New Zealand
luminium Smelters Limited (NZAS) has been operating under a ZAV for more than two decades and
ow consistently has fewer than ten lost-time injuries (LTI) per annum. While the ZAV has not been fully
alised, NZAS is now one of the safest heavy industrial worksites in the world. This mixed method case
udy substantiates the signiﬁcant reduction in LTIs and describes the interventions used to achieve the
provement. The interventions are rated using a hazard intervention effectiveness matrix and by con-
xtualising their apparent efﬁcacy within the available literature. The NZAS ZAV achievement is further
alysed using goal theory. The study concludes by attributing NZAS’ relative success to an assiduous
plication of hierarchy of control methodology with a particularly strong ergonomic focus.
Crown Copyright  2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.. Introduction
The zero accidents vision (ZAV) has become widespread among
mpanies around the world as they seek to protect their employ-
s from work-related harm (Hinze and Wilson, 2000; Mohamed,
999; Van Scyoc, 2008). Some writers, however, question the
nwavering belief in the attainability of absolute safety as a dis-
action from achieving realisable safety goals (Reason, 2000a),
hile others point to a need to pursue more scientiﬁc evidence
support the efﬁcacy of the ZAV (Zwetsloot, 2013). This paper
escribes a case study into a ZAV in a hazardous industrial plant
rough substantiation of the injury reduction and a description
f the interventions used.
New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (NZAS) has been
amed as the safest aluminium smelter of its class in the world
ew Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited, 2007). It is unusual
r a New Zealand company to be recognised internationally for
s safety record. New Zealand’s workplace injury rates are twice
ose of Australia and almost six times those of the United
ingdom (Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety,
012). NZAS’ reputation as a relatively safe workplace is especially
rprising considering the potentially hazardous nature of the
rocess of smelting aluminium. As an indication for the potential
r injury to aluminium smelter workers, a study analysing acci-
ents at an Indian smelter, with approximately 2100 employees,
milar in both size and production methodology to NZAS, reported
total of 465 lost-time injury (LTI) accidents, including 5 fatalities,etween January 1989 and December 1991 (Das and Chaudhury,
995). Over the same period, with a workforce of approximately
700 people, NZAS recorded 116 lost-time injuries and no fatali-
es. In the 11 years since 2000, no fatalities have been recorded
NZAS, and lost-time injuries have been conﬁned annually to sin-
e ﬁgures.
NZAS’ ZAV was introduced in 1990 with the slogan ‘Our Goal is
ero’. In November 2010, a full 12 months was completed with
ro LTIs – although one LTI at the end of 2010 meant that the goal
as not completed for a full calendar year. Nevertheless, in such a
azardous industry, this represents a signiﬁcant result. The
parent superiority in NZAS’ safety record over that of other
elters internationally, operating in a country with a relatively
igh workplace injury rate, is therefore worthy of investigation. If
e improving safety record of NZAS can be substantiated and
escribed, then others may be able to learn from this success and
revent serious injuries in their respective workplaces.. Methods
To explain NZAS’ ZAV, a research project was undertaken in
012 comprising a mixed method case study, with a pragmatic
orldview, using a concurrent strategy of inductive enquiry
oung, 2013).
The quantitative component of the study interrogated NZAS LTI
ata over the years 1972–2011. The data were retrospectively rec-
nciled to 2011 deﬁnitions of LTI by incorporating LTIs recorded by
ntractors and visitors, and by including restricted work duties
WD) previously omitted from LTIs. Where data were missing
100 S. Young / Safety Science 64 (2014) 99–108or uncertain (particularly in the early years of the study), interpo-
lations and estimations were performed, based on relevant data or
ratios drawn from adjacent years. In these cases, sensitivity tests
were completed to gauge what effect a 50% overestimation or
underestimation of the relevant data would have on the resulting
LTIFR. The data were tabulated and a regression analysis
calculated.
The qualitative enquiry employed semi-structured interviews
seeking responses to open questions. Interviews were conducted
with 23 NZAS employees across a broad range of organisational
levels, operating departments, and ages, and included both male
and female workers. A deliberate bias towards members of the
‘25-year club’ (those who had worked at NZAS for more than
25 years) was exercised in order to explore changes in the worksite
throughout the course of those employees’ working life.
The transcript from the interviews was coded according to
themes emerging from the participants’ responses. Quotes identi-
ﬁed as being rich in detail and contextual meaning were high-
lighted (Patton, 2002). Upon completion of transcription and
coding, the data set was considered to have reached ‘saturation’,
since nothing new was emerging and replication and redundancy
of dialogue were strengthening, but not expanding, the identiﬁed
themes (Bowen, 2008). An inductive analysis was developed inter-
preting the participants’ statements insofar as they related to the
research project’s two objectives of (1) substantiating the fall in
the LTIFR and (2) describing the interventions associated with
the LTIFR reduction. The themes identiﬁed were each categorised
initially as intervention or outcome according to their role in safety
at NZAS.
It was recognised that not all themes classiﬁed as interventions
could be considered as direct safety interventions. The themes ini-
tially identiﬁed as ‘interventions’ were therefore further classiﬁed
into 3 categories: ‘enablers’, ‘moderators’, and ‘interventions’. An
‘enabler’ was deﬁned as a critical element required for the identi-
ﬁed interventions to be established; a ‘moderator’ was deﬁned as
a contextual condition which may inﬂuence the success or failure
of the intervention process; an ‘intervention’ was deﬁned as a spe-
ciﬁc programme introduced with the intention of effecting change
and contributing signiﬁcantly to the achievement of the goal.
While the study did not set out to conclusively establish the rela-
tive efﬁcacy of the four identiﬁed interventions, the description
of each intervention was enriched through a consideration of the0
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25interactive relationship between the enablers, moderators, inter-
ventions, and the ultimate goal. The interventions were also rated
using a hazard intervention effectiveness matrix and evaluation
criteria based on the available literature. Finally, goal theory liter-
ature was used to describe the successful application of the ZAV at
NZAS.3. What did the numbers say? The quantitative enquiry
The LTIFR data set was represented in graphical form, with an
overlaid trend line, as shown in Fig. 1. The regression coefﬁcient
represented by the trend line was found to be statistically signiﬁ-
cant (R2 = 63%, p < 0.001).
An additional and more unusual analysis was also performed.
Since the annual output of the smelter had increased more than
threefold over the period of the study, the LTIs could have been
presumed to have increased in relation to total product output –
all other factors being equal. The ‘productivity LTIFR’ or LTIFR/
tonne was therefore also represented in graphical form. This re-
sulted in an even more signiﬁcant negative trend, as represented
in Fig. 2. The regression coefﬁcient represented by the trend line
was also found to be statistically signiﬁcant (R2 = 64%, p < 0.001).
The extremely low p-value in both graphs indicated the robust-
ness of the observed decline in LTIFR and LTIFR/tonne, conﬁrming
that the decline in lost-time injuries and the trend for this decline
was statistically signiﬁcant.4. What did the NZAS people say? The qualitative enquiry
An underlying caution for all LTIFR investigations must be that
LTIs can be misrepresented in a myriad of ways. An LTI measure-
ment system has inherent potential for manipulation through un-
der-reporting (Oleinick, 1993; Probst, 2008). The association of
LTIs with remuneration, either in injury compensation levies or
in bonus reward systems, has also been shown to distort the accu-
racy of the LTI measurement (Hopkins, 1994; Robertson and Keeve,
1983). Furthermore, there has been a call for a movement away
from LTI towards the development of positive performance indica-
tors (PPI) Coyle et al., 1995; Flin et al., 2000; Stiller et al., 2008.
The qualitative interviews, therefore, probed for evidence of
such misrepresentation in order to substantiate or dispel theR2 = 0.6344
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NZ
S. Young / Safety Science 64 (2014) 99–108 101parent empirical fall in LTIs. The respondents appeared very
miliar with the possibility of LTI underreporting and the means
which this may be carried out by organisations. Importantly,
en the most sceptical respondents were conﬁdent in the quality
d reliability of the LTI records. . .
‘‘I don’t know if an LTI would go unreported. . . it is part of
your employment here, so if you are caught not reporting
something that’s reasonably serious – it probably would cost
you your job. . . everybody here knows that. Second of all, I
guess the nature of an LTI – you know if you’ve got a broken
leg, it’s bloody hard to hide the fact that you’ve got a broken
leg.’’ [respondent 21]
‘‘. . .people say ‘‘Oh, it’s only the reporting that’s making the
difference’’, but it’s not – you’re either injuring people or
you’re not, and we’re not.’’ [respondent 2]
The respondents were encouraged to speak openly about safety
lated changes they had seen over their time at NZAS, and to de-
ribe the interventions they believed had made a difference. After
anscription and coding in accordance with the methodology
ove, the study distinguished four enablers, four moderators,
d four interventions, and one outcome. These are represented
Table 1.
The four enablers were identiﬁed as:
Leadership – as well as the initial impetus to begin the quest for
reduced injuries on site, leadership at all levels set directions
such as the ergonomic focus, changes in work organisation
and individual behaviour; and also had a high level of input into
automation decisions and incident investigation accountability.
Total quality management (TQM) – the cycle of improvement
methodology underpinned the relentless incident investigation
methodology, identiﬁed as a key intervention.ble 1
AS enablers, moderators, interventions and outcome.
Enablers Leadership Total quality management
Moderators Ergonomic focus Work organisation
Interventions Automation Proprietary interventions
Outcome Lost-time Injuries ‘‘Our Goal is Zero’’
257Ownership and governance – commissioning and enabling
automation required signiﬁcant capital and will to initiate and
perpetuate.
The Employment Contracts Act (1991) – this New Zealand leg-
islation enabled (inter alia) the reorganisation of work practices
and allowed leaders more ﬂexibility to introduce goal-oriented
interventions.
Four moderators were also identiﬁed:
Ergonomic focus – a directive that appeared to have had a major
pervasive effect on choice of interventions: automation, PPE,
and an emphasis on plant and work conditions in the incident
investigation methodology.
Work organisation – a ﬂexibility that facilitated the incident
investigation process in particular.
Culture – the pervading attitude to safety by NZAS employees as
it related to individual behaviour and proprietary interventions.
Individual behaviour – also a signiﬁcant consideration in self
efﬁcacy and its effect on proprietary interventions.
Four interventions were identiﬁed:
Automation – the process of eliminating or isolating hazards
through engineering.
Proprietary behavioural interventions – programmes intended
to alter behaviour in the workplace.
PPE – used primarily to isolate the hazard from the worker.
Cycle of improvement incident investigation – the cyclical pro-
cess of constant improvement based on analysis of historical
incidents.
Fig. 3 highlights the relationship between the enablers, moder-
ors, interventions, and the ultimate goal.Ownership and governance Employment Contracts Act (1991)
Culture Individual behaviour
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Incident analysis
102 S. Young / Safety Science 64 (2014) 99–108The primary focus of Fig. 3 is to illustrate the direct effect of the
interventions on the goal (dark arrows), and the contributory effect
of the enablers and moderators on those interventions (white ar-
rows). A simple ﬁgure showing the four interventions affecting
the goal would only partially indicate their efﬁcacy. For example,
in examining the automation intervention, plant upgrades were di-
rectly enabled by NZAS owners and its leadership; however, this
leadership was also moderated by an ergonomic focus, prioritising
eliminating or isolating hazards through automation.
Some relationships work in both directions. For example, the
‘cycle of improvement’ incident investigation process, while mod-
erated by an ergonomic focus, also recommends speciﬁcations for
PPE and automation, and ‘cycles upwards’ to make recommenda-
tions for work organisation, individual behaviour, and leadership.
Despite the complexity of these relationships, it is important to
distinguish the interventions from the enablers and the modera-
tors. It is the interventions that have the direct effect on the ulti-
mate goal. Enablers and moderators on the other hand, do not
have a direct effect on the goal, but do inﬂuence the success (or
otherwise) of the interventions through facilitation (enablers), or
inﬂuencing their efﬁcacy (moderators).5. The four interventions
Having identiﬁed the four interventions implemented by NZAS
in pursuit of a ZAV (‘Our Goal is Zero’), the study then used the
qualitative evidence to describe the characteristics of each with
reference to the available literature.5.1. Automation
Interview participants overwhelmingly identiﬁed automation
of the smelter over its 40 years of operation as the most important
reason for the decrease in acute injuries. Logically, it follows that if
a hazard is removed through automation, then it ceases to be a
hazard. This is entirely consistent with the requirement of New
Zealand’s Health and Safety in Employment Act (HSE) (1992) and
other OECD countries’ safety legislation. They all prescribe the
elimination of hazards in the ﬁrst instance. The overarching legis-
lation and the ongoing programme of automation at NZAS are clear
applications of the hierarchy of control methodology of hazardFig. 3. NZAS enablers, moderat
25mitigation. It is important that automation is regarded as an inter-
vention, for while some may see a worksite as a static model and
interventions as mere manipulations of the existing plant and
workforce, elimination of the actual source of the hazard must al-
ways be the ﬁrst consideration. Ellenbecker (1996) points out that
considering a hazard as a product of a static worksite and therefore
difﬁcult to alter, is a mistake. Productivity, return on investment,
feasibility, pragmatism, and social outcomes may all feature in
any decision to automate, but when safety is prioritised, hazard
elimination by replacing people’s exposure to that hazard through
automation is the ultimate intervention.
Flin’s (2004) review of industrial safety literature for leadership
research summarises two leadership models: transformational and
transactional leadership. Both models appear to be highly
characteristic of NZAS leadership. Transformational leaders pro-
vide inspiration, question assumptions and encourage others to ap-
proach problems from many different angles (Flin, 2004). The
initial drive for safety at NZAS originated from a 1980s General
Manager (GM) who demonstrated transformational leadership by
refusing to accept the inevitability of injuries on site. Successive
GMs have continued the transformational style, introducing the
ambitious goal of zero injuries on site, and intiating interventions
to achieve that goal.
The enablers necessary to initiate automation at NZAS were
identiﬁed as ownership/governance, and leadership. Successive
owners have provided the resources necessary to enable signiﬁcant
plant upgrades; while leaders from the 1980s until the present
have provided transformational leadership, enabling the applica-
tion of resources towards goal-oriented interventions. Ongoing
GMs have also been the conduit between worksite identiﬁcation
of the need for automation and the investment of resources from
the owners. The key moderator for this leadership conduit was
seen as the ergonomic focus on safety that pervaded the smelter
throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s. This ergonomic focus
may have originated in the transformational leadership character-
istic of approaching problems from many different angles (Flin,
2004). This characteristic also echoes the need to consider the mul-
tifactorial nature of a complex industrial site from all perspectives
when assessing the efﬁcacy of interventions (Goldenhar, 1994;
Zwerling, 1997).
In preference to the former blaming of individuals’ actions for
safety breaches, management moved to address the plant andors, interventions and goal.
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S. Young / Safety Science 64 (2014) 99–108 103vironmental conditions perceived to have made the injury pos-
ble. The Haddon (1980) concept of linking epidemiology, energy
change, and injury was introduced to NZAS by Australian consul-
nts, followed by the introduction of the National Occupational
fety Association (South Africa) (NOSA) equipment rating system
the 2000s. Acceptance of an ergonomic rather than an egocentric
cus for injury etiology by a succession of GMs from the late 1980s
wards appears to have intensiﬁed the automation intervention
a means of eliminating hazards.(E
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Fl2. Personal protective equipment (PPE)
Similarly, the NZAS identiﬁcation of isolating PPE as equivalent
any other means of hazard isolation manifests the ergonomic
ther than egocentric focus of NZAS leadership. The high levels
isolating PPE speciﬁcation and compliance requirements reﬂect
transformational leadership (enabler) moderated by an ergo-
mic rather than egocentric outlook. While PPE is generally re-
rded as a means for hazard minimisation or attenuation in
cupational health and safety (Aw et al., 2007), isolating PPE at
ZAS is considered simply as a means of isolating the worker from
e respective energy forms distinguished by Robertson (1992).
e ergonomic approach is particularly evident in the downstream
fect of NZAS incident investigation, where the use of isolating
E is regarded as a means of isolation of the worker from an en-
gy source equivalent to any other guard or barrier. For example,
the view of NZAS the hazard presented by the dropping of a hea-
tool may most simply be isolated by the compulsory wearing of
eel-capped safety boots. This is another manifestation of the hier-
chy of control methodology (Health and Safety in Employment
ct, 1992), with elements of the Haddon matrix also evident (Had-
n, 1980; Runyan, 1998, 2003).
Many valuable papers have been published on overcoming
orkers’ reticence to wear PPE, or the inappropriate use of PPE
eeney, 1986; Holmes, 1997; Lombardi et al., 2009; Sorock
al., 2004). These papers are primarily egocentric in focus, for
ey are essentially advising on means to alter human behaviour
promote PPE usage. However, the transformational leadership
NZAS, moderated by an ergonomic focus, initiated research
to the exact energy characteristics of each hazard on site.
here the hazard could not be eliminated, precise speciﬁcations
r isolating PPE were established in order to isolate the NZAS
orker from the hazard. For example, aluminium smelting pre-
nts potential for both acute and chronic respiratory injury
d disease through the presence of dust and fumes (Interna-
onal Primary Aluminium Institute and The Aluminium Associa-
on, 1997; O’Donnell, 1989, 1995). Previous use of paper masks
fering limited respiratory protection was replaced by ﬁltered
d positive-pressure masks speciﬁed for exposures higher than
ose on site at NZAS. These are ergonomically based interven-
ons initiated by NZAS to prevent worker exposure to unin-
nded energy exchange. Once the goal of zero incidents had
en established by NZAS transformational leaders, the role of
onitoring performance and achieving compliance was delegated
superintendents and crew leaders, using transactional leader-
ip styles. Omission or incorrect wearing of PPE has been a cau-
onary and ultimately dismissible offence at NZAS. Locke and
tham (2002) identiﬁed that goal speciﬁcity decreases variation
performance by reducing the ambiguity about what is to be at-
ined. Due to the high speciﬁcations of NZAS isolating PPE with-
their hazard isolation programme, variation of PPE usage, or
uman error’, is a minor consideration in hazard isolation. The
ansactional leadership in place insists that all staff wear the
quired PPE, since no alternative is possible to ensure the
eciﬁed protection.2593. Incident investigation
Comprehensive incident investigation has been undertaken for
ery signiﬁcant injury or near miss since the late 1980s. These
vestigations use the Haddon matrix (Haddon, 1980; Runyan,
98, 2003) as a framework for analysis of each incident. However,
ols introduced by the total quality management methodology
so became important in incident investigation from the late
80s. In particular, The TQMmethodology’s cycle of improvement
vans, 2008; Foster, 2007) became an enabler for effective inci-
nt investigation across site. The cycle of improvement ethos took
cident investigation beyond a simple analysis of the incident.
sing the cycle of improvement model in incident analysis led to
commendations which were duly implemented, monitored, and
stitutionalised when found to be effective. Leadership also be-
me an enabler for this process to succeed, for without leadership
mmitment across site, recommendations from investigations
ould not have been as effective (Flin, 2004). Another unantici-
ted enabler, the Employment Contracts Act, (1991), also
erged from the qualitative research. This Act enabled reconsti-
ted hierarchical and interdepartmental relationships on site,
lowing signiﬁcant changes in work organisation.
Work organisation therefore became a moderator of incident
vestigation. The effect of causal attribution (DeJoy, 1994; Gray,
09; Gyekye, 2010) has been minimised by a policy of frequently
ing horizontally and vertically integrated incident investigation
ams. Team members are often drawn from across different
partments and from differing organisational levels. For instance,
relatively low-skilled operator from a totally unrelated depart-
ent, albeit with some training in investigative methodology,
ay investigate an incident from an unfamiliar department along-
de the manager of that area. Other elements of work organisation
ch as safety audits, safety-oriented policies and alternate proce-
res became unencumbered by conﬂicts over worker allowances,
ereby moderating the cycle of improvement in a positive
anner.
The transformational leadership change from an egocentric to
ergonomic focus at NZAS has also been a moderator on incident
vestigation. In particular, in the late 1980s, Australian consul-
nts introduced the ‘essential factors’ model of incident analysis
hich treats human behaviour as but one element of any injurious
ent. Heinrich’s (1931) focus on human error as the most likely
ause of the accident’ was given little weight in NZAS incident
vestigations after the late 1980s. Similarly, Reason’s (1990,
97, 1998, 2000) and Reason et al. (2006) ‘Swiss cheese’ model
incident investigation appears not to have been used at NZAS.
is may be due to the egocentric focus of much of Reason’s work
hen compared to NZAS’ ergonomic paradigm. It is more likely
wever, that the ‘Swiss cheese’ model’s reliance on a chance
ignment of opportunities for the incident to progress is inconsis-
nt with the ‘essential factors’ model of a predictive sequence of
itical events.
4. Proprietary behavioural interventions
A number of proprietary interventions were introduced to NZAS
om the late 1990s. These were primarily based around the in-
nded modiﬁcation of individual and team behaviour. In common
ith the other interventions, transformational leadership was a
ear enabler for these proprietary behavioural interventions.
ithout leaders selecting these interventions and facilitating their
troduction, they simply would not have been launched.
Culture and human behaviour were identiﬁed as moderators of
ese behavioural interventions. Many writers have pointed to the
fﬁculties in deﬁning ‘culture’ in an organisation (Cooper, 2000;
in et al., 2000; González-Romá et al., 1999; Zohar, 2000, 2002).
Fig. 5. The ergonomic-egocentric effectiveness vector.
104 S. Young / Safety Science 64 (2014) 99–108The qualitative research in this study also revealed the many dif-
ferent uses of the term by NZAS employees, with participants often
not distinguishing between organisational, local or national cul-
ture. The New Zealand, Southland, or NZAS ‘culture’ was inter-
preted as having both a positive and negative moderating effect
over safety interventions. For instance, some of the training media
accompanying the Du Pont STOP programme was regarded by
some employees as inappropriate to the local ‘culture’ and dispar-
aged accordingly. However, one participant who had doubts about
the cultural ﬁt and efﬁcacy of several programmes, also said that
he was unwilling to reject them because he considered that some
parts of each of the programmes might contribute to fewer acci-
dents. This is suggestive of Cooper’s (2000) work which asserts that
a focus on the ‘product’ of safety culture was the most important
aspect of a study of ‘culture’. The decreasing injuries result is the
‘product’ regardless of the perceived or actual efﬁcacy of any one
proprietary intervention (Cooper, 2000).
As a moderator of these proprietary behavioural interventions,
the effect of (individual) human behaviour is even more difﬁcult
to determine. Reason (1990, 1997, 1998, 2000a, 2000b), Reason
et al. (2006), and Rasmussen (1982, 2003) have added much to
the understanding of how people interact with their workplace,
but some writers argue that the means by which behaviour can
be changed within a workforce have not been demonstrated
(Robertson, 1992; Wagenaar, 1998). Furthermore, Gray (2009),
identiﬁes the DuPont ‘STOP’ programme as an example of the
‘responsibilisation’ of safety, attributing workers’ ‘human error’
as the frequent cause of incidents rather than considering the com-
pany’s duty to provide a safe workplace. It is perhaps indicative of
NZAS’ ergonomic focus that participants have generally rejected or
adapted many of these proprietary behavioural interventions that
do not ﬁt the overall pursuit of their goal.6. A hazard intervention effectiveness matrix
Drawing from Haddon’s work and his fellow ergonomists, the
hierarchy of control model prescribes a sequential consideration
of controls for hazard reduction: the hazard should be eliminated;
if it cannot be eliminated, it should be isolated; if it can neither be
eliminated nor isolated, the hazard must be minimised through
administrative measures, work organisation, and training (Barnett
and Brickman, 1986; Ellenbecker, 1996; Manuele, 2005). Fig. 4
represents an effectiveness vector, showing that elimination of
hazards provides the most effective control, whereas minimisation
of hazards provides the least control.
However, the hierarchy of control model is often misunderstood
or misinterpreted. Ellenbecker (1996) notes that in many work-
places, the bulk of industrial hygiene resources is not devoted to
engineering controls, but to measuring worker exposures and com-
paring the results to legislative standards. Furthermore, the model
focuses solely on a hazard in a static context, whereas effective
changes made to the dynamic work environment may produce a
more positive effect on workplace safety (Ellenbecker, 1996).
These observations point to another effectiveness vector: that of
ergonomic intervention versus egocentric intervention. An ergo-
nomic intervention such as automation, when introduced to sub-
stitute for a hazardous human task, will eliminate a hazard;
whereas an egocentric intervention such as a behavioural change
programme or a rule-based system may never be assumed to haveIsolate 
Fig. 4. The hierarchy of control effectiveness vector.
26completely eliminated a hazard. An egocentric intervention based
on the assumption that human behaviour change is feasible may
therefore be regarded as less likely to be effective than an
ergonomic intervention such as automation. This additional effec-
tiveness vector is illustrated in Fig. 5.
As part of the description of the identiﬁed interventions, the
hierarchy of control effectiveness vector and the ergonomic/ego-
centric effectiveness vectors were combined in a hazard interven-
tion effectiveness matrix. The identiﬁed interventions were then
plotted on this matrix to better understand their relative effective-
ness (see Fig. 6).
The automation intervention is exclusively ergonomic and
primarily eliminating and is therefore largely plotted in quadrant
1. Quadrant 1 is the most effective quadrant since it describes
interventions that are both eliminating and ergonomic. Automa-
tion may also be isolating only, so it is also plotted into quadrant 2.
When considering personal protective equipment (PPE) inter-
vention, NZAS drew a distinction between ‘isolating PPE’ and ‘risk
mitigation PPE’. At NZAS, intervention using isolating PPE is
regarded as ergonomic and has efﬁcacy across the isolation hierar-
chical control, so isolating PPE is plotted across quadrants 1 and 2.
The placement of the isolating PPE intervention here is regarded as
ergonomic in accordance with NZAS’ practice of inseparable hazard
measurement, PPE technical speciﬁcation, and unequivocal trans-
actional leadership.
NZAS incident investigation is plotted across quadrants 1 and 2,
and has an acknowledged behavioural input. However, it has been
established above that NZAS incident investigations preferentially
focus on ergonomic solutions wherever possible, and while behav-
iour may be important to understanding the incident, it is gener-
ally regarded as a lesser consideration. This intervention is
nevertheless closest to the ergonomic quadrants.Fig. 6. Hazard intervention effectiveness matrix with NZAS interventions.
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Table 2
NZAS interventions and evaluative criteria.
Automation PPE Incident investigation Proprietary behavioural interventions
Implemented as intended Yes Yes – since the 1980s Yes – since the 1980s Inconsistent
Relatively stable Yes Yes – since the 1980s Mostly No
Seem to be achieving positive results Yes Yes Yes Yes
1. Automation – criteria all positive.
2. Isolating PPE – criteria all positive since the 1980s.
3. Incident investigation – criteria mostly positive since the 1980s.
4. Proprietary behavioural interventions – criteria inconsistent.
Table 3
Goal theory characteristics and NZAS evidence.
Characteristics of successful goals NZAS evidence
A goal may serve as a benchmark against which performance
feedback can be evaluated (Wood, 1987)
NZAS asserted that the only absolute deﬁnition of a ‘safe’ worksite was one that had zero injuries
on site – and having a goal of zero injuries is the ultimate benchmark. The potential difﬁculties
with using LTIs as a performance measure are acknowledged, but as a benchmark, consistently
recording zero carefully speciﬁed LTIs would indeed represent the benchmark for an achieved
goal
Conscious goals can constitute an intervention on a measureable
outcome and the power of the ‘self-fulﬁlling prophecy’ has been
well established (Bandura, 1986)
While variation in the way NZAS employees viewed the efﬁcacy of interventions was noted, all
employees were conscious of the goal and enthusiastically supportive of its pursuit
Speciﬁc, difﬁcult goals consistently lead to higher performance than
urging people to do their best (Bandura, 1986; La Porte, 1996)
Exhortations to ‘be safe’ were not acceptable at NZAS. Absence of LTIs represented a pragmatic
and unambiguous target
Effectiveness indicators
Goals serve a directive function, avoiding distraction from goal-
irrelevant activities (Rothkopf, 1979)
The TQM cycle of improvement was used in incident analysis pervasively. The goal of recording
zero LTIs was a compelling directive – with little room for distraction
Difﬁcult goals have an energising function, leading to greater effort
than that applied towards low goals (Bandura, 1986)
Every level of management, from GM to crew leaders, was accountable for injuries suffered by
subordinates – and all understood the difﬁculty of preventing injury in such a hazardous
environment. Their motivation for success has been kept at a high level – a collective mindfulness
Goals affect persistence, with difﬁcult goals often inducing
prolonged effort (Bandura, 1986)
The effort applied to injury prevention has been unrelenting – the plant operates without pause,
and successive leaders have sought to improve interventions to approach the unilateral goal in a
more effective manner
Goals affect action indirectly by leading to the use of task-relevant
knowledge or strategies (Wood, 1987)
NZAS personnel sought solutions to hazards from a wide range of TQM and engineering sources,
with a pragmatic attitude to applying the hierarchy of controls
Goal moderators
Commitment (Hollenbeck, 1989) Since the ‘pivot point’ moment in the 1980s of the GM ‘putting his ﬂag in the sand’ over
workplace injuries, all GMs and owners have shown their commitment to injury reduction
through both declaration and resource allocation
Feedback (Hollenbeck, 1989) A large board at the front gate has displayed the yearly tally of LTIs. The negative connotations of
this tally have been noted, but employees were never unaware of the current status
Task complexity (La Porte, 1996) While they may have differing views on the interventions used, all employees understood the
complexity and the aspirational nature of the goal
S. Young / Safety Science 64 (2014) 99–108 105It has also been demonstrated above that behavioural interven-
on can never eliminate a hazard. The proprietary behavioural
terventions are therefore primarily plotted in the 4th quadrant.
cause human behaviour modiﬁcation is occasionally required
isolate a hazard, e.g., a warning sign on a machine, this interven-
on is also plotted into the 3rd quadrant.
Evaluation of interventions
In addition to the use of the hazard intervention effectiveness
atrix, the study also assessed the interventions in relation to
aluation literature. Evaluating the effects of occupational health
d safety intervention has become central to ongoing safety
provement (Goldenhar, 1994; Zwerling, 1997). Intervention
search may be deﬁned as the study of planned and applied activ-
ies designed to produce designated outcomes (Windsor et al.,
84). Prevention effectiveness research includes identifying efﬁ-
cious and effective strategies to reduce morbidity and mortality
oldenhar, 1994). The effectiveness of evaluation relates directly
the ‘assess’ stage of Deming’s cycle of improvement (Evans,
08). Further, Zwerling (1997) called for inclusion of a qualitative
mponent in quantitative studies in order to understand how and
hy speciﬁc interventions may contribute to injury prevention.261However, the literature proposing theoretical frameworks for
vising or assessing safety interventions is limited (Goldenhar,
94, 2001; Rivara and Thompson, 2000; Roelofs, 2003; Shannon,
99; Zwerling, 1997). Goldenhar’s (1994) review of 36 occupa-
onal health and safety intervention studies called for increased
easurement of reliability and validity of intervention data. Exist-
g intervention research is too often based on individual research-
s’ intuition and experience rather than on theory and evidence
oldenhar, 1994; Shannon, 1999). Since Rivara and Thompson
000) opined more than 12 years ago that few randomised trials
d been conducted evaluating occupational injury interventions,
ry little appears to have been added in the literature. Smith
003) stated that the near total absence of controlled trials, ran-
mised or otherwise, is indeed an issue of concern for the ﬁeld
injury prevention research.
In general, literature reviews of occupational injury interven-
on studies have commented on the reviewed studies’ limitations
oldenhar, 1994; Roelofs, 2003; Zwerling, 1997). Zwerling (1997)
ints out that many interventions are multi-factorial. Moreover,
oldenhar (1994) cautions that causal phenomena are complex,
d advise that intervention research should focus more on the
going process of interventions as well as studying the outcomes.
oldenhar (2001) also points out that, ‘‘. . .although ‘Does it work?’
106 S. Young / Safety Science 64 (2014) 99–108is the ultimate question that must be answered, the broader view
of the intervention research process includes research to evaluate
the development (or adaptation) and implementation of interven-
tions’’. These statements are consistent with the multi-factorial
nature and complexity of a large industrial plant.
In 2001, the (USA) National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) set out to address this lack of safety intervention
models by engaging health and safety stakeholders to establish a
national occupational research agenda (NORA). In her overview of
the intervention research process, Goldenhar (2001) speciﬁed that
an intervention must meet three criteria to be evaluative:
1. the intervention should be operating or have been implemented
as intended;
2. the intervention should be relatively stable;
3. the intervention should seem to be achieving positive results.
Using these criteria, the rating of the interventions remained
the same as plotted on the hazard intervention effectiveness ma-
trix (see Table 2).
8. The ‘Zero Accident Vision’ – goal theory
Ultimately, the only absolute deﬁnition of a ‘safe’ worksite is
one that has zero injuries on site: the very goal set by NZAS more
than 20 years ago. Indeed, in 2010, NZAS celebrated having oper-
ated for 12 months without a single LTI. However, the following
year seven LTIs were recorded, and annual LTIs have varied be-
tween one and seven for the 12 years to the end of 2011: the goal
has not been reached. Nevertheless, the examination of LTIFR over
NZAS’ 40 years of operation reveals an extraordinary reduction and
represents an outstanding achievement.
Locke and Latham’s (2002) characteristics of goal effectiveness
all appear to have been met at NZAS, either consciously or intui-
tively. NZAS’ use of their slogan ‘Our Goal is Zero’ provides an
unequivocal direction for safety on site (Rothkopf, 1979). Failure
to consistently achieve the aspirational goal of zero injuries frus-
trates NZAS employees, but also energises them to pursue the goal
more assiduously (Bandura, 1986). The pursuit of a difﬁcult goal
often induces prolonged effort (La Porte, 1996). The NZAS goal
was introduced more than 20 years ago and has yet to be consis-
tently achieved, but the persistence of successive GMs and other
NZAS leaders has brought LTI numbers tantalisingly close to zero.
Health and safety professionals at NZAS have repeatedly sought
task-relevant knowledge from around the world to confront persis-
tent safety issues on site, in pursuit of their goal1 (Wood, 1987).
Other indicators of successful goal pursuit such as public commit-
ment to the goal (Hollenbeck, 1989), a belief that the goal can be at-
tained (White, 2000), and feedback on progress to all personnel
(Bandura, 1986) were all represented in this study’s qualitative re-
search of NZAS safety (see Table 3).
9. Conclusion
The aluminium smelter at Tiwai Point in New Zealand is an
industrial site where potentially catastrophic hazards are con-
fronted 24 h a day, 365 days a year; and yet, its safety record has
improved signiﬁcantly over its 40 years of operation. From the
early years of the smelter’s operation, when workplace injuries
were frequent and tacitly accepted, NZAS has worked assiduously
to reduce the incidence of injuries on site. LTIs have reduced from
682 for the 5 years 1975–1980, to 24 for the 5 years 2005–2010.
This has been investigated by analysis of composited NZAS records1 For instance, working at heights equipment and methodology was ﬁrst intro-
duced to New Zealand by NZAS, and is now commonplace throughout the country.
26and ﬁeld data, and a programme of semi-structured interviews
with NZAS employees (Young, 2013). The research conﬁrmed the
trend of declining LTIFR over the 40-year period examined, and
established that under-reporting of LTI was not likely to be an
explanatory factor for this decline.
The qualitative research component also identiﬁed and de-
scribed the key enablers, moderators, and interventions at NZAS
through which the safety improvement was engineered. These
components were positioned within the context of the available
literature, and the relationship between each component was de-
scribed. Four interventions were identiﬁed and ranked in order of
their perceived efﬁcacy:
1. Automation
2. Personal protective equipment
3. Incident investigation – cycle of improvement
4. Proprietary behavioural interventions
The ranking of these interventions was achieved by deductive
analysis using a hazard intervention effectiveness matrix and crite-
ria from evaluation literature. The progress of NZAS towards their
goal of having zero injuries on site was also assessed and found to
be consistent with the established principles of goal theory.
Other companies can learn from NZAS’ success. In general, the
smelter’s unrelenting focus on an unequivocal goal of having zero
injuries on site, while not yet consistently fulﬁlled, has demon-
strated that a signiﬁcant reduction in lost-time injuries is possible.
Speciﬁc, difﬁcult goals consistently lead to higher performance
than urging people to do their best (Locke and Latham, 2002).
Exhortations to ‘be safe’ are not acceptable at NZAS: a genuine ab-
sence of LTIs is the non-negotiable, unambiguously deﬁned target.
Speciﬁcally, other industrial plants must acknowledge that haz-
ards are more readily ameliorated by long-term persistence with
hierarchy of control methodology for injury prevention. In particu-
lar, the control of unintended energy exchange through ergonomic
rather than egocentric measures has been shown by the NZAS
experience to be the most effective mode of intervention. Automa-
tion and the use of isolating PPE are clear manifestations of the
hierarchy of control methodology. Cycle of improvement TQM
methodology using non-blame incident investigations can result
in meaningful worksite changes. Over time, these changes are able
to produce a signiﬁcant decrease in LTIs.
Further, worksites should not be regarded as a static environ-
ment where automation and ergonomic intervention are regarded
as impracticable. Effective feedback from incident investigation
can result in the elimination or isolation of hazards. Automation
may have major ﬁnancial implications for the elimination of major
hazards, but these must be considered against the ongoing costs of
a high injury rate, the company’s reputation, and its statutory du-
ties. Notwithstanding the process of major plant upgrading, avoid-
ance of perfunctory judgements of ‘human error’ in incident
investigations often identiﬁes simple, low-cost engineering solu-
tions for worksite hazard elimination or isolation.
This case study supports the effectiveness of hierarchy of con-
trol methodology as the basis for workplace injury prevention. Fur-
ther, NZAS’ ergonomic focus in hazard intervention has been
shown to signiﬁcantly enhance the efﬁcacy of its ZAV. The study
places New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited at the forefront
of ZAV hazard amelioration both within New Zealand and interna-
tionally. Their relative success should be recognised and emulated
wherever possible.
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ZAS is nevertheless noted as a possible source of bias. The respon-
ents in the qualitative research were self-selected, and the codiﬁ-
tion of the interview transcript was performed solely by the
searcher. In addition, the historical LTI data cannot be validated.
hese may be seen as limitations of the study. Further, data from
ther, similar companies were not available for comparison.
The pragmatic worldview evidence presented herein may con-
ibute to a better understanding of industrial safety in general,
d initiate opportunities for further enquiry. In particular, the
escriptive distinction between enablers, moderators, and inter-
entions has been shown to be a useful construct for the analysis
f safety interventions. The development of a hazard intervention
fectiveness matrix may also provide opportunities for further re-
arch into assessment of safety intervention efﬁcacy.
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A B S T R A C T
A purposive critical case study of two heavy industrial plants was conducted to identify and discuss safety issues
faced by companies under ﬁnancial duress. Access to these companies presented a rare opportunity for study:
one plant had announced deﬁnite closure while the other was under threat of closure. Both companies were
facing signiﬁcant redundancies. Interviews with senior staﬀ members accountable for safety outcomes sought to
answer three questions relating to lean management, redundancies, and hierarchy of control methodology in
times of ﬁnancial duress. An inductive analysis compared respondents’ comments with peer-reviewed literature
and identiﬁed commonalities, diﬀerences and concerns. Four recommendations are made for companies facing
similar ﬁnancial duress. These recommendations include (i) an emphasis on use of the hierarchy of controls for
hazard mitigation, (ii) the inﬂuence of lean management, (iii) prioritisation of injury classiﬁcation, and (iv) the
importance of external audits.
1. Introduction
The evidence base for the eﬃcacy of the zero accident vision (ZAV) is
growing. Recently, in a critique considering all sides of the ZAV debate,
Zwetsloot et al. (2017) called for “a more realistic understanding of the
strengths and weaknesses of the ZAV” (p. 263). The Zwetsloot et al.
(2017) paper cited Young’s (2014) analysis of New Zealand Aluminium
Smelter’s (NZAS) exemplary safety performance as positive evidence for
ZAV. Young’s paper described the nature of the interventions used in a
hazardous industry to achieve a remarkable safety result over the
period 1972–2011. It found that (inter alia) hazards are more readily
ameliorated by long-term persistence with hierarchy of control meth-
odology for injury prevention. But what happens when an organisation
with an apparently successful safety strategy faces extreme ﬁnancial
duress?
The global ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–2008 appeared to have relatively
little eﬀect on smelter operation, but in recent years, oversupply in
world aluminium markets has resulted in lower prices (Bureau of
Resources and Energy Economics, 2014). In response to the con-
sequential economic pressures and NZAS’s $49 million loss in 2012, the
company reduced the size of its organisation by 100 roles, representing
14% of the workforce (New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited,
2014). In order to address the same ﬁscal drivers, in February 2014,
Alcoa announced the closure of its aluminium smelter and rolling mills
at Point Henry, Geelong Australia (Alcoa Corporation, 2014). Both
companies demonstrated excellent safety records in the years leading to
this time, but what eﬀect would prolonged ﬁnancial duress have on
safety in these extremely hazardous worksites? In particular, the fol-
lowing three questions were selected for investigation:
• Both plants practised ‘lean’ management methodology in order to
maximise proﬁts (or minimise losses). What were the eﬀects on
safety management when ‘lean’ management practices were subject
to even further ﬁnancial duress?
• The staﬀ at both plants were likely to be aﬀected by conﬁrmed or
looming redundancy. What were the key issues for safety managers
surrounding actual or likely staﬀ redundancy?
• NZAS’s ZAV had been characterised by a long-term persistence with
upper-level controls for injury prevention (Young, 2014). Did the
beneﬁts derived from hierarchy of control methodology continue in
times of ﬁnancial duress? [For a discussion on the eﬃcacy of the
upper levels of the hierarchy of controls, see Young (2014, sections 5
and 6)].
A purposive strategy using critical case sampling (Teddlie and Yu,
2007) was employed to provide insight into the eﬀects and signiﬁcance
of ﬁnancial duress on safety management at these two large industrial
plants. When asked whether safety standards slip in tough economic
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times, 73% of a sample of United States chemical engineers replied that
there is a decline (Sharp, 2010); but very few studies have been con-
ducted to substantiate or challenge this claim. This paper sought to
explore safety management issues relating to the imminent closure of
the Alcoa plant, and the rationalisation of NZAS, with a view to pro-
viding a useful insight for other companies facing similar diﬃculties.
The NZAS aluminium smelter is recognised as a particularly ha-
zardous work environment (Young, 2014), but despite the threat of
closure, it continued its exemplary safety performance with only four
lost-time injuries in 2014 (all musculo-skeletal injuries in an aging
workforce). At the Point Henry Alcoa rolling mill, one staﬀ member
commented on the potential for catastrophe: “…the consequences in
heavy industry is death in a lot of cases – or a very serious injury”
[Alcoa 2]. Nevertheless, despite the pending closure, and the possibility
that the associated workforce anxiety could produce a spike in injuries,
“…this year’s been the best year that… Alcoa Rolled Products has ever
had in regards to safety” [Alcoa 1]. In posing the three questions above,
this paper examined the apparent contradiction of highly stressed staﬀ
remaining free of serious injury during ‘hard times’.
2. Methods
The research project undertook a purposive study of two large in-
dustrial plants, with diﬀerent corporate owners and in two diﬀerent
countries, operating in similar industries. Both were experiencing sig-
niﬁcant down-sizing or closure. The exemplary safety record of one of
the plants was researched previously by one of the authors in a mixed
method study (see Young, 2014) and presented as evidence sub-
stantiating the zero accident vision (ZAV). The current research project
sought to build on the previous study by investigating the same plant in
the context of a particularly challenging time in its operation. Another
similar plant facing the same ﬁnancial challenges was also examined.
Interviews were conducted with safety management staﬀ in the two
organisations. A purposive critical case sample (n = 8) of in-depth in-
terviews was chosen to provide rich data on topics of interest across the
two sites. The interviewees were “…deliberately selected for the im-
portant information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from
other choices” (Maxwell, 1997, p.87).
Purposive sampling leads to greater depth of information from a
smaller number of carefully selected cases (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). The
researcher’s unique access to New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited
(NZAS) (Young, 2014), and access to Alcoa’s Point Henry smelting
operation, oﬀered an excellent opportunity to provide considerable
insight into these workplaces under ﬁnancial duress. Unlike the original
NZAS study (Young, 2014), this study did not seek to validate the
empirical data concerning safety performance. With both NZAS and
Alcoa, the authors accepted the injury data as presented by the re-
spondents in the current study, and focussed on accessing qualitative
understanding “…that had previously been inaccessible to scientiﬁc
investigation”(Yin, 1994, p.42).
The selected roles for the two companies are listed in Table 1.
The critical case (Maxwell, 1997) interviews were conducted in
November and December 2014, during a period of signiﬁcant economic
restraint, and sought responses to purposive questions (Teddlie and Yu,
2007) relating to the implications for safety management in harsh
economic circumstances. The interviews were recorded with the re-
spondent and interviewer only present, in closed oﬃces, over 20–30
min. Interviews were subsequently transcribed verbatim with tran-
scripts coded according to themes of interest and new topics emerging
from the participants’ responses. Quotes identiﬁed as being rich in
detail and contextual meaning were highlighted (Patton, 2002). An
inductive analysis was developed to interpret the participants’ under-
standing of any eﬀect on plant safety as a result of the diﬃcult eco-
nomic reality facing both workforces. Finally, both themes of interest
and new emerging topics were compared to existing literature in a logic
model approach where recorded statements were compared to
theoretically predicted events (Yin, 1994).
3. Results
The coding of the interview transcripts highlighted the three pur-
posive themes addressing the respondents’ reﬂections on safety during
times of ﬁnancial duress:
1. Concerns about the eﬀects of lean management on safety practices;
2. Key issues for safety personnel surrounding staﬀ redundancies;
3. The continuing inﬂuence of hierarchy of control implementation.
These themes appear here as questions, sub-questions and relevant
comments representing a coherent account and analysis of the re-
spondents’ understanding of their diﬃcult ﬁnancial situation and its
eﬀect on their safety management duties.
3.1. What are the eﬀects on safety management when ‘lean’ management
practices are subject to even further ﬁnancial duress?
“…all the ‘nice-to-haves’ are gone…” [NZAS 5].
3.1.1. What does ‘lean’ mean for staﬀ safety?
NZAS staﬀ noted a gradual deterioration in their safety processes
due to the often indistinguishable eﬀects of the progressive application
of lean principles. In particular, their decades-old checks and balances
that had kept them safe (Young, 2014), were gradually being eroded
despite their best intentions: “…no-one said ‘stop using your systems’;
in fact, everyone thought that they were being used…” [NZAS 3]. With
fewer operatives, more digital systems were introduced to assure
compliance with long-established procedures: “What lean said was ‘OK
we’ll have a visual system that says have the checks been done and did
you ﬁnd anything?’; and that system kept on coming up: ‘check’s been
done – didn’t ﬁnd a thing’ – so they took it away…’ [NZAS 3].
Observations about the role of safety management considered the
apparent contradiction between saving money and keeping their people
safe: “…it’s imperative that you have to have these governance systems
in place… they’re robust and they’re audited, because they’re the things
that are stopping you from killing people… and if it falls over, un-
fortunately it’s probably only a matter of time” [NZAS 3]. Senior
management noted that despite operational staﬀ being focussed on
production economy, “the leaner your organisation gets, the stronger
your governance has to be, in some ways, because you can aﬀord to do
‘light-touch and ﬁt-for-purpose’ but you’ve got to be really sure that
things aren’t slipping” [NZAS 1]. A balance between an urgency of
saving money at a divisional shop ﬂoor level and a consideration of the
possibly negative eﬀects on safety of cost saving, appeared to have
preoccupied management thinking at NZAS: “…if you’re not operating
for the long term, then you’re probably not going to be there for the
long term…” [NZAS 3]. Governance decisions made oﬀsite were also
Table 1
Company roles selected for interview.
Role Company
Maintenance Safety Supervisor Alcoa Rolling Mill, Australia
Safety and Environment Change Agent Alcoa Rolling Mill, Australia
Health and Safety Advisor Alcoa Rolling Mill, Australia
General Manager New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd
Senior Manager – Loss Reduction New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd
Manager – Health and Safety New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd
Communications Manager New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd
Health and Safety Advisor New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd
Note. The labels following each quote in the text below e.g. [NZAS 2] refer to a randomly
allocated number for NZAS participants (similarly for Alcoa). These labels do not ne-
cessarily relate to the order of participants listed in this table.
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acknowledged: “…out of the ﬁnancial crisis, one of the things that
surprised me, was how fast decisions can be made for big operations…
they can make those decisions in weeks and the place can be shut down
in months…” [NZAS 3].
3.1.2. Where is the focus of injury prevention?
In reviewing the overall model of hazard mitigation at NZAS, one
manager made a distinction between the three types of safety con-
siderations on site:
• Multiple fatality, catastrophic failure protection;
• Single fatality prevention –working at heights, conﬁned spaces, etc.;
and
• Injury prevention – training procedures, safety observations, etc.
The manager noted a recent tendency for safety management to
focus more on prevention of moderate injuries. “…for a number of
reasons, the focus had drifted away from maintaining the systems
around fatality prevention in particular…” [NZAS 3]. In addition to
advocating the need for a higher emphasis on potentially disastrous
outcomes, the NZAS manager pointed to an increased legal emphasis on
accountability for such catastrophes: “…if you’re found lacking, there is
a real clear line of sight to prosecution, and in fact in the worst case, jail
terms. Now that makes directors sit up. And senior leaders sit up…”
[NZAS 3].
3.1.3. What role do company audits play during diﬃcult times?
As soon as the Alcoa closure was announced, the company used its
internal audit system to “…double up on our compliance audits…” in
the time remaining before actual closure [ALCOA 3]. In contrast, at
NZAS, it was noted that the internal audits and checks became less
eﬀective as a result of the economising: “…there’s a slow decay of audit,
if you like – governance – starting to slide away from the leadership –
just checking that those checks were being made…” [NZAS 3]. One
manager compared the process to maintaining a garden: “…you don’t
notice the impact straight away… things start to get a bit frayed around
the edges… like a garden where you’re not doing as much gardening
any more…” [NZAS 1].
This deterioration at NZAS was ultimately detected by an external
audit conducted by staﬀ from a sister smelter from Paciﬁc Aluminium
(PacAl) [a subsidiary of Rio Tinto]. The audit exposed that many cri-
tical systems had been unintentionally discontinued: “…we certainly
were alerted to that pretty sharply through our…‘third party audit’: the
process we have where other people from PacAl came in last year and
really gave us a bit of a wake-up call about some of those things…”
[NZAS 1]. The external audit exposed a number of safety systems that
had unintentionally been allowed to degrade. For instance, even ‘well-
performing superintendents’ [NZAS 3], when asked about their anchor
points (for securing working-at-heights harnesses, etc.) and other such
systems, said, “…‘yep, they’re good…’ so they went out and looked and
what they found was: no, they weren’t…” [NZAS 3]. This came as a
surprise to a community of people who took pride in their exemplary
safety procedures (Young, 2014). Alcoa have a similar process whereby
‘independent Alcoans’ arrive on-site every 3–4 years to: “…verify that
we’re doing, what Alcoa expects, and it’s taken very seriously… if you
do poorly in those audits, plant managers will lose their job…” [Alcoa
2].
Both companies considered the audit process as a key tool in
monitoring their satisfactory safety progress through diﬃcult times;
importantly, the company that was continuing to operate (NZAS) ex-
posed its vulnerability to a signiﬁcant injury event through an external
audit. “…things are not where we would typically have been over the
last… seven or eight years. So this year in particular, (there) has been a
lot of eﬀort put into re-establishing those systems…” [NZAS 3].
3.2. What are the key issues for safety managers surrounding actual or
likely staﬀ redundancies?
“I certainly had grown men crying in my oﬃce” [NZAS 2].
3.2.1. The personal eﬀect of actual or potential redundancy
Staﬀ of both companies were not taken by surprise by the an-
nouncement of redundancies: “(There were) a lot of rumours… for
probably a good 12 months to 2 years so then when it initially hap-
pened there was that initial shock and then it was like ‘OK, yeah’…”
[Alcoa 3]. Both companies were very aware of the potential for the
welfare of their staﬀ to be adversely aﬀected, and both provided access
to external professional advice. “…we encourage people to come for-
ward if they need to talk to us… and we actually had people come on
site as well and the safety team see that as a real big focus for us” [Alcoa
1]. There was also a pro-active emphasis on anxiety management on-
site at NZAS “…at one stage we had probably three psychologists rea-
sonably active on site” [NZAS 3]. The ongoing uncertainty in NZAS was
in some ways worse than the certainty of closure for Alcoa: “…there’s
not much you can do to take that anxiety away…” [NZAS 3]. “…we are
trying to be positive but you(‘ve) still got to be real and think, ‘well you
know, closure potentially is still a possibility’…” [NZAS 5].
Despite the well-resourced professional help, one long-term staﬀ
member articulated the diﬃculty of providing eﬀective support: “…we
have EAP (employee assistance program) and we’ve got industrial
chaplains – we have got heaps of support networks but a lot of people
don’t feel comfortable using that kind of stuﬀ, do they?” [NZAS 5].
3.2.2. The collective eﬀect on staﬀ morale
The inevitable closure of the Alcoa plant produced a remarkable
determination to defy any intuitive assumption of deteriorating safety
performance: “It’s just pride for us. We can present to management:
‘we’ve shut everything down and we’ve done it safely’…” [ALCOA 3].
Alcoa staﬀ were particularly proud of their company’s policy of workers
being able to stop the task in hand if they were not conﬁdent that the
job could be completed safely. This mutual conﬁdence between staﬀ
and management is something that had taken a long time to develop: “I
guess historically we’ve patted people on the back for getting the job
done: ‘we’ve got the machine up and running again, that’s fantastic.’
Now we’re patting people on the back for stopping…” [Alcoa 1].
Another staﬀ member explained how the ‘stop of the week’ was re-
warded with a small prize, and related how he was teased by workers
from other companies for being praised for shutting down production:
“Alcoa’s the one place that you get rewarded to stop work for safety”
[Alcoa 3].
Staﬀ in both companies drew some reassurance from the dedication
to safety of their respective company throughout their working life to
date: “Alcoa… from the moment I had my ﬁrst interview they spoke
about safety… they did have that 100% commitment” [Alcoa 1]. NZAS
reported a similar ethos: “…over many, many years, very, very deeply
ingrained into the culture and the psyche I guess of people here, is
safety. And it’s continually reinforced, through senior leadership, I
guess, of Rio Tinto. It’s always visible, it’s always reported on” [NZAS
3]. Both companies had continued their responsiveness to staﬀ concerns
as and when they were raised: “When you did raise any issues using
tools that were in place, you got feedback and it didn’t take 2 weeks,
3 weeks – it was like the next shift you’d come back in there was
feedback provided to you” [Alcoa 1]. “…if something happens there’s
always an immediate response… underlying that I think is a very, very
deeply held view that safety is important – and the most important
thing at work – and we don’t compromise on it…” [NZAS 3].
Despite the Alcoa managers’ sense of achievement of their stated
aim: “the main thing for us was to ‘let’s all leave here safely’ and we’ve
done that” [ALCOA 3], there was nevertheless an underlying sadness
and mystiﬁcation about their apparently hollow success: “…we’ve run
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record production on the line here so it seems strange that we are
shutting down… ’cause the guys are producing records… we’re safe,
probably we’re better than we’ve ever been in our lives; we’re making a
proﬁt yet they’re closing the business” [ALCOA 3].
3.2.3. Management perception of behaviour-based safety (BBS) programs
Alcoa personnel placed much of the credit for their excellent safety
performance on their ‘Human Performance’ behavioural safety pro-
gram: “…what’s keeping us safe? …what’s diﬀerent between now and
ﬁve years ago? …and you know, everyone – ‘Human Performance’
would be the ﬁrst thing they say” [ALCOA2]. This program encouraged
operatives to stop and think for a few minutes before they commenced a
task. In particular, its role was to identify ‘error traps’ when ﬁrst time or
infrequent tasks are undertaken.
NZAS reported encouraging results from their relatively new
Brother’s Keeper behavioural safety program, “It’s given us a statistically
signiﬁcant change in behaviours associated with particular incidents, so
those incidents have stopped happening…” [NZAS 4]. Compared to
previous behavioural management tools, Brother’s Keeper is more of a
voluntary system which allowed staﬀ to learn as and when they wanted
– rather than having the system imposed upon them. One staﬀ member
claimed Brother’s Keeper was superior to a previous behavioural system
employed at NZAS in that it: “stop(s) that gotcha and the spying and the
tattle-tailing – all the negative stuﬀ that was associated with the STOP®
system…” [NZAS 4]. The gotcha eﬀect was revealed in Young (2014).
In a time of tight budgetary constraints, one of the NZAS safety
managers expressed frustration with the number of sales pitches being
received: “I was frequently getting phone calls from a variety of
people… selling me the next best safety system that would ‘re-
volutionise’ safety at NZAS…” [NZAS 2]. The staﬀ member wanted “to
get rid of these people because it just felt like a great sales pitch… yet, I
didn’t really have any idea whether what they were saying was going to
have worth or not…” [NZAS 2]. As a result, this safety manager re-
viewed all 20 BBS programs used at NZAS, and identiﬁed which pro-
grams conformed to Geller’s seven key principles of BBS (Geller, 2005).
The manager intended recommending the elimination up to half the
BBS programs that did not comply with Geller’s seven key principles.
3.3. Do the beneﬁts derived from hierarchy of control methodology continue
in times of ﬁnancial duress?
3.3.1. The inﬂuence of hierarchy of control methodology
The safety managers frequently referred to their respective com-
pany’s application of higher-order hierarchy of controls interventions in
the past as a reason for their continuing safety success. One NZAS
manager pointed out that many of the higher order mitigation invest-
ments had already been completed before the ﬁnancial duress: “I
wonder if that’s just where we are on the safety journey – whether
those… big ticket items… have been done…” [NZAS 3]. Nevertheless,
as new hazards were identiﬁed, higher-order controls continued to be
sought and implemented at NZAS: “…straight-out elimination is always
the holy grail” [NZAS 1]. The general manager’s (monthly) innovation
awards continued to produce higher order suggestions from staﬀ re-
sulting in higher order hazard controls that did not necessarily require
major capital expense: “I think if you give people more time… to draw
on more ingenious thought, you can sometimes come up with a really
well-engineered solution that the users of the equipment like… it’s also
cheap… it also solves the issue… in fact, they’re the classic hallmarks of
a really good solution… it actually ticks more boxes than you thought it
would…” [NZAS 1].
3.3.2. Is capital still available for safety initiatives, even when the plant is
closing (or under threat of closure)?
Notwithstanding the eﬀectiveness of existing higher order con-
trols, constriction of money for operations did not stop continuing
safety investments at either plant when they were needed. Staﬀ
commented that while capital was now diﬃcult to justify for general
business applications, capital for injury prevention was never with-
held: “…we’ve been struggling for 14 years ﬁnancially – we’re not
cashed up… (but) Alcoa’s good – they will make capital available for
safety and (we) see the results of that…” [Alcoa 2]. NZAS staﬀ ex-
plained that the ‘hurdle rate’ on capital access had generally decreased
in recent years from a ﬁve-year payback to a two-year payback as a
result of the ﬁnancial duress, but: “The hurdle rate for safety im-
provement capital actually didn’t change during that period of time”
[NZAS 1]. Where the justiﬁcation for a high capital safety item was
clear, NZAS still intended to solve the problem through investment in
higher level controls despite the cost. For instance, “…we still have
someone holding on to a vibrating tool and there’s a growing body of
evidence that that’s not a great thing over a long period of time… we
may still have to spend a million dollars eliminating that task… it
wouldn’t take many (injury) cases like that to make a million-dollar
robot worthwhile. So from time to time we’re still going to have to
make those big investments” [NZAS 1].
4. Discussion
In Section 4, the themes highlighted in the results section are con-
sidered in relation to relevant peer-reviewed safety literature.
4.1. What are the eﬀects on safety management when ‘lean’ management
practices are subject to even further ﬁnancial duress?
4.1.1. Pressure for productivity
Since the 1990 introduction of its zero accident vision (ZAV), NZAS
dramatically reduced its lost-time injuries (LTI) to single ﬁgures an-
nually, but also maintained a ‘constant mindfulness’ (Weick and
Sutcliﬀe, 2007) about the potential for catastrophe on site (Young,
2014). The observation of the NZAS respondent that “the focus had
drifted away…” [NZAS 3] indicated that the preventive measures
aimed at rare, but potentially catastrophic, events had deteriorated
more than the attention focussed on day-to-day LTIs. This has a parallel
with Woods’ (2003, p.4) “drift towards failure as defences erode in the
face of production pressure”. While Woods was referring to ‘production
pressure’ rather than ﬁnancial duress, the net eﬀect of producing more
(or the same) output with less input is similar. Hopkins (2000, 2008)
also documented this ‘drift toward failure’ where fatalities occurred in
the wake of ﬁnancial cuts and constriction. The eﬃciency-thoroughness
trade-oﬀ principle (ETTO) (Hollnagel, 2012) remains a core contra-
diction at the heart of safety management: eﬃciency is usually the
short-term catalyst for productivity, whereas thoroughness is often the
long-term guarantor of safety.
4.1.2. Lean management
The increasing sophistication of management expertise has pre-
cipitated the use of ‘best practice’ total quality management (TQM)
techniques (Manzella, 1997). NZAS has excelled in using TQM to
maximise production quality (see (Young, 2014)) including ‘lean’ pro-
duction methodology. Lean production seeks to eliminate all ‘waste’
from the production process. The three types of waste identiﬁed are
overburden (too much input into the process), unevenness (input that is
irregular and therefore counterproductive), and non-value-adding work
(Longoni et al., 2013). The identiﬁcation and elimination of ‘non-value-
adding work’ has potentially adverse implications in that many safety
checks and balances do not appear to do anything: they represent what
Weick (2011) called ‘a dynamic non-event’. Redundancy in safety in-
terventions is implicit: i.e. an occupational injury will not necessarily
occur when a safety intervention is absent. As far as the production
process is concerned therefore, a ‘lean’ rationalist could argue that
safety precautions are seldom required. While no safety professional
would ever profess this polemic, the pursuit of lean production never-
theless presents continuing safety dilemmas in the selection of which
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particular ‘non-value-adding work’ to eliminate from the work process
chain.
The prediction by Longoni et al. (2013) that ‘lean thinking’ may be
detrimental for safe operational outcomes appeared to be occurring
surreptitiously at NZAS during the period of cost-cutting. Some routine
‘checks and balances’ that had been part of NZAS safety procedures for
decades (Young, 2014) had been cut because they appeared to be ‘non-
value-adding’ since they continually returned a zero result: i.e. nothing
was going wrong, so why keep checking? This ‘drift to failure’ (Woods,
2003) was detected by an external audit conducted by staﬀ of NZAS’s
sister smelter, and modiﬁed following its identiﬁcation.
4.1.3. The reason for audits
NZAS senior staﬀ were appreciative of the discovery, through the
external audit, that their formerly exemplary systems were deterior-
ating: “I’m very thankful that the audit happened… They’re not un-
pleasant things that people come and do to you – they’re a fresh set of
eyes that are just checking that the things that are going to keep you out
of jail, that stop people from dying, are actually in place…” [NZAS 3].
Contrasts between positive internal safety audits and subsequent
catastrophic events have been well documented in other heavy in-
dustrial plants (Hopkins, 2000, 2008, 2011). External audits, on the
other hand, can provide a more detached and impartial assessment of
the status quo. An external audit can expose the safety condition known
as ‘work as imagined versus work as done’ (Clay-Williams et al., 2015)
where safety managers sometimes fail to recognise that their supposed
excellent internal audit does not correspond with actuality. It may be
that an integrated management safety system is well-established in an
organisation, but in reality, work is conducted in an entirely diﬀerent
way. One NZAS manager also highlighted the need for ‘constant
mindfulness’ (Weick and Sutcliﬀe, 2007) in a hazardous heavy industry:
“…the issue with the systems and the fatalities… is that because they’re
so infrequent… unless you’re watching them carefully, there’s no in-
dicator that you’re coming adrift…” [NZAS 3].
4.1.4. The prioritisation of injury classiﬁcations
Lost-time injuries are the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of safety management.
While any injury should be prevented, LTIs are often relatively frequent
and usually of lesser consequence than life-changing injuries (see
below). LTIs can be manipulated (Coyle et al., 1995; Oleinick et al.,
1993; Probst et al., 2008; Stiller et al., 2008) to deliver apparently
improving safety trends while obfuscating potentially catastrophic
eventualities. The NZAS manager who distinguished between multiple
and single fatalities, and ‘injury prevention’, was referring to this at-
tention to amelioration of LTIs at the expense of preventing more cat-
astrophic events. McDonald (1996) dismissed the prevalence of LTI,
considering them to be an ineﬀective measurement of relative safety,
and in analysing data from Australia’s Industry Commission in 1995,
instead proposed three classes of injury:
• Class I Permanent life-changing injuries – accounting for 80% of
injury costs
• Class II Temporary (recoverable) injuries e.g. LTIs – accounting for
19% of injury costs
• Class III Minor inconveniences – accounting for less than 1% of in-
jury costs
McDonald (1996) argued that injury prevention eﬀort must there-
fore focus primarily on Class I injuries, for reasons of severity and cost,
in preference to the current emphasis on Class II injuries. Further, the
wisdom of concentrating on prevention of Class I injuries recognises
that there is little if any relationship between the causal factors for LTIs
and those of catastrophic injuries (Manuele, 2011; O'Neill et al., 2013;
Oleinick et al., 1993): prevention of catastrophic events usually re-
quires a totally diﬀerent safety approach.
4.2. What are the key issues for safety managers surrounding actual or
likely staﬀ redundancy?
4.2.1. Redundancy fears and consequences
Fear of layoﬀs during recession may increase employee stress,
which has the potential to increase the probability of injuries (Beale and
Nethercott, 1985; Jenkins et al., 1982; Sharp, 2010). Similarly, the
negative eﬀect of redundancy on the psychological wellbeing of those
who lose their job through plant closure or downsizing has been
documented (Milner et al., 2014). In the current study however, while
both companies reported considerable employee anxiety as a result of
imminent redundancies, the reported safety record of both companies
remained excellent. (It is noted that the original NZAS study (Young,
2014) substantiated that company’s exemplary safety improvement;
whereas the current qualitative study of both companies accepted their
reports of continuing excellent quantitative safety records).
According to Boone et al. (2011), people who have accidents are
more likely to be ﬁred and workers may therefore not report injuries for
fear of becoming candidates for redundancy. At NZAS, one manager
related a previous work situation where staﬀ were ranked on their
suitability for their role and were therefore, at the time of this study,
apprehensive of being selected for redundancy. While no current sug-
gestion of such practices were found at either company, one manager
related that some of the older workers sometimes worked beyond their
physical capabilities, risking a musculo-skeletal disorder, to hide their
possible unsuitability for the task in hand: “…they really wanted to
work in the role incredibly thoroughly, and I was having a dreadful
time getting them to lift items appropriately…” [NZAS 2]. This pro-
pensity to hide their relative unsuitability for the job may lead workers
to under-report incidents (Boone and van Ours, 2006). The eﬀect of
under-reporting could be particularly relevant to NZAS during the
period of ﬁnancial duress because their incident reporting system and
associated remedial actions had so eﬀectively contributed to amelior-
ating hazards in recent years (Young, 2014). Under-reporting of in-
cidents could lead to compromised safety understanding and an in-
crease in injuries.
One of the ﬁrst realisations following the redundancies at NZAS was
the loss of experience from the older workforce (average age over
50 years old): “…we have been very dependent on that institutional
knowledge… we very rarely have that complete list of all the things
that someone does…” [NZAS 1]. The requirements of the health and
safety management systems have become a challenge for those over-
seeing safety at NZAS “…because you just don’t have as many people to
manage the administrative side of all of the checks and balances”
[NZAS 1].
In addition, not all NZAS staﬀ regarded redundancy as a totally
undesirable result of the downsizing, and this produced its own diﬃ-
culties for the company. The attractiveness of the redundancy package
to workers approaching retirement age was such that many of the older
leaders and holders of institutional knowledge took voluntary re-
dundancy, thereby exacerbating the reduction of composite safety ex-
pertise. This is a common problem when companies downsize since the
length of experience in a given function is positively related to
knowledge sharing behaviour (Nesheim and Gressgård, 2014). This has
clear implications for the safe completion of many customary work
tasks.
4.2.2. Implications for morale
Evans et al. (2001) noted that in second order change – where change
is transformational, radical and complex – there is a need for man-
agement to imbue a shared sense of the impending crisis in all em-
ployees. This eﬀect is clearly evident in the Alcoa statements, where
staﬀ knew that their fate was sealed. Perception of personal safety is, at
least in part, related to employee perceptions of leaders’ commitment to
safety (Evans et al., 2001).
Shared, transparent communication of the pending redundancies,
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consistent with second order change noted by Evans et al. (2001), was
seen as a key contributor to both companies’ continuing safety success.
At Alcoa, the understanding that employees at every level were about to
lose their jobs appeared to have produced a communal spirit in ad-
versity: “…we said, ‘we’re all in this together… we’re all going through
the same issues’, and I think that’s really made a close working team
this year…” [ALCOA 1]. While closure or a signiﬁcant program of re-
dundancies can deliver a devastating blow to communities surrounding
the aﬀected plant (Lambert, 2004), the ﬁndings of this study suggest
that looming redundancies need not lead to an inevitable loss of morale
and a possible deterioration in safety performance.
4.2.3. Eﬃcacy of behaviour-based safety programs
Alcoa attributed much of their successful safety record to one par-
ticular proprietary BBS program. One NZAS manager, on the other
hand, was seeking to rationalise their BBS systems by preparing a chart
comparing Geller’s (2005) seven criteria for an eﬀective BBS, mapping
each of their existing and former proprietary systems against the cri-
teria: “…we’ve got lots and lots of safety systems that we use… so I
could clearly see where one was working and where one wasn’t…”
[NZAS 2]. Using the work of Geller (2005), the manager observed that,
“from our 20-odd systems, we’ve actually only got… 5…that are ac-
tually looking at the work as it is being done.” [NZAS 2]. The authors’
research did not identify nor record any conclusion from this analysis,
but the logical application of peer-reviewed research to the eﬃcacy of
proprietary BBS programs is nevertheless noteworthy.
4.3. Do the beneﬁts derived from hierarchy of control methodology continue
in times of ﬁnancial duress?
4.3.1. Hierarchy of control
Safety managers from both companies believed their long-term and
continuing investment in higher order controls such as elimination or
isolation for hazard mitigation was central to the companies’ successful
management of safety through all economic climates. With respect to
hazard mitigation, NZAS has had an excellent long-term commitment
applying funds to the upper end of the hierarchy of controls (Young,
2014). Qualitative evidence from both companies in this study in-
dicated that this focus on upper level of controls was continuing – even
in the most diﬃcult ﬁnancial conditions. This is in stark contrast to
more than 80% of large companies, who typically rely on lower order
controls for hazard mitigation (Behm and Powell, 2014).
Furthermore, the persistent emphasis on using upper level controls
in both companies was made more successful by both companies’ use of
eﬀective and transparent incident reporting. Health and safety systems
work more eﬀectively when the users of a safety solution are involved
in the system design (Molineux, 2014). Both companies reportedly
continued their open communication across all levels of their organi-
sations with respect to hazard identiﬁcation and mitigation, enhancing
the application of upper level hazard control. In the case of NZAS
particularly, a focus on the most serious class of potential injury ap-
peared to reinforce a ‘constant mindfulness’ in the workplace – al-
though they acknowledged that they had unintentionally moved away
from this until an external audit highlighted an erosion of safety checks
and balances.
5. Conclusion
There is little guidance available to safety managers who seek to
keep their people from injury when organisations are facing serious
ﬁnancial duress. This paper used a purposive critical case study of two
unique research opportunities to consider the answers to three ques-
tions of relevant interest.
Firstly, what are the eﬀects on safety management when ‘lean’
management practices are subject to even further ﬁnancial duress?
NZAS management indicated some uneasiness about the possible eﬀect
on safety of lean TQM principles. They acknowledged that many of
their checks and balances that had served their personnel so well in
recent decades (Young, 2014) had deteriorated with the elimination of
‘non-value-adding waste’. NZAS management also deduced that while
their LTI frequency rate remained admirably low, some of their systems
for mitigation of rare, but potentially catastrophic, incidents were being
eroded. This was highlighted by an external audit. NZAS management
acknowledged this insidious and unintended drift into hazardous
practice and in response to the audit, moved directly to resolve the
identiﬁed shortcomings.
Secondly, what are the key issues for safety managers surrounding
actual or likely staﬀ redundancy? Despite indications from the litera-
ture that the stress of imminent or possible redundancies may produce a
deteriorating safety performance, this study did not ﬁnd any such re-
sult. On the contrary, both plants reported better safety records than in
previous years. The fear of an increase in injuries due to increased
employee stress (Beale and Nethercott, 1985; Jenkins et al., 1982;
Sharp, 2010) did not eventuate. This paper therefore notes that com-
panies need not assume that increased injury rates are inevitable in
diﬃcult ﬁnancial times. Despite the unhappy consequence of many job
losses from the Alcoa plant closure and NZAS downsizing, both com-
panies have performed commendably in managing the safety of their
staﬀ during this diﬃcult period. Both companies were unequivocal in
maintaining the right for staﬀ to stop work when they were uncertain of
their own safety. This was especially important when performing
shutdowns and other unusual tasks during closure or when downsizing
operations. Alcoa ultimately closed their plant with their best ever
annual safety record. NZAS continued its exemplary safety record
through trying times, and, more importantly was able to identify where
encroaching catastrophe may have been looming.
Thirdly, do the beneﬁts derived from hierarchy of control metho-
dology continue in times of ﬁnancial duress? Both companies reported a
strong previous and ongoing commitment to investment in higher order
hierarchy of controls solutions to mitigate hazards. Capital for elim-
ination and isolation of hazards had been invested over many years, and
was not withheld during the ‘hard times’. The safety managers inter-
viewed in this research project were unequivocal in attributing their
ongoing success to previous upper-level hierarchy of controls mitiga-
tion of hazards. Further, while acknowledging the potentially negative
eﬀect of lean management practices noted above, the eﬀective appli-
cation of hierarchy of controls methodology appeared to be the prime
underwriter of safety in hard times.
This study therefore oﬀers four recommendations for all industrial
plants facing ﬁnancial duress:
1. Focus on higher order hierarchy of controls mitigation of hazards.
When ﬁnancial conditions deteriorate, previous and continued in-
vestment in eﬀective higher order mitigation will protect staﬀ from
hazards.
2. While lean management is beneﬁcial in the continual search for
company proﬁtability, remain mindful of retaining ‘non-value-
adding’ work that may not contribute to productivity and proﬁt-
ability, but is crucial for safety.
3. Despite (and perhaps because of) their rarity, treat prevention of
Class I injuries as paramount. Prevention of Class II injuries (in-
cluding LTIs) is desirable but sometimes distracting: it is easy to
overlook the potential for life-altering Class I catastrophes.
4. Value external audits. A ‘fresh set of eyes’ can identify the unin-
tentional ‘drift’ away from prudent safety mitigation. A positive
response to a negative audit may ultimately save lives.
A ﬁnal quote from Alcoa staﬀ who delivered record production le-
vels in their ﬁnal year sums up both companies’ ethos:“…you can’t have
one without the other – for us, if we had someone injured, all those
record production rates mean nothing… they mean absolutely nothing
to us…” [ALCOA 1].
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Appendix D: Are we capable of learning? Can New Zealanders move 
beyond the ‘kind wish’ school of safety management? 
Presentation to ‘Safety 360’ conference in Auckland, New Zealand; 16 March, 2015 by 
keynote speaker Stephen Young. Also published in New Zealand Management magazine, April 
2105. 
Are we capable of learning? 
Can New Zealanders move beyond the ‘kind wish’ school of safety management? 
The Pike River disaster was a watershed in 21st century New Zealand industry. WorkSafe was 
subsequently established to improve the safety of New Zealand workers. But legislators and 
regulators can only do so much: the ‘rule as imagined’ versus the ‘rule as done’ is a clear 
dichotomy in safety understanding. Because a rule is written does not make it so.  
Many companies and their advisors spend considerable time interpreting taxation law to 
avoid tax (usually legal) or evade tax (illegal). Similarly, many companies and their advisors 
appear to comply with the letter of safety legislation without complying with, or even 
understanding, its intent. It is my observation – drawn from 30 years of working in New 
Zealand safety – that New Zealand organisations tend to fall in to one of three categories: 
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1. Those who avoid safety by riding their luck and avoiding legal detection – usually
small-to-medium sized enterprises (SME) that have minimal safety expertise and
attribute accidents to ‘stupid people doing stupid things’.
2. Those who comply with the law because it is a cost of doing business. They often
appoint safety officers who believe that they have the power to train their employees
to work ‘safely’ and ‘avoid doing stupid things’.
3. Those who do not want any people associated with their business to be hurt – ever –
and who use evidence-based interventions to mitigate hazards. They do not use the
word ‘stupid’. New Zealand organisations that fall into this third category are very few.
New Zealand businesses have no wish to hurt people (of course!) but most are unwilling to 
follow the example of successful companies – both here and overseas – that have exemplary 
safety records despite working in inherently hazardous industries.  
Most supposed law-abiding companies in New Zealand follow the ‘kind wish’ school of safety. 
They spend money on signs and slogans exhorting their employees to ‘be safe!’ without any 
understanding of what this means. They provide training for their employees that ‘changes 
behaviour’ when there is almost no evidence that (a) behaviour can be irreversibly changed 
in most work situations, and (b) that behaviour is the problem in the first place.  
While worker behaviour is integral to the complex aetiology of occupational injury and ill-
health, exclusive focus on the actions of individuals in workplace safety has no legitimacy. It 
is very difficult for people to ‘work safely’ when an explosion is pursuing them at supersonic 
speed, or a heavy load is falling on to them from above. Because companies do not actively 
wish to hurt their own people, we call this mode of safety the ‘kind wish’: companies profess 
274
a wish that their employees suffer no injury, but they offer very little in the way of mitigation 
for the ever-present hazards that lead to injury and ill-health.  
So what is the alternative? The answer lies in the simplest of ideas – one that every safety 
professional claims to follow but few ever do: the hierarchy of controls. An explanation of this 
method of hazard mitigation does not belong here – but the higher levels of control such as 
eliminating or even isolating the hazard are generally ignored in any safety analysis under the 
guise of ‘impracticality’. This is a get-out-of-jail-free card, embedded in our legislation, for 
many companies that simply do not wish to confront a significant hazard in the workplace. 
Instead, they point to the lowest order of controls: signs, warnings, rules, training… the ‘non-
hierarchy of control’. 
Post-Pike River, every well-meaning safety professional and regulator asked, ‘How can we 
improve safety in New Zealand?’ But they generally asked people who earn their living by 
training workers in the ‘kind wish’ school of safety. Perhaps understandably, they suggested 
more training as the answer.  
Now, I am not suggesting that we discontinue all safety training programs in New Zealand; 
but I am suggesting that as a lower order control, training may help people avoid injury, but 
can never assure any injury avoidance. There is considerable evidence that we can increase 
people’s knowledge, but there is little evidence that this will result in different behaviours – 
or even that a different behaviour would have prevented the injury at all. 
I am suggesting that New Zealand organisations look to those who have been extremely 
successful in mitigating hazards where many would throw their hands up in desperation at 
the complexity and ‘impracticality’ of embarking on such a course. One such example is New 
Zealand Aluminium Smelters Limited (NZAS) which has a large workforce and a daunting 
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range of potentially fatal hazards to control – yet for many years now, has restricted injuries 
to small numbers of mostly musculo-skeletal problems in an aging workforce. They have 
achieved this through their assiduous attention to the simple hierarchy of controls – attacking 
hazards in a logical and evidentially valid manner (see author’s research details below). 
Some may point to NZAS’s corporate ownership as providing the requisite funds for such 
mitigation and success. There are three answers to this.  
1. There are many, many successful examples of utilising the hierarchy of controls to mitigate
hazards, without spending huge amounts of capital.
2. Sometimes large amounts capital are required – but in 2012, NZAS lost $49 million after tax –
yet still kept its exemplary safety record.
3. The third answer is simply, so what? Where the cost of safety is high, let’s be honest about it.
Quite simply, we need to dump the ‘kind wish’ school of safety and embark on a highly 
considered and evidentially based program of workplace injury mitigation in New Zealand. 
Just like NZAS. 
Steve Young is Program Coordinator for the Victorian Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health (VIOSH) at Federation University, Australia. VIOSH offers a Graduate Diploma in 
Occupational Hazard Management (GDOHM) and associated Master’s degree. Young is a New 
Zealander who researched and substantiated NZAS’ safety achievements and has recently 
updated that research in a soon-to-be- published paper ‘Safety in Hard Times’. 
276
Appendix E. Statement of author contribution 
Brewers and Vintners Beware! Mitigation of the carbon dioxide hazard in the 
fermentation industries using hierarchy of control methodology (Young et al., 
2015). 
Author 
Stephen Young 
Dr Mani Naiker 
Assoc. Professor Peter Aldred 
Contribution 
80% 
10% 
10% 
Is that the light at the end of the tunnel, or is it an oncoming train? An 
obsession with obvious hazards may blind us to approaching catastrophe 
(Young et al., 2017) 
Author 
Stephen Young 
Dr Mani Naiker 
Assoc. Professor Peter Aldred 
Assoc. Prof. Jennifer Blitvich 
Contribution 
70% 
10% 
10% 
10% 
Signature 
�( 
-��)� 
yp;_e:�
-
rlk�
� 
277
Appendix F: Published Manuscript – ‘Brewers and Vintners Beware!’ - 
Journal of Health, Safety, and Environment 
Young, S., Naiker, M., & Aldred, P. (2015). Brewers and vintners beware!: 
Mitigation of the carbon dioxide hazard in the fermentation industries using 
hierarchy of control methodology. Journal of Health Safety and Environment, 
31(3), 193-206. 
278
FEATURE ARTICLE
Brewers and vintners beware!
Mitigation of the carbon dioxide hazard in the fermentation
industries using hierarchy of control methodology
Stephen Young, Mani Naiker and Peter Aldred
Stephen Young, MHealSci (OHS), BCom, is the graduate program coordinator for
VIOSH (Victorian Institute of Occupational Safety and Health) in the School of
Health Sciences and Psychology, Federation University Australia.
Mani Naiker, PhD, is a chemistry lecturer in the School of Applied and Biomedical
Sciences, Federation University Australia.
Peter Aldred, PhD, is Associate Professor and Program Coordinator — Brewing, in
the School of Applied and Biomedical Sciences, Federation University Australia.
Address for correspondence: Mr S Young, Program Coordinator, Post-graduate
Studies, Victorian Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, School of Health
Sciences and Psychology, Faculty of Health, Federation University Australia, PO Box
663, Ballarat Vic 3353.
Email: s.young@federation.edu.au
Tel: +61 3 5327 6889
Conflict of interest
The authors of this paper declare no conflict of interest.
Abstract
This paper suggests that elevated levels of CO2 are a widely underestimated
occupational hazard for those working in the fermentation industries. The
generation of CO2 as a natural by-product of fermentation, and the input of
additional CO2, are examined and the potential CO2 hazard highlighted. The
need for the rapidly growing fermentation industries to understand and
mitigate this hazard is emphasised. A robust application of hierarchy of
controls methodology is employed to effect a best-practice mitigation of the
CO2 hazard. The paper concludes with a strong recommendation for the use of
automated monitoring linked to lock out mechanisms as the most effective
means of assuring worker safety with respect to elevated levels of CO2 in the
workplace.
Keywords: carbon dioxide, fermentation, beer, wine, hazard.
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1. Introduction
During fermentation processes, carbon dioxide (CO2) levels inside vats and tanks can
rise to up to 100% of the internal gas composition. A person entering such an
atmosphere — even quickly looking inside a tank — can lose consciousness in
seconds, and often dies within a few minutes (1).
There has been a significant increase in the numbers of small, craft breweries and
boutique wineries in recent times. Seventy per cent of Australia’s wine companies
were established in the last 25 years (2), and there has been a 500% increase in
breweries in the last 20 years (3). Many of these new entrants are owner-operated
businesses, whose principals may have a limited understanding of the hazards
presented by CO2 in brewing and winemaking. From the authors’ experience in
visiting breweries and wineries, very few production companies have installed CO2
monitoring. A lack of understanding of this hazard by production companies and a
lack of awareness by workers is common in this type of industry (4). There is a gap in
the knowledge regarding the extent of exposure to the CO2 hazard, but anecdotal
evidence suggests that supposed industry ‘‘safeguards’’ against asphyxiation,
poisoning, and other hazards associated with CO2 may rely on low level controls such
as rules, signs, vague procedures and inadequate or long-forgotten training. This may
be exacerbated by continual incremental increases in production, without
consideration that the increase in production also produces an increase in CO2 output,
resulting in higher CO2 concentrations than originally anticipated.
In the production of alcoholic beverages, CO2 is usually present in two distinct
manifestations.
1. As an (output) by-product of the fermentation process.
In alcoholic beverage production, CO2 is generated as part of the natural
fermentation process. In winemaking, the addition of yeast to the sugar
contained in the grapes results in the production of alcohol and CO2. One
litre of grape must produces between 45 and 60 litres of CO2 (1). Similarly,
the fermenting of the sugar-rich wort in beer production also produces
alcohol and CO2. The fermentation of a normal gravity beer will produce
approximately 25–30 grams of CO2 (or approximately 20 litres) per litre of
beer (5). It is the unpredictable nature of the elevated CO2 levels that
presents an extreme hazard to people in and around the fermentation
industries (6).
2. As an (input) additive.
a. In both winemaking (7) and brewing beer (5), CO2 is used to prevent
oxidation during production. CO2 is also used to purge lines, vessels,
filters and de-aerating water (8, 5).
b. CO2 is also used as a preservative and taste enhancer (9, 10). Both
alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages are often distributed in vessels with
CO2 at high pressure. Some of this CO2 dissolves in the beverage which is
then said to be ‘‘carbonated’’ or ‘‘fizzy’’. The CO2 is normally stored on site
in cylinders and conveyed through hoses into the appropriate vessel using
a pressure regulator.
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c. CO2 is used as a coolant within the fermentation process. In wine
production, ‘‘dry ice’’ (CO2 at a temperature lower than −78.5°C) is
sometimes added to cool the grapes for a period of three to five days in
order to slow the fermentation process without adding further water and
to improve the taste. Such manipulation of the rate of fermentation may
result in a very high rate of natural production of CO2: up to 545 litres of
CO2 gas per kilogram of dry ice (1).
Both manifestations of CO2 in brewing and winemaking, ie CO2 production as a
natural part of fermentation, and introducing CO2 gas or dry ice for production
purposes, have the potential to produce unpredictable atmospheres capable of killing.
Mitigation of this hazard is essential in every workplace where such a build-up of CO2
is possible. This includes all premises where alcoholic beverages are produced.
While CO2 poisoning and asphyxiation has been documented in both natural volcanic
occurrences (10) and in large-scale industrial uses such as refrigeration (11, 9), fire
extinguishers (11), CO2 sequestration (12), and in associated transport and storage of
CO2 (12), the increasing scale of the alcoholic beverage production industry around
the world presents the most likely source of exposure to elevated levels of CO2. This
paper will review the current knowledge surrounding the CO2 risk, and provide a
‘‘hierarchy of control’’ approach as a recommended methodology for prevention of
fatalities.
2. Health effects Ð what could possibly go wrong?
CO2 is the fourth most common gas in the earth’s atmosphere and presents no hazard
to humans in normal or temporarily elevated concentrations in well-ventilated spaces.
CO2 is absorbed passively through the lungs, and small amounts occur naturally in the
plasma and blood. Along with the carbon dioxide produced by the natural
metabolism of the body, it is eliminated principally through the lungs, with a small
amount excreted through the kidneys (10). High levels of CO2 will produce
immediate and serious acute sickness, and in many instances, death. This can occur in
two ways.
Firstly, significant increases in carbon dioxide concentration at a cellular level alter
the cell’s buffering capacity, changing its pH (10). Inspiration of an elevated
concentration of CO2 triggers adverse effects in the respiratory, cardiovascular and
central nervous systems (12). Symptoms include headaches, hyperventilation,
dizziness, drowsiness and sweating. In excessive concentrations convulsions, loss of
consciousness, coma and ultimately death will occur (6, 10).
Secondly, high concentrations of CO2 simply displace oxygen in confined
atmospheres, causing asphyxiation (6). The recommended or permissible exposure
limit for CO2 is up to 15 times the naturally occurring concentration; and a short-
term exposure of up to 100 times natural CO2 concentration is determined to be
unlikely to produce harm to people in normal circumstances (13). However, higher
CO2 concentrations can produce acute sickness and/or death through either poisoning
or asphyxiation. A post-mortem may reveal dual aetiology of death due to a worker
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entering a confined space with high CO2 levels: presenting a very high concentration
of CO2 in blood gas analysis through excessive absorption of CO2, and a low level of
oxygen in the blood representing asphyxiation through oxygen displacement by
carbon dioxide (4, 1).
While the normal concentration of CO2 in our atmosphere is only 330 parts per
million (ppm) (6), it is recommended that people should not work an eight-hour day
in concentrations exceeding 5,000 ppm. Even a short-term exposure exceeding 30,000
ppm is regarded as hazardous to health; while levels exceeding 40,000 ppm are
regarded as immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH). Table 1 lists the
recommended exposure limits. When CO2 levels rise above the IDLH levels indicated
in Table 1, people within or near the workplace will be either poisoned or
asphyxiated, or both. Approximate relationships between CO2 levels and symptoms
are shown in Table 2.
Table 1. Carbon dioxide concentrations and associated occupational exposure limits
(NB See Glossary for an explanation of these terms)
Measurement Workplace Exposure Limit (WEL) Concentration1 Source
Parts per Percentage Milligrams per
million (ppm) concentration cubic metre
(mg/m3)
Normal 330 ppm 0.033% 600 mg/m3 (6, 13)2
concentration in
air
Permissible 5,000 ppm 0.5% TWA 9,000 mg/m3 Occupational Safety
exposure limit Time- TWA and Health
(PEL-TWA) Weighted Administration (OSHA)
Average [USA]
(TWA)
Recommended 5,000 ppm 0.5% TWA 9,000 mg/m3 National Institute for
exposure limit (TWA) TWA Occupational Safety
(REL-TWA) and Health (NIOSH)
[USA]
Threshold limit 5,000 ppm 0.5% TWA 9,000 mg/m3 American Conference
value (TLV-TWA) TWA TWA of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists
(ACGIH) [USA]
Workplace 5,000 ppm 0.5% TWA 9,000 mg/m3 Health and Safety
exposure limit TWA TWA Executive (HSE) [UK]
(WEL-TWA)
Short-term 30,000 ppm 3% 54,000 mg/m3 National Institute for
exposure Occupational Safety
limit(STEL) and Health (NIOSH),
ACGIH [USA]
Immediately 40,000 ppm 4% 73,000 mg/m3 NIOSH [USA]
dangerous to life
or health (IDLH)
Based on (13).
1 WEL in mg/m3 = (WEL in ppm × MW) / 24.05526 (14). Molecular Weight of CO2 (MW) = 44.01.
2 Others specify 360 ppm (9).
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Table 2. Carbon dioxide concentrations and toxicity
Concentration
EffectsParts per million Percentage Milligrams per cubic
(ppm) concentration metre (mg/m3)
330 ppm 0.033% 600 mg/m3 Normal concentration. No effect.
20,000±50,000 2±5% 36,000±90,000 Headaches, dizziness, sweating,
ppm mg/m3 dyspnoea (shortness of breath).
60,000±100,000 6±10% 109,000±180,000 Hyperventilation, tachycardia
ppm mg/m3 (increased heart rate), worsening
dizziness.
110,000±170,000 11±17% 200,000±300,000 Drowsiness, muscle twitching,
ppm mg/m3 loss of consciousness.
Greater than >17% Greater than Convulsions, coma, death.
170,000 ppm 300,000 mg/m3
Based on (10).
Throughout history fatalities resulting from CO2 have generally been under-reported
(15, 16). Even in the 21st Century, the hazards posed by CO2 are underestimated and
under-represented in occupational health and safety taxonomies (16). CO2 levels in
blood are sometimes difficult to detect in post-mortems due to hemolysis,3 suggesting
that diagnoses of fatalities resulting from exposure to CO2 are difficult to determine
unequivocally, and probably continue to be under-reported (1, 15, 17).
Perhaps because CO2 occurs naturally, and plays an important part in the metabolism
of humans, many workers exposed to variable levels of CO2 in their occupation believe
that it is harmless (13). Yet, it is this underestimation or indifference to the CO2
hazard that poses the greatest threat to their occupational survival.
3. Hazard mitigation
3.1 The hazard of CO2 in confined spaces
Working in confined spaces is one of the most serious occupational risks faced by
operatives (18). In the wine and beer industries, production unavoidably utilises
storage and fermentation tanks and thereby has the potential to expose personnel to
potentially hazardous levels of CO2 in confined spaces.
A confined space may be defined as a space which, by design:
1. has limited openings for entry or exit
2. has unfavourable natural ventilation, and
3. is not intended for continuous employee occupancy (19, 15).
In an analysis of deaths from confined spaces in the USA between 1983 and 1989, it
was found that almost half of fatalities were caused by asphyxiation (19). Within the
fermentation process, CO2 has the potential to increase at unpredictable rates to
undetectable levels (ie without adequate chemical monitoring). Within a confined
3 The destruction or dissolution of red blood cells, with subsequent release of haemoglobin. (The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language)
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space, this hazard can be lethal. Investigations of fatalities occurring in confined
spaces within the wine industry have identified concentrations of CO2 of more than
100,000 ppm — more than 285 times the naturally occurring level (18).
Furthermore, CO2 is heavier than oxygen and will therefore accumulate in low points
such as cellars, pits, tunnels and pipes (12). Simply opening a door or similar opening
in a confined space before entry will therefore not necessarily dissipate a higher-than-
normal concentration of CO2 (4). Workers often enter a tank ‘‘head first’’, facing
downwards, so that their head enters the toxic gas layer below the entrance (4, 1).
This can result in almost instant death.
Detection of CO2 without specific testing devices is impossible (6). Therefore, any
claims that workers are ‘‘experienced’’ or ‘‘have had no problems in the past’’ must be
discounted. Manwaring and Conroy (19) found that in 80% of companies that had
experienced a confined space fatality, the same type of entry had been performed in
the past without adverse effects. Furthermore, any reliance on informal rescue from
supervisors or fellow workers must also be discounted as a mitigation measure.
Manwaring and Conroy (19) also identified that 39% of fatalities were workers who
were attempting to rescue another worker;4 and 35% of confined space fatalities were
workers with supervisory responsibilities. In one event, three supervisors died (19).
‘‘Rescuing a worker from a confined space is a low-frequency, high-risk operation that
is both time sensitive and technically challenging (17).’’ Since death from contact
with high levels of CO2 can be almost instantaneous (13), rescue of workers overcome
by CO2 (through the displacement of oxygen) in confined spaces is virtually
impossible without dedicated rescue equipment and rescue personnel instantly
available.
In view of the potential for unanticipated and rapid elevations of CO2 in the
fermentation industries, it is appropriate to expand the usual definition of a confined
space. When vats and tanks have extremely high concentrations of CO2, in the absence
of adequate ventilation, the rooms in which the vats and tanks are situated may also
have elevated CO2 concentrations. Without ventilation, the atmosphere of the whole
workplace — the beer or wine production spaces, barrel cellars and bottling rooms —
may become perilously high in CO2 overnight, or even temporarily during normal
production times. During the active fermentation process therefore, closed buildings
may in themselves become confined spaces.
Contractors and allied workers are also endangered by a lack of awareness or proper
mitigation techniques. Almost half of confined space fatalities are suffered by workers
cleaning, repairing, or inspecting these spaces (4, 19). Furthermore, in all the
fatalities, no atmosphere testing of the confined space was performed, none of the
confined spaces were labelled or posted with confined space warning signs; and in
only two of the events was the confined space ventilated prior to entry (19). With CO2
asphyxiation, there are no warning signs to indicate possible overexposure; therefore,
workers working alone and losing consciousness through asphyxiation will continue
to inhale CO2 until death (1).
4 Suruda et al’s (15) paper found 36% of persons who died in confined spaces were attempting rescue.
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3.2 Hierarchy of control mitigation of the CO2 hazard
This paper takes a simple three-stage hierarchy of control approach to mitigation of
the CO2 hazard in the fermentation industries:
1. Elimination
2. Isolation
3. Minimisation
This simple mitigation hierarchy is portrayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1. The hierarchy of controls for hazard mitigation.
Since the two manifestations of CO2 in the fermentation industries are distinct, ie as a
controlled input CO2 (cylinders and dry ice), and as a natural output (from
fermentation), mitigation of the hazard using the hierarchy of controls requires
separate analysis.
3.3 Mitigating hazardous quantities of introduced CO2
Where CO2 is introduced to the fermentation process for purposes of flavouring,
‘‘carbonating’’ (fizziness), or cooling (dry ice) — to slow down the rate of
fermentation, CO2 is normally introduced either as a commercially-available gas
stored in pressurised cylinders, or as a solid in the form of ‘‘dry ice’’. Consideration of
full safety procedures for pressurised gas cylinder handling is beyond the scope of this
paper, and detailed precautions are available elsewhere, eg (20, 21). Leakage or
spillage of CO2 from pressurised cylinders presents potential for hazardous levels of
CO2 in the workspace. In addition, explosions from fire may occur, and a ‘‘torpedo
effect’’ from a mishandled cylinder releasing high pressure gas may drive the cylinder
with high force toward people or equipment — resulting in significant injuries and
damage.
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Dry ice is the solid form of CO2 and is usually used as an additive to slow
fermentation. It is much denser and colder than frozen water and usually exists at a
temperature below −78.5°C (−109.3°F) (22). Since dry ice will sublimate5 to an
atmospheric gas at room temperature, it also presents the possibility of producing
unintended elevated levels of CO2 in the work atmosphere. Narcosis has been recorded
through sublimation of relatively small quantities of dry ice in an enclosed space (23).
Dry ice can also cause severe skin damage through frostbite ‘‘burns’’ (24). A hierarchy
of controls approach to the mitigation of hazards presented by both the use of
pressurised CO2 in cylinders and the use of dry ice must be implemented.
Elimination
Storage of pressurised CO2 cylinders and inventories of dry ice should be kept to a
minimum using just-in-time stock management principles (25), thereby eliminating
a significant proportion of the explosion hazard from fire (cylinders) and sublimation
of dry ice to atmospheric gas.
Isolation
Minimum inventories of pressurised cylinders should be isolated in fire-protected
rooms or cupboards. This will also isolate the cylinders from the possibility of
collision with forklifts, etc. When CO2 is introduced into the fermentation process, it
must be reticulated using a regulator and hose from the cylinder to the inside of the
fermentation vessel. Dry ice must be stored in a freezer capable of maintaining its
temperature below sublimation temperature −78.5°C (−109.3°F) (22). Consideration
must be given also to maintaining the integrity of the dry ice packaging so that the
material can be moved to the fermentation area without any possibility of contact
with skin or eyes.
Minimisation
Staff must be well trained and supervised in the transportation and storage of both
pressurised cylinders and dry ice. Cylinders must be strapped to any barrows used in
moving the CO2 from the cylinder storage area to the areas adjacent to the
fermentation vessels; mishandling or inappropriate transport of cylinders may produce
the ‘‘torpedo effect’’ described above. Shifting dry ice from the freezer storage facility
to the areas adjacent to the fermentation vessels presents the possibility of spillage
resulting in burns or elevated atmospheric levels of CO2. Staff must be well trained
and supervised in the storage and transportation of dry ice.
3.4 Mitigating hazardous quantities of CO2 produced naturally by fermentation
Elimination
The only way to eliminate the hazard of naturally produced fermentation is to not
allow the process to commence — clearly not an option when undertaking the
fermentation of materials to intentionally produce an alcoholic beverage.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that unintentional fermentation may be prevented
and a significant part of the hazard eliminated through the timely disposal of fruit
5 At normal room temperature, dry ice will transform directly from a solid to a gas (sublimation) (22).
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that is not required. For instance, unwanted or excess raw stock, by-product, etc, may
be disposed of before fermentation commences (or continues), thereby eliminating a
potentially hazardous, and possibly unnoticed, source of CO2. Unintentional
fermentation is a commonly occurring hazard in general agricultural situations such as
grain storage or silage storage (26). Wherever fermentable produce is stored in
preparation for processing, the CO2 hazard exists.6 It may therefore be possible to
eliminate a large proportion of the risk by efficient stock (produce) management,
including ‘‘just-in-time’’ process management and timely disposal of fermentable
excess produce and by-products.
Isolation
Undertaking an intended fermentation process will, however, inevitably produce often
unpredictable quantities of CO2. Since it is impossible to eliminate CO2 production
from the process, the next level in the hierarchy of controls is to isolate a hazardous
level of CO2 from people.
There are three primary techniques of isolating the workplace from elevated levels of
CO2:
1. Automated capture of CO2 from fermentation vessels. This is sometimes used in
larger breweries as the captured CO2 can be purified, compressed and reused in
the brewing process.
2. Ventilation of the workplace through extraction apparatus designed and set to
automatically begin extraction when CO2 levels reach elevated levels.
3. Automatic lock-out of the workplace when detectors sense elevated levels of
CO2 within the confined space.
None of these mitigation techniques rely on human judgement or operator actions —
either from personnel unqualified to assess the risk, or from those qualified to do so.
Together, these interventions represent a highly effective isolation from the CO2
hazard. Clearly, the success of this hazard isolation depends on ensuring the
implementation of appropriate engineering measures:
c Dependable CO2 monitoring instruments suitably calibrated with displays
outside the potential confined space.
c Adequate exhaust installations linked to the calibrated monitoring instruments.
c Lock-out systems linked to the monitoring instruments.
c Periodic assurance that the automated systems are operating as intended.
Any manual intervention in these automated processes will diminish the effectiveness
of the isolation, and should therefore be prevented.
6 In a salient example of how rapidly the CO2 hazard can manifest itself, during the writing of this
paper, two French winemakers died after being asphyxiated when treading grapes with their bare feet
in the traditional manner (27).
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A manual system of isolation, such as enabling access by personnel — who believe
that CO2 levels are acceptable by (say) using a mounted or hand-held detector —
represents a low level of protection from the hazard. The potential for a system
override by people who do not understand the hazard must be recognised and
acknowledged as a lower order isolation. Properly calibrated CO2 monitors must be
present and operating satisfactorily wherever a hazardous accumulation of CO2 may
occur — with associated alarms and displays positioned outside the potentially
hazardous area. But where staff or contractors are able to override any automatic access
restrictions, or where manual access is possible, isolation cannot be guaranteed.
Minimisation
Minimisation of the hazard comprises the least effective means of hazard control. It
involves behaviour-reliant measures to manage the risk of occupational injury, eg
warning signs, rules, supervision, training, use of personal protective equipment
(PPE), permits, standard operating procedures, etc. These measures are generally
regarded as the least effective because they cannot be assured — people are always able
to bypass these measures, and eventually, someone does. Suruda et al (15) recommends
a lock-out entry system to prevent the worker from entering until all appropriate
confined space entry procedures (below) are completed. Yet, most of the isolation
measures listed in the Suruda et al (15) paper represent low level administrative or
minimisation measures only. Any mitigation measure that depends upon human
judgement is open to failure through operator, supervisor, or observer
misunderstanding, lack of hazard knowledge, pressure of work, and a myriad of other
possibilities for omission (28).
Fermentation tanks often have pressure relief valves so gas levels may rise
unexpectedly in process areas while people are working nearby. All people working
within or in support of the fermentation industries must comprehend that even
briefly looking inside a vessel with an elevated CO2 level can induce unconsciousness
and death (1). Within the room, monitoring instruments must be mounted wherever
there is a possibility for CO2 leakage and accumulation. The instruments must be
calibrated below permissible levels (see Table 1) and linked to alarm systems so that
personnel are able to exit the worksite readily before the gas levels accumulate to
hazardous levels. Because of the hazard presented by elevated levels of CO2 being
undetectable by people, the fermentation rooms must be considered as potential
‘‘confined spaces’’. The declaration of a ‘‘confined space’’ indicates the critical need for
application of ‘‘confined space procedures’’. These explicit procedures require a high
level of understanding and are beyond the scope of this paper. However, there are
many excellent sources of information on working in confined spaces readily available
in safety books, regulatory safety websites, and peer reviewed papers, eg (26, 29, 30).
People who have not been highly trained in confined space procedures may be in
mortal danger when entering a room with elevated levels of CO2. For instance, since
CO2 fatalities appear to be primarily the result of asphyxiation rather than poisoning,
the use of an air-purifying respirator is futile — since in a hazardous CO2
concentration there is insufficient oxygen to purify. Manwaring and Conroy’s (19)
paper found that in 16% of confined space fatalities, either the wrong type of
respirator was being used or an air-supply respirator was being used improperly.
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4. Conclusion
Suruda et al (15) identified an average of 89 deaths (in the USA) per year from
confined space incidents between 1980 and 1988 — more than 10 per year in one
country alone. Although not all deaths were necessarily caused by CO2, under-
reporting of CO2 asphyxiation and poisoning through misunderstanding of both the
pathology and the incidence of such injury appears to indicate that brewers and
vintners should be more aware of this hazard. Further, the inadequate level of
knowledge about the hazard presented by this seemingly ‘‘harmless’’ gas appears to be
a significant threat to those involved in the rapid growth of boutique wineries and
craft breweries.
Elevated levels of CO2 from both process by-product (naturally occurring CO2 from
the fermentation process) and process additives (pressurised gas cylinders of CO2 and
dry ice) frequently produce atmospheric conditions that are critically hazardous and
usually not survivable. This paper has highlighted the potentially catastrophic effect
of this invisible and undetectable (in the absence of technical monitors) hazard within
the alcoholic beverage production industries. Further, a lack of understanding of
working in confined spaces — even the definition of a confined space — has
prevented appropriate mitigation of this hazard. Common ‘‘safety’’ practices are
generally restricted to a nebulous regard for ‘‘experience’’ and for procedures that have
‘‘always been the way’’.
This paper has employed hierarchy of control methodology to dispassionately
‘‘unpack’’ the CO2 hazard and offer a more professional analysis for hazard elimination
or control. Higher order controls are preferred to unreliable lower level controls such
as depending upon human behaviour. The use of automated monitoring linked to
automated lock-out of production spaces is strongly recommended as the optimum
mitigation measure. Such production areas can become confined spaces simply by a
natural elevation of CO2 levels due to the normal fermentation process. Automated
lock-out until automatic or remotely controlled ventilation has occurred, is therefore
the best protection from this hazard. Brewers and vintners are therefore urged to
consider this methodology and apply it to their own production processes and people.
While they may not have had a serious incident to date, they should nevertheless be
aware of the volatility of CO2 production in the fermentation process, and its potential
for harm.
The authors contend that no death should result from the crafting of such an excellent
product.
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Glossary
Occupational Health Abbrev Definition (source) or use
terminology
Immediately Dangerous IDHL The exposure to airborne contaminants that is ``likely to
to Life or Health cause death or immediate or delayed permanent adverse
health effects or prevent escape from such an
environment'' (NIOSH).7
Milligrams per cubic mg/m3 Used for reporting the concentration of solids in the
metre worker's atmosphere (as mass per volume of air) (31).
Permissible exposure PEL See Workplace Exposure Limit below.
limit
Parts per million ppm Parts of vapour or gas per million parts of air by volume at
25°C and 760 torr (atmospheric pressure) (31).
Recommended Exposure REL See Workplace Exposure Limit below.
Limit
Short-term Exposure WES-STEL The 15-minute exposure standard. Applies to any
Limit 15-minute period in the working day and is designed to
protect the worker against adverse effect of irritation,
chronic or irreversible tissue change, or narcosis that may
increase the likelihood of accidents. The WES-STEL is not
an alternative to the WES-TWA; both the short-term and
time-weighted average exposures apply (31).
Threshhold Limit Value TLV See Workplace Exposure Limit below.
Time-weighted average TWA The maximum concentration of an air-borne substance
averaged over a reference period,8 to which employees
may be exposed by inhalation (14).
Workplace Exposure WEL The maximum concentration of an air-borne substance
Limit averaged over a reference period,8 to which employees
may be exposed by inhalation (14).
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Abstract
A mixed method survey of owners of commercial breweries in Victoria and
Tasmania (Australia) was conducted (n = 45). The purpose of the study was to
gain an understanding of how the breweries mitigated for the hazards they
identified — in particular, asphyxiation from elevated levels of CO2. The
survey comprised a questionnaire regarding the breweries’ age, staff numbers,
how brewery owners assessed a ‘significant’ hazard, and their methods of
recognition and mitigation of the CO2 hazard. The research methodology also
encouraged and recorded qualitative responses. The research intended to gain
an understanding of how the breweries mitigated for the hazards they
identified — in particular, asphyxiation from elevated levels of CO2.
Contradictions between the respondents’ questionnaire (quantitative) and
qualitative responses were noted. A discontinuity between the respondents’
awareness of potential Class I injuries and their safety processes was discussed
— in particular, the distinction between high frequency and high consequence
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hazards. Accordingly, the paper suggests a ‘‘polar area’’ graph for mapping
hazards in small businesses generally, to highlight rare but potentially
catastrophic injuries among known industry hazards.
Keywords: significance, hazards, hierarchy, controls.
Introduction
Much has been made of the inadequacy of lost-time injury (LTI) as an indicator of
workplace safety (1–4). LTI reduction usually targets the frequency axis of the risk
matrix rather than the consequence axis (see Figure 3 for the commonly-used format
of the risk matrix); and reductions in reported high frequency injuries are typically
regarded as success (5–7). While LTIs can include injuries and illness of high
consequence, Safe Work Australia states, ‘‘LTIs reflect high-frequency, low-
consequence injuries but provide little insight into disabling injury or illness’’ (8, p
60). In our enthusiasm to reduce LTI frequency therefore, are we neglecting the
potential catastrophes that destroy lives and businesses? Such catastrophes are often
easy to ‘‘identify’’ in hindsight (9,10) but are seldom predicted in the bustling day-to-
day workplace of the safety professional.
The authors of this paper recently published an exploration of the potential hazard of
asphyxiation due to elevated levels of CO2 in the fermentation industry (11). The
paper provided a review of relevant literature, presented an analysis of the potential
problem and proposed a practical workplace solution. [Asphyxiation can result from
an elevated concentration of CO2 displacing oxygen to the extent that people are
simply unable to receive sufficient oxygen to sustain life. Human beings normally
require their immediate atmosphere to contain approximately 21% oxygen to
function normally.] Some peer-review comment was received questioning whether it
was indeed a credible threat within the industry concerned, and whether it was
worthy of such attention. Literature and guidance on the hazards specific to the
brewing industry are largely unavailable — a vulnerability in itself to new owner/
operators of boutique breweries. The authors therefore devised a survey and
subsequent analysis intended to establish the hazards that brewers themselves identify
in their workplaces, and how they set about mitigating them.
The authors conducted a survey within the Victorian and Tasmanian (Australia)
brewing industry, to determine how hazards are identified, prioritised, and prevented.
The results were analysed and discussed in comparison with existing literature on
confined spaces, asphyxiation, and hazard identification generally, and conclusions
drawn on the suitability of current hazard identification and interpretation methods
within the brewing industry. The analysis focused on the general implications for
improving safety within small, but rapidly growing, workplaces.
Investigation of the developing craft brewing industry, usually managed and operated
by the owners, seems ideal for an analysis of emerging and possibly unfamiliar
hazards: ‘‘. . . growth in the past two years has been remarkable; scores of small
breweries have expanded, upgraded or taken on additional brewers’’ (12 (para 3)).
Exploration of this rapidly growing industry with relatively small, owner-operator
workforces may provide a useful insight into not only the brewing industry, but
management of hazards in many small businesses.
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Methods
Participants and procedures
A search of online media located as many Victorian and Tasmanian commercial (ie not
home-based) breweries as possible. All breweries for which details could be found
were contacted by telephone to initially determine the most appropriate person
(defined as ‘‘the person most likely to understand their organisation’s safety
processes’’) to complete a survey relating to hazard mitigation in their brewery.
Respondents were informed of the identity of the researchers and purpose of the
study. All surveys were allocated a random number and respondents were advised that
their responses would remain confidential and anonymous. The surveys were then
emailed to respondents who agreed to participate, or, if requested by the respondent,
were conducted immediately by telephone. Ethical approval (A16-008) for the study
was received from the university’s Human Research and Ethics Committee and
participant informed consent was obtained prior to participant commencement of the
survey.
Survey instrument
The survey posed 18 questions related to health and safety in breweries: the size and
age of the business; their methodology of identifying and ameliorating hazards
(including the possibility of CO2 asphyxiation); and their safety awareness generally.
In several of the questions, respondents were offered space and time to provide
alternative responses (ie as an alternative to the 4–8 answers offered for selection). The
final question simply asked ‘‘Is there anything you’d like to add regarding safety in
breweries’’? Where the surveys were conducted by telephone, the research assistant
recorded, without prompting, any answers offered by the respondents which could be
classified as ‘‘other’’. Survey questions are included in Appendix 1.
The survey was reviewed and refined between the authors; but no piloting was
possible since there was no cohort available whose response was dispensable, ie the
ultimate respondents (n = 45) were a purposive sample (13). This limitation was
regarded as an unavoidable consequence of surveying a relatively small purposive
sample.
Data analysis
To ensure anonymity, all surveys were identified by a random number during data
entry and analysis. Data entry was checked for accuracy, and frequency and multiple
frequency tables were prepared for cross-tabulation.
Qualitative data recorded were coded according to themes emerging from the
participants’ responses. Quotes identified as being rich in detail and contextual
meaning were highlighted (14). These themes were inserted into the Excel
spreadsheet containing respondents’ survey data. The resulting composite analysis was
then summarised to provide an insight into identification, prioritisation, and
prevention of hazards in the brewing industry.
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Results
Quantitative results
Contact details for 64 breweries were located. Details for some breweries were difficult
to find, but it is reasonable to assume that there were fewer than 90 breweries in
Victoria and Tasmania in 2016. Therefore the research sample represented 60–70% of
Victorian and Tasmanian breweries. Of the research sample, data were available from
70% of breweries contacted (see Table 1). The data therefore represent approximately
half the breweries in Victoria and Tasmania.
Table 1: Response of breweries approached
While almost half (49%) of breweries had been operating for more than six years, the
survey also found that 40% had been in business for less than three years. Almost
two-thirds of the breweries employed fewer than five people, with the majority
reporting that they were owner-operated.
The results of the survey request to identify and rank the ‘‘most significant’’ hazards
in their brew room are represented in Figure 1. This graph represents the six ‘‘most
significant’’ hazards identified in ordinal rank. The most commonly selected second-
and third-ranked hazards are represented alongside as more deeply shaded grey bars
respectively.
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Figure 1. Selection of ‘‘most significant’’ hazards.
Burns were, by far, identified most frequently as the ‘‘most significant’’ hazard (57%),
followed by manual handling (18%). Slips, trips, and falls (as one category), and
forklifts were identified as third and fourth (9% and 7%, respectively); with
explosions and asphyxiation identified as fifth and sixth (both 4%).
Two thirds of respondents ranked three or more ‘‘most significant’’ hazards. Therefore,
it was considered appropriate to sum the scores for each hazard category to establish a
more comprehensive understanding of hazard identification among respondents. By
combining the data for the first three categories, burns remained the ‘‘most
significant’’ hazard, selected in the top three hazards by 82% of respondents. Manual
handling was ranked second (69%), followed by slips, trips and falls (51%) and
forklifts (20%).
Asphyxiation was identified as the most significant hazard by only 4% of respondents,
and only 16% rated it in the top three hazards. Poisoning was also rated in the top
three hazards (9%), and confusion between asphyxiation and poisoning from CO2 may
have accounted for the low ranking of asphyxiation; but even if these responses were
grouped together, they were still only rated in the top three hazards by a quarter of
respondents. The possibility of confusing asphyxiation and poisoning can be
discounted somewhat by a question which asked whether respondents were aware that
CO2 ‘‘may be harmful in elevated concentrations’’; to which 78% responded ‘‘Yes, if
the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is high enough, people may be
asphyxiated’’ (see Table 2 below). These results indicated that asphyxiation is
therefore not generally regarded by brewers as a ‘‘significant hazard’’ when compared
to burns, manual handling, and slips, trips, and falls.
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Respondents were asked to report the methods they used to deal with hazards. Seven
methods were offered for selection and respondents were asked to choose ‘‘all that
apply’’. The responses are represented in Figure 2. Using personal protective
equipment (PPE) was the most common method utilised (87% of survey
respondents), with training ranked second (76% of respondents). Other results of note
are detailed as percentages in Table 2.
Figure 2. Methods of dealing with hazards.
Table 2: Other key findings from survey
In addition, the following aggregated responses were recorded:
c 62% had no means of measuring or estimating levels of CO2 in the
fermentation area (ie neither by personal judgment nor technical monitoring
apparatus).
c All respondents reported that people other than staff were permitted to enter
the fermentation area; 27% reported that anyone was able to walk into the
fermentation area at any time; 51% reported that the area was locked, but
multiple keys were available.
c 71% had no confined space procedures (see also qualitative results below on
response to finding an unconscious person).
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Question 16 in the survey asked ‘‘Have you heard of the ‘safety hierarchy’, or
‘hierarchy of controls’?’’ Responses are detailed in Table 3. A total of 71% had either
not heard of these terms, or had heard of them, but did not employ this methodology
for dealing with hazards in their brewery.
Table 3: Hierarchy of Controls Awareness
Results from the older and larger breweries were also tabulated to establish whether
differences existed between the newer, smaller breweries and the more established
breweries. Of the 45 breweries surveyed, 24 had been operating for more than six
years and/or employed more than 10 staff. These older and/or larger breweries revealed
some slight differences but these were not significant given the relatively small overall
sample size. An interesting exception to this was that only half as many respondents
in the older and/or larger breweries were aware that asphyxiation was a significant
hazard compared to the total sample. A comparison between the older/larger
breweries and the total sample is set out in table 4.
Table 4: Comparison of older/larger breweries (only) with total sample
Qualitative results
While 76% of respondents chose ‘‘absolutely necessary’’ as their opinion regarding the
importance of an ‘‘increased awareness of safety in industry generally’’ (20% chose
‘‘reasonably important’’, 4% chose ‘‘not important’’), many qualitative responses were
received which did not indicate a commitment of support for safety at
management/owner or supervisory level. These were characterised by comments on
‘‘common sense’’, ‘‘individual responsibility’’, and ‘‘bureaucracy and paperwork’’ —
spread across both the newer, smaller breweries, and the older, larger breweries. These
are quoted in Table 5.
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Table 5: Selected qualitative responses
Respondents were asked what action they would take on finding some unconscious on
their brewery floor. Their comments are categorised in Table 6.
Table 6: Confined space procedures
Data analysis and induction
The contradiction between an overwhelming 96% of respondents answering that
safety is either ‘‘absolutely necessary’’ (76%) or ‘‘reasonably important’’ (20%), and
the many negative qualitative comments about safety generally, is worthy of further
analysis. The qualitative responses quoted in Table 5 indicate a strong preference for
‘‘common sense’’ and ‘‘individual responsibility’’ as a means of achieving safety in a
brewery, and an aversion to ‘‘paperwork’’ and ‘‘bureaucracy’’. No survey questions
asked anything to directly prompt any such responses: all the quotations in Table 5
were offered as spontaneous, supplementary comments, or as an answer to question
18: ‘‘Is there anything you’d like to add regarding safety in breweries’’?
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At least 78% of respondents understood that elevated levels of CO2 could cause
asphyxiation, but all allowed access (mostly without any form of CO2 monitoring
installed) to the fermentation area by outside parties. Further, 67% responded that
supervisors and managers were ‘‘mostly responsible for safety’’ at their brewery
(question 15), but usually appeared to regard individuals to be responsible for their
own safety — see Table 5 for recurring qualitative responses. It is difficult to see how
‘‘common sense’’ or ‘‘individual responsibility’’ could protect visitors or staff from
possible asphyxiation in the fermentation area when 69% of breweries reported having
no CO2 monitoring, and CO2 is impossible to see or smell (15). For the participants in
this study, these obvious contradictions indicate that persons conducting a business
unit (PCBU) in brewing have a disconnection between their knowledge and their
safety actions. Their comments on ‘‘paperwork’’ and ‘‘bureaucracy’’ indicated a strong
aversion to any rule- or regulation-based mitigation of fermentation area hazards.
Respondents inexplicably felt that individuals should be responsible for their own
safety, even when those individuals were unaware of an undetected gas that could
result in their asphyxiation.
It is clear that while brewery PCBUs may acknowledge asphyxiation from CO2 as a
potentially catastrophic occurrence, very few have any meaningful procedures to
ameliorate this hazard. This research project set out (inter alia) to determine whether
the relatively rare but potentially catastrophic occurrence of elevated CO2 levels was
regarded as a ‘‘significant’’ hazard, and should therefore be subject to assiduous
mitigation in breweries. The contradictions noted above indicate that a multiple-
fatality asphyxiation is a real possibility, in the absence of such mitigation.
In addition, 71% of respondents reported having no confined space procedures, should
a person collapse from oxygen depletion. [Note — confined space procedures are
designed to exclude people from a work area with a potentially hazardous atmosphere,
or rescue someone who has been overcome in such a situation. The authors’ previous
paper recommended that all fermentation areas should be declared ‘‘confined spaces’’
due to the potential hazard of elevated CO2 levels (11)]. Of the 32 quotes concerning
what the respondent would do if they saw someone unconscious on their brewery floor
(Table 6), only 2 could be regarded as professional and potentially effective responses.
These 2 responses were submitted from breweries with more than five staff – perhaps
indicating a slightly greater knowledge about confined spaces procedures by some
larger breweries than the overall sample. Of the others, 27 indicated that the
respondent would move to aid the unconscious person immediately — whereas it has
been reported that more than a third of confined space fatalities are suffered by people
who were attempting to rescue another person, and many of these were workers with
supervisory responsibilities (16). Furthermore, 14 respondents answered that they
would call ‘‘000’’ (emergency services), whereas the confined spaces literature
indicates that, unless emergency services with specialised equipment and personnel
are available almost immediately, any reliance on external professional help is unlikely
to prevent a fatality (17,18). Therefore, without any suitable monitoring and
associated mitigation of elevated levels of CO2 in a brew room, a sufficiently elevated
level of CO2 is likely to result in a fatality; and without appropriate confined space
rescue procedures, multiple fatalities are possible.
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Further contradictions for safety intervention appeared from analysis of the data
regarding methods used to deal with hazards. Burns, manual handling, and slips,
trips, and falls were reported as the ‘‘most significant’’ hazards, but PPE was reported
as the most common means of mitigation identified. It is difficult to understand how
PPE can be used as protection against manual handling injury, and slips, trips, and
falls, or even for burns (except perhaps for gloves and visors). Regarding the CO2
hazard, and in relation to 78% of respondents acknowledging the possibility of
asphyxiation from elevated levels of CO2, only a supplied-air respiratoror a self-
contained breathing apparatus with a full face-piece can protect from asphyxiation due
to oxygen depletion or the bohr effect [the bohr effect explains that haemoglobin’s
oxygen binding affinity is inversely related to acidity and the concentration of carbon
dioxide; thereby causing death through physiological depletion of oxygen as a result
of elevated carbon dioxide levels (19)]. In response to the question ‘‘If you saw
someone unconscious on your brewery floor, what would you do?’’ one of the larger
breweries responded, ‘‘. . . we have gas masks available’’; clearly an ineffective
intervention against elevated levels of CO2, and/or the depletion of oxygen (except for
a supplied-air respirator or a self-contained breathing apparatus with a full face-piece
— virtually unknown in the industry).
Ventilation of the brew room also presented some contradictions. Several respondents
reported having ‘‘whirligigs’’ in the roof as a means of extraction of CO2 (‘‘whirligigs’’
are extractor fans, sometimes powered, sometimes wind-activated, generally intended
to allow rising heat and fumes to exit through the roof). Since CO2 is heavier than air,
higher than normal levels of CO2 will flow into lower areas of the work area (20). The
use of ‘‘whirligigs’’ is therefore a dubious mitigation. Further, many breweries
reported being well-ventilated with open doors and windows. Again, without
definitive CO2 monitoring in most brew rooms, any passive ventilation constitutes a
very inexact means of dissipation at best (21). How can dependence on an optional
opening of doors and windows to introduce more oxygen or dissipate (usually
unmeasured and undetectable) CO2 possibly constitute a credible defence against
asphyxiation?
The survey set out to understand how the brewing industry identified and mitigated
significant hazards: in particular, that of potential asphyxiation from elevated levels of
CO2. The results revealed a remarkable divergence between the industry’s awareness of
hazards and their proposed mitigation methodology. While the quantitative results of
the survey are of interest, a key finding of this paper must be to comment on this
divergence and the safety implications for the industry concerned, and for small to
medium sized businesses generally.
The survey analysis therefore prompted three questions worthy of further discussion
for brewers, and other PCBUs in small to medium businesses.
1. What is a ‘‘significant hazard’’?
2. How do persons conducting a business unit mitigate identified hazards?
3. Why do PCBUs think safety is important, but not their concern?
These questions are examined in s 4.
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Discussion
What is a ``significant'' hazard?
The concept of ‘‘most significant hazard’’ is central to the findings of this paper. It
would not be unreasonable to deduce that the respondents interpreted ‘‘most
significant hazard’’ as ‘‘most frequent’’, or ‘‘most likely’’ hazard. The ubiquitous risk
matrix model (see Figure 3) compares hazard likelihood against hazard consequence.
While no definitive data are available to substantiate the frequency of hazards in the
brew rooms surveyed, the experience and responses of the survey participants could
perhaps be taken as indicative of relative frequency and therefore likelihood. There is
little doubt that burns, manual handling injuries, and slips, trips, and falls, are more
likely to occur frequently in a brew room than asphyxiation, but asphyxiation is surely
a more consequential event. While burns, manual handling, and slips, trips, and falls
may sometimes result in life-changing injuries or fatalities, the frequency of resulting
injuries is likely to be made up of relatively minor injuries. Asphyxiation, on the
other hand, is highly likely to result in at least one fatality (15,21).
Figure 3. The risk matrix.
This raises questions of how hazards should be identified for amelioration. By
‘‘significance’’, do we mean frequency/likelihood, or do we mean consequence?
Although, many organisations use the likelihood/consequence matrix to assess and
treat hazards, does it inform us in any meaningful way? McDonald (1996) argues
strongly that consequence is more important. He classified occupational injury or
disease as represented in Table 7. Recent publications from Safe Work Australia have
supported McDonald’s work (8, 22).
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Table 7: McDonald's (1996) injury consequence classifications
The injured person's life is . . . The injury should be described as . . .
Permanently altered Class I
Temporarily altered Class II
Inconvenienced Class III
McDonald’s (1996) analysis of Australian occupational injuries and diseases in
1992–93, classified according to his three class definitions showed that while Class I
constituted only 13% of the injuries and diseases, it constituted 82% of the cost.
Class II accounted for 87% by frequency, and only 18% of the cost. [Class III
occupational injuries (inconvenience only) were presumably frequent, but cost
virtually nothing and were therefore ignored.] Therefore, while the incidence of Class
II (and Class III) injuries are clearly more frequent, the consequence of Class I in terms
of cost are overwhelmingly more ‘‘significant’’. Further, the analysis calculated
monetary cost, but not ethical cost; surely, any Class I injury has a higher ethical cost
(irrecoverable, permanent disability or fatality) to any community than a Class II
(temporary, recoverable incapacity). McDonald therefore argued that the grossly
higher costs (monetarily and ethically) of Class I injuries are significantly more
important than the nominal artefact of frequency tabulation. He stated it more
bluntly: ‘‘Unless these Class I occurrences are directly confronted, safety is fiddling’’
(p 5).
How then, may this Class I distinction be represented, communicated, and
considered? There have been calls for more diverse and sophisticated models of WHS
safety (23, 24). Safe Work Australia point out that ‘‘. . . the need to direct attention to
the prevention of Class I injury/illness (fatal and permanently disabling) is particularly
critical. Alternative methods of risk rating to guide officers’ due diligence are
required’’ (8, p 29). One such model may be represented by a polar area graph —
originally developed for a parallel dilemma in the dissemination of critical decision-
making data. Florence Nightingale, basing her diagrammatic description of Crimean
War mortality on her colleague William Farr’s medically-informed statistical
expertise, added a radial dimension to a segmented pie chart, thereby adding a
‘‘weight’’ of importance to selected frequency segments. [Nightingale also originated
and utilised many innovative diagrammatic techniques to impart understanding of
complex health issues (Magnello, 2012).] In her words, she highlighted, ‘‘what we fail
to convey to the public through their word-proof ears’’ (25 p 31). At least in part, the
consequence of Nightingale’s work was that the British government and the British
public came to understand that ‘‘the majority of soldiers died not from war wounds
. . . but of fever, cholera, diarrhoea, dysentery, and scurvy’’ (25 p 31).
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Figure 4. Florence Nightingale’s polar area graph.
Downloaded from upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/17/Nightingale-mortality.jpg.
There are strong parallels between Nightingale’s representations of the most
important drivers of British mortality in the Crimean war, and the most important
drivers of Class I injury in the modern workplace. Surely the likelihood of a sprained
ankle should not be given more importance than asphyxiation in a pie chart of
identified potential hazards, simply because it is more likely. It is acknowledged that
the ‘‘consequence’’ axis on the risk matrix (Figure 3) provides an indication of this
‘‘weight’’ — but this paper contests that the relevant importance of the risk
estimation is often subsumed by the overwhelming frequency measurement. This may
be explained by the continuing reliance on Heinrich’s triangle in many workplaces as
a preventive strategy for occupational injuries (26,27). The dictum of Heinrich’s
triangle suggests that more serious and less likely occupational injuries or fatalities
can be prevented by significant reduction of frequent minor injuries; but this
‘‘accepted wisdom’’ has been found to be unsubstantiated and contrary to peer-
reviewed evidence (1,28,29). Stated simply, prevention of 50 minor injuries in a year
is unlikely to prevent a potential Class I life-changing (or life-ending) injury.
The findings of the current study showed that 78% of respondents acknowledged that
elevated concentrations of CO2 in their brewery could asphyxiate people, but 69% had
no means of measuring CO2 levels, and 76% relied on natural permanent ventilation
to protect themselves and visitors from this hazard. It appears that a full
understanding of serious consequence is simply not acknowledged or communicated.
This paper therefore recommends a polar area graph be employed when explaining the
potential for Class I injury and illness in risk assessment. While burns, manual
handling etc., can be serious and debilitating, the majority are not. For instance, the
American Burn Association notes in relation to 2015 burns in the United States:
‘‘More than 75% of the reported total burn sizes were less than 10% TBSA (total
body surface area) and these cases had a mortality rate of 0.6%’’ (30, p 12).
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Asphyxiation from elevated levels of CO2 on the other hand, is very likely to be fatal.
This can be represented in a conceptual graph as demonstrated in Figure 5. As with
Florence Nightingale’s polar area graph, the radii of the frequency pie chart segments
can be extended to draw attention to the more extreme potential outcomes such as
asphyxiation and explosions. These may be rare, but the catastrophic consequences of
these potential hazards warrants such emphasis. It may be that depending on the
nature of the business, other classifications (such as burns, forklifts, manual handling,
and slips, trips, and falls), could also in some circumstances result in a Class I injury.
Assessment and communication of a potential Class I injury can therefore be at the
discretion of the safety professional, but should never be ignored.
Figure 5. Polar area chart — depiction of Class I & Class II potential hazards.
How do PCBUs mitigate identified hazards?
This survey and subsequent analysis set out to discover which hazards brewers identify
in their workplaces, and how they mitigate them. While only 27% of respondents
reported that they used the hierarchy of controls to deal with hazards in the brewery,
it is not reasonable to assume that the other 73% should be aware of this preferential
method for hazard amelioration (as say, may be expected of a safety professional).
Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the above discussion on ‘‘significance’’, some
observations can be made on how the brewers approach the hazards that they do
identify. Analysis of the methods the brewers reported using showed that 66%
employed controls regarded as ‘‘lower order’’, ie training, signs/rules, PPE, and
management/supervision — commonly classified as ‘‘administrative’’. Since these are
the least effective controls of the safety hierarchy, this is perhaps disappointing,
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although it is noteworthy that other more mature industries are no more likely to
employ higher order controls (5). Many respondents (60%) reported using
‘‘elimination’’ (the highest order in the hierarchy of control) as a means of hazard
mitigation, but without any evidence of actual elimination of hazards, it is difficult to
substantiate this. With respect to the hazard of elevated levels of CO2, no intervention
can prevent the production of CO2 in a brewing workplace, so it can be concluded that
‘‘elimination’’ cannot apply to potential asphyxiation.
The use of lower end controls as perceived interventions may be a manifestation of the
work-as-imagined versus work-as-done principle (31,32). Brewery owners or
managers may create rules or assumed behavior norms that, whether or not they are
communicated to other staff, may be arbitrary and ineffective. For instance, one
respondent made a comment about staff: ‘‘. . . many seem happy to work unsafely
believing nothing bad will ever happen to them’’ and ‘‘. . . every employee is
responsible for their own safety and the safety of others’’. Despite 67% reporting that
supervisors and managers were mostly responsible for safety (in their breweries), it
seems that many of the respondents assume a level of knowledge and behaviour in
their staff or visitors that is simply not there. There appears to be no formal
identification and communication of serious hazards; instead, a general familiarity
with injuries that have happened in the past seems to suffice as hazard identification,
and a reliance on ‘‘common sense’’ seems to serve as the key means of hazard
mitigation.
Why do PCBUs think safety is important, but not their concern?
The mixed method approach to this survey ie recording both qualitative and
quantitative data, produced some interesting contradictions. In comparing the
qualitative responses (ie ‘‘common sense’’, ‘‘individual responsibility’’ and the stated
aversion to ‘‘bureaucracy’’ and ‘‘paperwork’’) with the quantitative results of the
survey, it appears in general, that many PCBUs assume that the safety function can be
devolved to individuals. This is despite 67% stating safety was mostly the
responsibility of supervisors and managers. There seems to be considerable animosity
about the safety function generally. For instance, the following quotes appear to
openly question the very need for any formal safety considerations:
‘‘Often ‘one size fits all’ approach to brewery safety procedures don’t work and create
a reliance on a procedure rather than the human perception of the possible
hazard.’’
‘‘Bureaucracy (is) probably more dangerous than any physical danger you can face in
your brewery’’
‘‘. . . must be mindful rather than rely on procedure’’
‘‘One size doesn’t fit all; common sense is necessary’’
‘‘. . . don’t put yourself in a predicament.’’
There is very little in the safety literature to inform us why this uncertainty or
antagonism exists. Further research is needed to answer this question.
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Conclusion
This survey and subsequent analysis set out to ascertain the hazards brewers identify
in their workplaces, and how they set about mitigating them. In particular, the
researchers found that brewers’ focus was more on mitigating relatively minor and
common day-to-day hazards than being concerned about the relatively rare, but
potentially catastrophic hazard of asphyxiation. More general observations were
derived from the contradictions between the formal answers to the survey questions
and the ad hoc comments made by respondents. These contradictions told a story of
confusion and uncertainty when trying to answer the following questions:
1. What is a ‘‘significant hazard’’?
2. How do persons conducting a business unit mitigate identified hazards?
3. Why do PCBUs think safety is important, but not their concern?
The answers to these questions cannot be determined by one survey of one small, but
rapidly growing industry, although some framing of the questions and possible
answers have been attempted by comparing the survey findings and contradictions to
relevant literature. It is clear that more research must be undertaken to provide
greater insight into these questions and their answers. It is also evident that, without
effective intervention, one or more fatalities from asphyxiation in the brewing
industry are inevitable.
The metaphorical light at the end of the tunnel could be a progression toward a
perceived safety goal, or it could be an oncoming train — a fatal incident that was
unforeseen, unexpected, and catastrophic.
Research declaration, limitations and opportunities
No financial support from any corporation, organisation, or any other body was
sought or received for this research.
The sample size of the survey was large enough to be representative of the brewing
industry in two Australian states, but not to draw specific conclusions that may
necessarily apply to other industries. Nonetheless, the results of this paper raise
questions that prompt research topics for the future, leading to a better understanding
of safety in small to medium businesses.
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Appendix 1 Ð survey questions
1. How many years has your brewery been operating?
2. How many people work at your brewery (include part-time, casuals)?
3. What do you think is the most significant hazard in the brew room?
4. What methods do you use to deal with the hazards you believe are important?
5. Aside from the normal levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere you
and your staff breathe, do you use or produce additional carbon dioxide in your
brewery?
6. While Carbon Dioxide is harmless to people as a normal part of the atmosphere
we breathe, are you aware that it may be harmful in elevated concentrations?
7. How do you ventilate the fermentation area?
8. How do you measure/estimate atmospheric CO2 levels in the fermentation
area?
9. Do you have any atmospheric CO2 monitoring apparatus in your fermentation
areas?
10. Is your fermentation area secured/locked?
11. Aside from your staff, do you permit anyone else to enter your fermentation
area?
12. How do you ensure the safety of visitors/tradespeople etc?
13. Do you have any confined space procedures in your fermentation area?
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14. If you saw someone unconscious on your brewery room floor, what would you
do?
15. Who is mostly responsible for safety at your brewery?
16. Have you heard of the ‘‘safety hierarchy’’ or ‘‘hierarchy of controls’’?
17. There appears to be an increased focus on safety generally. What is your
opinion of this increased awareness?
18. Is there anything else you’d like to add regarding safety in breweries?
Note. Questions 1–17 offered between 3 and 8 choices as answers, with room for an
alternative answer or additional comments. Question 18 had room for the respondent
to add any further comments they wished.
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Appendix H: Brewery safety survey 
1. How many years has your brewery been operating?
Please tick one 
 Less than 3 years 
 3 – 6 years 
 More than 6 years 
2. How many people work at your brewery (include part-time, casuals)?
Please tick one 
 1 
 2 – 5 
 6 – 10 
 11 – 20 
 More than 20        [Approximate number__________________] 
3. What do you think is the most significant hazard in a brew room?
Please rate these 1 – 8, with 1 being the most important, 8 being the least 
important. 
Explosions / Implosions 
Burns (thermal or chemical) 
Poisoning 
Asphyxiation 
Slips, trips & falls 
Manual handling 
Stress 
Forklifts 
Other: _________________________________________ 
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4. What methods do you use to deal with hazards you believe are
important?
Please tick all that apply 
 Eliminating the hazards 
 Staff training and standard operating procedures 
 Engineering guards and general isolation 
 Warning signs and rules of behaviour 
 Automation (i.e. technical means – not requiring staff judgement or 
intervention) 
 Personal protective equipment (e.g. masks, safety glasses, boots, 
protective clothing, hearing protection, etc.) 
 Manager or supervisors guidance 
5. Aside from the normal levels of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) in the
atmosphere you and your staff breathe, do you use or produce
additional carbon dioxide in your brewery?
Please tick all that you are aware of: 
 Produced as a naturally occurring by-product of fermentation 
 Imported in cylinders and introduced to the fermentation process ( eg. for ‘carbonating’) 
 Any other uses of Carbon Dioxide?  Please explain: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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6. While Carbon Dioxide is harmless to people as a normal part of the
atmosphere we breathe, are you aware that it may be harmful in
elevated concentrations in a brew room?
Please tick all that you are aware of: 
 Yes, Carbon Dioxide may be poisonous to people if the dose is high enough 
 Yes, if the concentration of Carbon Dioxide in the atmosphere is high enough, people may be asphyxiated  
 No, elevated concentrations of Carbon Dioxide are not a problem in our 
brew room 
 No, CO2 is harmless to people in any concentration 
7. How do you ventilate the fermentation area?
Please tick all that apply 
 Permanent natural ventilation 
 Manually operated ventilation system (operator must switch on) 
 Automated ventilation system (switches on automatically) 
 Opening doors and windows when necessary 
 Other (please describe briefly) __________________________________ 
 No means of ventilation 
8. How do you measure/estimate atmospheric CO2 levels in the
fermentation area?
Please tick one 
 No measurement/estimation 
 By personal judgement e.g. smell, brewing experience etc. 
 By use of technical monitoring apparatus 
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9. Do you have any atmospheric CO2 monitoring apparatus in your
fermentation areas?
Please tick all those that you have installed or available for use: 
 No monitoring 
 Fixed monitor inside the  fermentation area  showing ambient levels of 
CO2  
 Fixed monitor outside the fermentation area, showing ambient levels of 
CO2 inside the brew room 
 Portable monitor available for use by trained personnel 
 Portable monitor available for use by any staff member(s) 
10. Is your fermentation area secured/locked?
Please tick only one 
 No, anyone can walk in at any time 
 No, but there are signs and established procedures in place to restrict access to authorised people only 
 Yes it is locked and there is only one key 
 Yes it is locked and there are multiple keys issued to authorised personnel only 
 Yes it is locked by a password-protected keypad (password issued to authorised personnel only) 
 Yes, it is locked automatically according to automatic measurements of the internal atmosphere 
11. Aside from your staff, do you permit anyone else to enter your
fermentation area?
Please tick all that apply 
 Friends and interested visitors 
 Customers/clients 
 Formal tours 
 Specialised tradespeople (contractors) 
 Cleaners or other regularly admitted personnel 
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12. How do you ensure the safety of visitors/tradespeople etc.?
Please tick all that apply 
 Formal induction procedures 
 Supervision by authorised personnel 

Other ______________________________________________________ 
 No particular procedure or supervision 
13. Do you have any confined space procedures in your fermentation
area?
Please tick one only 
 Not sure 
 Yes 
 No 
14. If you saw someone unconscious on your brewery floor, what would
you do?
Please tick one only 
 Call emergency services to handle the situation 
 Get the person out of the brew room immediately 
Briefly 
explain why? ______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
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15. Who is mostly responsible for safety at your brewery?
Please tick one only 
 Management / supervisors 
 Individual staff members look after their own safety 
 Worksafe inspectors 
 Other ____________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
16. Have heard of the ‘safety hierarchy’, or ‘hierarchy of controls’?
Please tick one only 
 Yes, we use this to deal with hazards in the brewery 
 Yes, but we don’t use it 
 No. 
17. There appears to be increased focus on ‘safety’ in industry generally.
What is your opinion of this increased awareness?
Please tick one only 
 Absolutely necessary 
 Reasonably important 
 Not very important 
 Unnecessary 
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18. Is there anything you’d like to add regarding safety in breweries?
We’re interested in your ideas!
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix I. Final reports to Human Ethics Research Committee
The following two reports were submitted to the Human Ethics Research Committee of 
Federation University Australia on completion of the respective research projects. 
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1) Project Details:
Project No: GB14-142 
Project Name: Safety in Hard Times 
2) Principal Researcher Details:
Full Name: Stephen Young 
School/Section: Health Sciences and Psychology 
Phone: 53276889 
Fax: 
Email: s.young@federation.edu.au
3) Project Status:
Please indicate the current status of the project: 
 Data collection complete 
Completion date:  30/11/ 2014  
 Abandoned 
Please give reason: 
4) Special Conditions:
If this project was originally approved subject to special conditions, were these met? 
 N/A  Yes  No    * NB: If ‘no’, please provide an explanation: 
5) Changes to project since original approval was granted:
Have amendments been made to the originally approved project? 
 No  Yes     
Was HREC Approval granted for these changes? 
 Yes    No: Please provide details :  
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6) Storage of Data:
Please indicate where the data collected during the course of this project will be stored, then when 
and how it will be destroyed: 
Data is stored on the principal researcher’s password-protected FedUni hard-drive. Data will be 
destroyed 30/11/2019 or on retirement of the principal researcher from FedUni – whichever is the 
sooner. 
7) Research Participants:
Were there any events that had an adverse effect on the research participants OR unforeseen 
events that might affect ethical acceptability of the project? 
 No  Yes    * NB: Please provide details: 
8) Summary of Results:
8.1.  Please provide a short summary of the results of the project (no attachments please): 
Qualitative data was collected as per the research project proposal and HREC application. 
The data was transcribed and coded. The resulting paper ‘Safety in Hard Times’ is currently 
being reviewed by the researcher’s PhD supervisor, Associate Professor Jenny Blitvich. 
8.2. Were the aims of the project (as stated in the application for approval) achieved?   
  Please provide details. 
The research project posed the question: 
‘How do successful heavy industry plants maintain high safety standards in the face of 
impending closure or job redundancies?’ 
As intended, the researcher interviewed staff from Alcoa Rolling Products in Geelong, 
Victoria, and New Zealand Aluminium Smelters Ltd in New Zealand. The resulting coding of 
interview transcriptions provided rich data which, the researcher believes, provide 
insightful answers to the research question. 
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9) Feedback:
The HREC welcomes any feedback on: 
• Difficulties experienced with carrying out the research project;  or
• Appropriate suggestions which might lead to improvements in ethical clearance and
monitoring of research.
10) Signature/s:
Principal 
Researcher: 
……… …………………….. 
Print name:      Stephen Young 
Date: 10-11-2015
Other/Student 
Researchers: 
…………………………….. 
Print name: 
Date: 
……………………………. 
Print name: 
Date: 
Please return to the Ethics Officer, Gippsland or Mt. Helen campus, as soon as possible. 
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Please indicate the type of 
report 
 Annual Report 
 Final Report   
Project No: A16-008 
Project Name: Current practices of mitigation of hazards in 
Australasian breweries.  
Principal Researcher: Associate Professor Jenny Blitvich 
Other Researchers: Mr Stephen Young 
Dr Mani Naiker  
Dr Peter Aldred  
 
Date of Original Approval: 1/3/2016 
School / Section: School of Health Sciences and Psychology 
Phone: 9690 
Email: Jenny Blitvich <j.blitvich@federation.edu.au> 
Please note: For HDR candidates, it is a requirement of candidature to submit 
Candidature reports annually to research.degrees@federation.edu.au in addition to 
Ethics Annual/Final reports. 
1) Please indicate the current status of the project:
1a) Yet to start 
1b) Continuing 
1c) Data collection completed 
1d) Abandoned / Withdrawn: 
1e) If the approval was subject to certain conditions, have these 
conditions been met? (If not, please give details in the comments box 
below )  
  Yes   No 
Comments: 
1f) Data Analysis  Not yet 
commenced 
 Proceeding   Complete   None 
1g) Have ethical problems been encountered in any of the following 
areas: 
Study Design 
Recruitment of Subjects 
Finance 
Facilities, Equipment 
(If yes, please give details in the comments box below) 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  Yes 
  No 
  No 
  No 
  No 
Comments: 
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2a) Have amendments been made to the originally approved project? 
 No  Yes 
2b) If yes, was HREC approval granted for these changes? 
 Yes Provide detail: 
 Yes     Application for Amendment to an Existing Project 
 Yes     Change of Personnel 
 Yes     Extension Request 
 No  If you have made changes, but not had HREC approval, provide detail as to 
why this has not yet occurred: 
2c) Do you need to submit any amendments now? 
 No  Yes     Application for Amendment to an Existing Project 
 Yes     Change of Personnel 
 Yes     Extension Request 
* NB: If ‘Yes’, download & submit the appropriate request to the HREC for
approval:
Please note: Extensions will not be granted retrospectively. Apply well prior
to the project end date, to ensure continuity of HRE approval.
3a) Please indicate where you are storing the data collected during the course of this project: 
On hard drive of Stephen Young’s computer, within the university network. Back-up to 
USB. Both computer and back-up secured within Stephen Young’s office at Mt Helen. 
3b) For Final Reports only: Advise when & how stored data will be destroyed 
As per HREC approval, hard copies of collected data will be shredded, and associated 
computer files will be deleted during December 2021. 
4) Have there been any events that might have had an adverse effect on the research participants
OR unforeseen events that might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project?
 No  Yes   * NB: If ‘yes’, please provide details in the comments box below: 
Comments: 
5a) Please provide a short summary of results of the project so far (no attachments please): 
All data collection and analysis completed. Final paper written and accepted for publication 
in Journal of Health Safety & Environment. 
5b) Final Projects only: Were the aims of the project (as stated in the application for Approval) 
achieved? 
Yes – the key question (and associated sub-questions were answered as a result of the collection and 
analysis of data from the project survey. The results were published as follows: 
Young, S.A., Blitvich, J., Naiker, M., & Aldred, P. (2017) Is that the light at the end of the tunnel, or is it an 
oncoming train? An obsession with obvious workplace hazards may blind us to approaching catastrophe. 
Journal of Health, Safety & Environment, Volume 33(1) pp.53-71. 
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6) The HREC welcomes any feedback on:
• Difficulties experienced with carrying out the research project;  or
• Appropriate suggestions which might lead to improvements in ethical clearance and monitoring
of research.
7) Signatures
Principal 
Researcher: 
………
………………………………. 
Print name:  Assoc. Prof. Jenny 
Blitvich 
Date: 10/11/2017 
Other/Student 
Researchers: 
………….…
…………………………. 
Print name: Stephen Young 
Date: 9/11/17 
……………………. 
Print name: Dr Mani Naiker 
Date: 
13/11/17 
…………………………….. 
Print name: Assoc Prof. Peter Aldred.. 
Date: 13/11/17 
Submit to the Ethics Officer, Gippsland or Mt Helen campus, by the due date: 
research.ethics@federation.edu.au 
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